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ABSTRACT
This dissertation describes extensions o f post-structuralism in 
contemporary curriculum discourses. Post-structuralist thought is 
mainly associated with the seminal work of M ichel Foucault, Jacques 
Derrida, G illes Deleuze, Jean-Franfois Lyotard, and Michel Serres.
Post-structural criticism  and analysis challenge prevailing 
structuralist approaches and question the fundamental assumptions 
upon which these approaches rest. A key assumption of structural 
approaches is that all phenomena are constituted by an underlying 
structure. In curriculum, these structural assumptions (often 
scientific) remain unacknowledged and thus are immunized against 
criticism; rather, they are incorporated into the preferred structural 
analyses, interpretations, and organizations promoted by the promise 
of order  and rat ional i ty .  The notion o f "rationality"—scientific in 
essence—has been the dominating force of curricular "planning." The 
problem is not that reason has turned into domination, but that we 
do not fully recognize its domination. Chapter One and Chapter Two 
portray historical formations of post-structuralism in order to 
identify specific threads or themes which lay a basis for 
understanding post-structuralist elem ents o f contemporary 
curriculum theory.
The author investigates the extensions (in Chapters Three and 
Four) o f post-structuralism in contemporary curriculum theorizing. 
Working from concepts of "subject," "history," and "differences" 
identified in major works by Foucault, Derrida, D eleuze, Lyotard, and
Serres, this study identifies those concepts o f these scholars that 
surface in contemporary curriculum discourses.
This study explores the works of eight curriculum theorists 
now drawing on contemporary post-structuralist thought. This focus 
w ill not only give rise to reexamining the questions and problematics 
of curriculum, but w ill also put forward a post-structural framework 
for curriculum inquiry, which might provide a rethinking and 
reexamining o f curriculum discourses.
A final purpose of this study is to link aspects o f Eastern 
Taoism and Zen philosophy with post-structuralist thought which will 
provide curriculum theorists with an intercultural understanding of 
"the play o f unrecuperable differences" and irresolvable paradoxes. 
The notion of Tao and Zen may provide a useful counterweight to 
Western logocentric thought and the metaphysics o f presence. In 
addition, the connection (passage) between Taoist and post- 
structuralist thought may serve to illuminate the questioning post­
structuralism posits. Curriculum as post-structuralist text may 
vitalize the curriculum field itself.
INTRODUCTION
However far man may extend him self with his 
knowledge, however objective he may appear to 
him self—ultimately he reaps nothing but his own 
biography. (Nietzsche, 1984, p. 23)
From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think 
that there is only one practical consequence: we have 
to create ourselves as a work of art. (Foucault, 1977, p.
2 3 7 )
Background
In this passage Foucault expresses what has become one of the 
central issues o f curriculum studies in the 1990s: The problematic o f  
the formation and technology of the self and the problematic of 
theory and practice in curriculum. There have been many emerging 
theoretical approaches and practical implications in curriculum  
reform movements since the launching of Sputnik in 1957 (Jackson, 
1992). Beginning in the 1960s, discontent with dominant positivist 
orientations, critical analyses and theoretical understanding of  
curriculum were introduced to the curriculum studies, including 
work associated with neo-M arxism, critical theory, hermeneutics, 
fem inism , sem iotics, psychoanalysis, phenom enology, 
postmodernism. These diverse traditions have been extensively  
employed in curriculum research (Pinar, 1988b, 1992; Jackson,
19 9 2 ).
Throughout my graduate studies, I have been intrigued by post­
structuralists' thinking and their arguments. When I read post­
structuralists' works, there is a sense that what I read I have thought 
before, albeit not realized or articulated. Post-structuralists raise
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radically different questions (than the ones posed by their 
predecessors, the structuralists and phenom enologists) concerning 
the problematics o f knowledge, language and subjectivity that are 
fundamental to human understanding and existence. The curriculum 
question, and my question as well, is no longer the Kantian question 
of "what can we know?", but rather "how has the path of my 
knowing been determined?" and "how have I been situated to 
experience the real, which is a product of that knowing?" (Foucault,
1970, p. 229) The whole idea of language as a sign system has been
displaced from questioning its intrinsic nature to problematizing its 
exterior field, that space o f distribution within which signs function 
as  signs, as elements deployed and activated through a network of 
relations. This is the result o f relations established among 
institutions, economic and social processes, systems of norms, etc.—in 
short, in "a field of exteriority that is not contained in the object," 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 45), nor can be formalized as grammar, logic or 
speech-act conventions. The dichotomy o f subject and object, 
fundamental to the project o f modernity, entails the search for 
certainty and the effort to use reason to establish absolute and 
universal truth. In this view , the knowing subject is the self-
conscious guarantor of all knowledge. Humankind is the source of all
truth. The post-structuralists' diagnostic problematization of the 
"death o f man" or the "disappearance of subject" is neither abstract 
nor subjectless; rather, it is an exploration of concrete bodies and 
their circumstances in order to open new possibilities. How do 
knowledge discourses create subject and deploy power? "Since man 
was constituted at a time when language was doomed to dispersion,
will he not be dispersed when language regains its unity?" (Foucault, 
1970, p. 386) What is the linkage between the universal "I" and the 
individual "me"? What is the relationship among power, knowledge 
and the self and how does it function? These problematics do not 
replace a discredited episteme. Rather, they create an 
epistemological space through the displacement o f old one; it is for us 
to realize our position vis-a-vis that displacement ceaselessly  
postpones and defers, and thus to make connections with ourselves. 
These displacements or dislocations of problematization open up a 
gap that can be extended close to another "functions of 
singularization"—new variables o f space and time—so as to obtain a 
connection, a relational complexity (Deleuze, 1991, p. 94). The 
connections among post-structuralism, curriculum and m yself seem  
to be enmeshed, and therefore the purpose of this study is to 
untangle post-structuralism and its meanings, curriculum  
im plications, including efforts at self-understanding.
The ideas o f difference, multiplicity, transgression, non- 
hierarchical and non-m onolithic discourses challenge educators 
(curriculum scholars in particular) to re-think their theoretical 
understandings and daily practices. One central tenet o f these post- 
structuralist notions is to argue that any approach which claims to be 
a universal or totalizing realization and transcendental justification is 
doomed to self-exhaustion. Today the objective or aim of developing 
general theories or universal claims is vulnerable to self­
deconstruction, or is regarded simply as "anachronistic" (Burbules 
and Rice, 1991). The merging of contemporary debates has occurred 
to the extent that it is difficult to identify what distinguishes a
"curriculum theory" from social-historical-political-cultural critique 
concerning the discourse o f curriculum in general. These merging 
and diverse themes have been at the core of contemporary 
curriculum discourses.
Many curriculum scholars have claimed that we seem to be on 
the verge of a major "paradigm shift" (Kuhn, 1970; Brown 1988) or
an "epistemological break" (Althusser, 1970); or rather as Jean-
Fran9 ois Lyotard (1984b) has termed it, the "post-modern condition."
As Lyotard says, any theory that looks to a metadiscourse of
emancipation in order to legitimate itself should be described as 
"modern" and therefore as irredeemably inappropriate to 
contemporary conditions (Lyotard, 1984b). It is in a space of 
"heterogeneity" (Pefanis, 1991) or a state of "heteroglossia" (Bakhtin, 
1981; Whitson, 1988) that we find ourselves in the midst of a site 
among diverging discourses. W hile in the celebration of "difference," 
we are urged to make connections, not to adopt a merely pluralistic 
approach, but to unravel the nexus of power, knowledge and self 
among difference, to "translate" one from another (Serres, 1983). 
Deleuze (1991) also notes:
[Cjoncept does not die simply when one wants it to, 
but only when new functions in new fields discharge 
it. This is also why it is never very interesting to 
criticize a concept: It is better to build the new 
functions and discover the new fields that makes it 
useless or inadequate, (p. 94)
This study is also an attempt to suggest connections between 
post-structuralism and curriculum. It w ill also suggest that the 
Eastern Taoist thought and Zen philosophy may shed light on
understanding these connections. The implications of these 
connections for an emerging curriculum theory represent one focal 
point o f this study.
Journey
Since I was in the elementary school, I have been fascinated 
with the teaching profession. It is, in part, due to the Confucian 
tradition that teaching is a divine profession—to be a teacher, is to 
live meaningfully, to study, to be a literatus (wen). "Wen," my first 
name (middle name in Chinese), can also be translated as literature, 
writing or to write; somehow I always feel connected to that idea.
The Confucian idea of being a teacher is to decipher the "Tao," to pass 
on knowledge, and to enlighten pupils. After I entered the Normal 
University to study to be a teacher, I began to study Taoism and Zen 
philosophy which pushed me further toward understanding my own 
situatedness in the world. Zen stories are always refreshing to 
remember. One story points to my current thought:
One day when Ma-tsu was walking with Po-Chang, a 
flock of wild geese flew  overhead. Ma-tsu asked Po- 
chang, “What is there?” “Wild geese, master.” “Where 
are they now?” “They have flown away.” Ma-tsu 
seized Po-chang's nose and gave it a violent twist, so 
that Po-chang cried out in pain. The master said, “How 
could you say that the wild geese have flown away?
They have been here from the very beginning.” Po- 
chang was immediately awakened. (Cheng, 1991, p.
6 5 )
W hile I was teaching, there were certain dilemmas I faced 
everyday. I tried to resolve them, but to no avail. Questions 
surrounded me constantly. Is there another alternative to the
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approach I am employing? The answer is "yes," but what difference 
does it make? Is this the best I can do? Definitely "not." What do 
we mean by the "best" anyway? I was also troubled by the idea that 
doing what you do best is to do what you can do. Doing what I 
cannot do may be the best to do.
In 1985, I came to the United States to pursue these questions.
It was at the University o f W isconsin-Stout where I first encountered 
hermeneutics and critical theory; I was immersed in understanding 
the relation between the individual and the world. Through 
Gadamer and the Frankfurt school I realized that notions of meaning, 
interpretation and understanding are central to curriculum studies. I 
had been studying the work o f curricular scholars such as Michael 
Apple, Eliot Eisner, Paulo Freire, Maxine Greene, Henry Giroux,
M adeleine Grumet, Dwayne Huebner, Herbert Kliebard, James 
MacDonald, W illiam Pinar, and Philip W exler since W illiam Reynolds 
introduced me to the curriculum field. In studying curriculum and 
pedagogy, I found those dilemmas I had previously encountered 
reemerging into my thought. Then I decided to work with William  
Pinar whom I thought would be helpful to my study.
At LSU I studied postmodernism with W illiam Doll, semiotics 
with Tony W hitson, curriculum theory with W illiam Pinar, and 
phenomenology with Ted Aoki. Most importantly I was reawakened 
by French post-structuralism through studying with Jacques 
Daignault. Each of these teachers and traditions opened up new 
possibilities for me to deal with curriculum theory and self- 
understanding. These individuals allowed me to trace my personal 
journey from the East to the West, then back to the East. My Eastern
heritage has enabled me to recognize the constitution and 
significance of Western arguments and their Eurocentric 
assumptions. Through study o f post-structuralism, I have attempted 
to discover a space in order to think "difference" and to transgress 
"the order of things" (Foucault, 1970).
P er so n a l E x p er ie n c e
As a Chinese student, mainly influenced by Confucius, I have 
come to understand that each tradition in philosophy has its origin in 
the unity of human experience and in human reason or thinking. In 
the sense, life refers to an attitude, a way of being in the world. The 
idea that anyone can be whatever one wants to be as long as one 
keeps working hard is engrained in many students' minds; 
everything is possible if  only one works hard enough. I am no 
excep tion .
The problematic o f language is the cornerstone o f understanding 
human existence. Language is not only a mimetic conception of 
reality, but also a deictic one. Its purpose is to "point" to reality, not 
merely to "represent" or "mirror." Post-structural thinking is to show  
an attitude, an ethics that traverses the "in-between" among 
discourses. It is an attitude of "detachment," of conceptual 
configuration which determines whether an action—its probable or 
actual consequence—is good or evil. It is the effect produced through 
discursive practices which conditions the possibilities o f discursive 
formation. Another Zen story illustrates this point:
Liang-chieh who forded a river with Master Mi.
Liang-chieh was said to have asked Mi: “What kind of
action is it to ford a river?” “One that does not wet the 
feet,” replied Mi. “Most reverend sir, you have 
declared it,” exclaimed Liang-chieh. Then Mi asked in 
turn: “And how would you describe it?” “The feet are 
not made wet,” answered Liang-chieh. (Cheng, 1991, p.
200 )
Post-structuralism is like the art o f fording a river without 
wetting the feet. It teaches one to be moral without being bound to 
or having to hold onto a set of rules and thus to sever that 
attachment. Post-structuralism is not opposed to morality, yet it is 
an ethics without morals. In this regard, teaching is like an art; it is 
an "artless art," and perhaps unteachable. It is achieved by each 
individual deploying a network o f historical power/knowledge 
relationships. Teaching is not what one does; it happens. This study 
attempts to make these and other connections between post­
structuralism and curriculum, and in elaborating them, suggests a 
new stage of curriculum theory forthcoming. To elucidate in detail 
the elements of this new theory is outside the scope of this study, 
which is transitional in character. In the last chapter, however, I will 
draw a path from the East (Taoism and Zen philosophy) to the West 
(post-structuralism) back to the East (a Taoist post-structuralism), 
which represents not just one path of one person, but perhaps a 
possibility for a new intercultural field o f curriculum theory.
CHAPTER ONE 
HISTORICAL FORM ATION OF POST-STRUCTURALIST
THOUGHT
Life reiterating itself in order to recover its hold on 
itself during its fall—as if  holding its breath in an 
instantaneous apprehension o f its origin; but the 
reiteration o f life by itself would be hopeless without 
the simulacrum o f the artist who, by reproducing its 
spectacle, succeeds in delivering him self from 
reiteration. (K lossowski, 1970, p. 15)
S c e n a r io
In the beginning, I would like to clarify the term "post-" which 
was, and has been, a trendy one used by many scholars in various 
disciplines (post-Kantian, post-M arxism, post-industrial, post-liberal, 
post-modern, etc.). For some, post- means something that is "after," 
"beyond," "above" or "transcending"; for others, it means virtually 
"anti-" or "neo-"; for still others, it means simply to "stop" (an 
anagram for "post"), or rather to step b e h in d  or b e n e a th ,  to subvert, 
to deconstruct. In this last sense post-structuralism is a way to the 
opening o f ambivalence between "oppositions" proposed by 
structuralists through the "play o f differences"  or "double science," 
those oppositions which essentially constitute binary logics in 
metaphysical thinking, such as subject/object, presence/absence, 
speech/writing, signified/signifier, truth/error, and the like. In 
these oppositions, a hierarchy is established by privileging one side 
of each binary opposition (for example, presence has come to be 
valued over absence). Post-structuralism attempts to overturn and 
dismantle this hierarchical formation. This interpretation of post will
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be the one employed in this study. As Michel Serres suggests, we 
need to consider beings rather than names, relations rather than 
beings, and movements rather than slogans, paths rather than 
movements (Serres, 1989b). Serres (1989b) notes: "The slave and
the master are kneeling together; they both venerate the relation 
which binds them. . . . Their place changes, the spot o f relation 
remains" (p. 92). Gilles Deleuze also argues that even if  there are 
only two terms, there is an "AND" between the two, which is neither 
the one nor the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but 
which constitutes the "multiplicity" from within. Deleuze (1987b) 
rem arks:
It is always possible to undo dualism from the inside, 
by tracing the line of flight which passes between the 
two terms or the two sets, the narrow stream which 
belongs neither to the one nor the other, but draws 
both into a non-parallel evolution, into a 
heterochronous becoming, (p. 35)
Structuralism in France has two different traditions. The one I 
w ill study is derived from the social sciences, and was mainly 
developed by Ferdinand de Saussure (linguistics, sem iology—the 
theory of the sign), Claude L6vi-Strauss (anthropology), early Roland 
Barthes (literary criticism), and Jacques Lacan (psychoanalysis). The 
other is derived from a tradition in the natural sciences— 
mathematics, the leading exponents of which are the Nicolas 
Bourbaki group (mathematics) and Jean Piaget (biology, mathematics 
and psychology). While remaining committed to its major tenets, 
both groups provide their own alternatives to those problems 
embedded in humanism's fundamental assumptions. The main
11
problem with humanism is the prioritization of the subject in a 
mythologized fashion; the belief that "man" has a special kind of 
being; that "he" and his thought have a privileged status in the world; 
that the subject is at the center o f the signification it generates.
Structuralism seem s convinced that there is an elementary and 
underlying "structure" or "system" which can be systematized and 
used as a method of scientific knowledge. Structural analysis is to 
reveal the underlying fundamental structure which is common to all 
human activities, and to make it intelligible. Such a fundamental 
structure becomes an essence without which no one could be a one. 
According to Josue Harari, in Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post- 
structuralist Criticism  (1979), structuralism or a structuralist 
"tendency of thought" can be summarized as follows:
The rejection of the concept o f the 'full subject' to the 
benefit o f that of structure; (2) the loss of pertinence 
of the traditional “form/content” division insofar as for 
all structuralist theories content derives its reality 
from its structure; and (3) at the methodological level, 
a stress on codification and systematization. (1979, p.
27)
Philip Lewis examined Vincent Descombes' Modern French 
P h ilo sop h y  (1986) and remarked that Descom bes had characterized 
three primary themes of sem iological structuralism: (a) "The
signifier precedes the signified"; (b) "Meaning arises out of non­
meaning"; (c) "The subject submits to the law of the signifier" (1986, 
pp. 95-97). Then he concluded that the structures, in structuralism, 
emerge in large scale social and cultural contexts, "make themselves" 
independently o f subjects. "Myths think them selves through us," 
says Levi-Strauss (Caws, 1988, p. 29).
1 2
These characteristics give rise to the following questions raised 
by post-structuralists: What is the relation between subject and 
structure? How does this relationship become interdependent? Why 
is there a notion of an overall pattern in history? In all these 
questions, the isomorphic idea between propositions and reality, in 
terms of the signifier and the signified, comes under suspicion. Also 
the hierarchical relation is denied; the notion of stability in either 
structural linguistics by Saussure or cultural anthropology by Levi- 
Strauss is brought into question (Derrida, 1976, 1978). In short, 
post-structuralism involves a critique of metaphysics, of reason, of 
the concepts of history, of identity, o f the subject, and of truth.
A b b rev ia ted  H istory  o f  S tru ctu ra lism
It can be said that structuralism was inaugurated in linguistics 
and anthropology, particularly in the works of Ferdinand de Saussure 
and Claude Levi-Strauss. Each tried to explain human reality, one 
through literary and linguistic theory and the other through 
anthropology (Scholes, 1974; Culler, 1975; Clarke, 1981; Rex, 1984; 
Sturrock, 1982, 1986; Caws, 1988). Structuralist theory arrived in 
the United States during the early 1970s, founded, in part, on a 
model of language proposed by Saussure. Language, in Saussure's 
mind, is a system, a whole, a body of rules, independent of any 
speaker, historically given, on which speakers are forced to draw; it 
also is purely "relational." The "sign," Saussure states, is comprised of 
"langue" (language) and "parole" (speech) (Saussure, 1959). He 
asserts that the supremacy of the totality is langue  over p a r o l e ’, in 
other words, langue  is primary, p a r o l e  is secondary. Another key
idea of Saussure’s is the distinction between "signifier" and 
"signified" which may be regarded as the central tenet in the 
structuralist approach. According to Saussure, "signifier" can be said 
to be a sound-image, or its graphic equivalent; on the other hand, 
"signified" is considered as the concept or meaning. The relation 
between signifier and signified is arbitrary—Saussure calls this 
relation "sign" (Saussure, 1959). Signification is the process or 
activity o f relating the signifier to the signified within a system of 
differences between signs; in other words, speech precedes writing. 
As Terry Eagleton (1983) remarks "there is no inherent reason why 
these three marks (c-a-t) should mean 'cat,' other than cultural and 
historical convention" (p. 97). Saussure (1959) states:
Language is a system that has its own arrangement. 
Comparison with chess will bring out the point. In 
chess, what is external can be separated relatively 
easily from what is internal. The fact that the game 
passed from Persia to Europe is external: against that, 
everything having to do with its system and rules is 
internal. If I use ivory chessmen instead of wooden 
ones, the change has no effect on the system; but if  I 
decrease or increase the number of chessmen, this 
change has a profound effect on the 'grammar' of the 
game. One must always distinguish between what is 
internal and what is external. In such instance one 
can determine the nature o f the phenomenon by 
applying this rule: everything that changes the system  
in any way is internal, (p. 22)
Besides linguistic structural analysis, there are anthropological 
approaches, scientific in nature, toward understanding human 
relation and existence. Levi-Strauss is a cultural anthropologist. He 
insists that he fully recognizes the "autonomy" of society. For him, 
the individual can exist only in society, but society has effective
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reality only in the individual psyche. It is no longer possible to see 
reality as something out there, a fixed order of things which language 
merely reflects. On this assumption, there is a natural connection 
between word and thing. In his long study of relations of kinship 
and systems o f myth, he not only attempts to develop an objective 
scientific analysis of meaningful cultural phenomena, but he also 
gives his structural analysis a psychological foundation and insists 
that this foundation is provided by a rational unconscious.
Simon Clarke argues that Levi-Strauss goes on to specify the 
"fundamental structures o f the mind" which underlie "reciprocity"—a 
spontaneous response to the experience of opposition between self 
and other. These structures which, Levi-Strauss (1969) insists are 
"universal," are three:
The exigency of the rule as a rule; (2) The notion of 
reciprocity as the most immediate form of integrating 
the opposition between self and the others; and finally,
(3) The synthetic nature of the gift, i.e., that the agreed 
transfer of a valuable from one individual to another 
makes these individuals into partners, and adds a new 
quality to the valuable transferred, (pp. 75, 84)
It is in this sense that modern French structuralists reasoned 
that if  we know the word is formed by language—in Saussure's view, 
language as a system of signs—then language may be said to 
constitute our knowledge o f the world; in other words, language is 
the only reality since knowledge can be represented or 
communicated only through and in linguistic form. Terry Eagleton 
(1983), commenting on structuralism, says that "reality is not 
reflected by language but p r o d u c e d  by it" (p. 108). It is assumed by 
structuralists that the system of language, its construction, is
explicable without reference to the intentions of the user: the 
structure of mentality is derived from the observable structure of  
language, rather than presumed to be knowable as itself a cause of 
language. Structure can be analyzed as if it existed autonomously 
(M egill, 1985; Descom bes, 1986). Structures define practices that 
themselves change the structures. We can conclude that the 
structural analysis assumes that through language the world can be 
described, actions appropriately identified, events truthfully 
d ep icted .
What is structuralism? The answer to this question may be 
different to different people. Some identify structuralism and 
semiology as the sciences of the sign, as systems of signs (Saussure, 
1959). Others see it as a sort of scientific methodology to various 
inquiries (Sturrock, 1981, 1986). Still others regard structuralism as 
"a movement of mind" (Scholes, 1974, p. 1). These different 
emphases concerning structures are difficult to isolate from one 
another for they are interrelated. As Jonathan Culler (1975) notes: 
"One cannot define structuralism by examining how the word has 
been used; that would lead only to despair" (p. 3). A number of 
participants, including Saussure, Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes (in his 
early works), Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, and 
Jacques Derrida, have devoted much of their efforts to discussion (if 
not definition) of this mode of thought; each has done so in a 
different and ambiguous way based on the author's own 
interpretations and suited to his own purposes.
According to J. G. Merquior (1986), structuralism can be 
summarized as follows: A "style o f thought" in the humanist wing of
knowledge, a result of disappointment with so-called humanism, an 
"anti-humanism" or an "anti-historicism" (pp. 2-3). Structuralism
was born out of a "revulsion against the existentialist cast of mind"
(Merquior, 1986, p. 6). Because existential humanism asserted the 
primacy of consciousness, or of the subject which has been rejected 
by most structuralists, the "death of the subject" and "the assault on 
realism" have been two provocative slogans for many structuralists. 
Eagleton (1983) remarks that the subject, for structuralists, was 
effectively "reduced" to the function of an impersonal structure. In 
his view , the new subject is really  the "system" or structure itself. 
Structuralism is, according to Eagleton (1983), an attempt to apply
linguistic theory to objects and activities other than language itself.
Eve Tavor Bannet, in Structuralism and the Logic of Dissent 
(1989), argues that the label of structuralism is problematical if  it is 
regarded as a description o f method. Conversely, she insists that we 
may begin to think of it ideologically. The ideological implications of 
structuralism in France are made clear, for instance, in Descombes' 
Modern French Philosophy (1986) and Rabinow's French Modern 
(1989). Here the assertion is made that structuralism was looking 
for a base on which to build a rationalist human philosophy, while 
rejecting phenomenology and existentialism . The central ideological 
tenet o f structuralism, remarks Bannet (1989), is "language as a 
system defines society as a system and also the forms of thought," 
that "it brings into accord, because it engenders, mental structure 
and social structures" (p. 3). It can also be said that structuralism 
wants to preserve the principles of the Enlightenment in the face of 
the onslaught of irrationalism. As Clarke (1981) puts it,
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Structuralism therefore sought to integrate the whole 
of human existence in a rational synthesis rooted in 
the individual mind: to restore the unity o f reason and 
emotion, intellect and experience as the basis of 
human existence, (p. 32)
More fundamentally, its central notion is that certain basic 
structures or systems govern and explain any object of study. The 
notion or problematic o f "structure" is the central element in any 
structuralist's or its counterpart's mind; it is not on the basis of 
human existence, but as the basis. For some, the structures of 
structuralism are "generally subsumed under a model, a master 
structure explicated by analysis as the basic 'mechanics of meaning' 
obtaining in any given area of social life" (Merquior, 1986, p. 7). For 
others, a structure should be understood as a set o f "relations" among 
entities that form the elements of a system; "the structure w ill be 
said to be 'concrete' if  the relations are actually embodied in some 
system, 'abstract' if  they are merely specified but not so embodied" 
(Caws, 1988, p. 13). For still others, structural analysis begins with 
the structure—relations that, defined in a purely formal way by 
certain properties, characterize a set of elements, the nature of which 
is not specified. This analysis demonstrates that a certain cultural 
content (kinship system, or myth) is a "model" o f that structure, or a 
"representation" of it (Descombes, 1986, pp. 83-85). Descombes 
(1986) remarks:
Neither more nor less than this content is “isomorphic” 
to a number of other contents. Structure is precisely 
that which holds good in an isomorphism between two 
sets o f contents, (p. 86)
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Other characteristic ideas and practices, important to 
structuralists, are the notions of wholeness, self-regulation, and 
transformation. Rex Gibson (1984) remarks that one of the key 
assumptions structuralists hold is that the whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts. Reality lies not in things but in the relationships 
between and among them. This is often expressed as "decentering 
the subject"; in other words, the human loses his or her place at the 
center of things. Gibson (1984) says "no longer is man  the proper 
study of mankind, but the w h ole  that is mankind itself' (p. 9).
Human beings become the object and subject o f study at the same 
time. The relation between s t ru c tu re  and meaning becom es the 
central focus o f structuralist approaches.
Another key idea of structuralism is transformation. Such an 
idea appears to contrast strangely with the preceding characteristics 
which suggest that structuralism is essentially static in its preference 
for "synchronic" analysis and self-regulation. But this idea does not 
conflict with the notion o f transformation, for the latter draws 
attention to those laws of wholes that themselves constitute the 
origin and direct the flow of change. Such laws are both structured 
and structuring. As Piaget (1970) puts it: "[A] 11 known structures. . . 
are, without exception, systems of transformation" (p. 11). Therefore 
structures are subject to change, but according to the laws o f system.
The notion of transformation, for Levi-Strauss, is that cultural objects 
are never given singly, but always in groups whose members prove 
to be transforms of one another; the object of knowledge in human 
sciences is therefore not the particular case but the group of 
transformations to which it belongs.
For Piaget (1970), structuralism is concerned with structure, and 
a structure is a "system o f transformation" (p. 5). Allan M egill 
(1985) summarizes Piaget's theses on the definitions o f structure 
succinctly. It is worth quoting here:
In the first place, for Piaget a structure is not a mere 
aggregate; it is not an accidental collection of elements 
and their properties. Rather, it is a whole whose 
elements are subordinate to laws, in terms of which 
the structure qua whole or system is defined. In the 
second place, a structure is subject to transformations, 
brought about by the play of its governing laws. And 
finally, a structure is self-regulating—that is, the 
transformational laws of the structure "never yield  
results external to the system nor employ elements 
that are external to it." (p. 212)
In short, as M egill (1985) sees it, a structure necessarily "entails 
self-maintenance and closure." He continues to argue that "it 
operates according to its own inner system of laws, a system of laws 
that never transforms the system into something other than what it 
is" (p. 212). The structure is beyond the reach of each element 
within that structure. One element can not be modified without 
entailing a modification of all the others.
Important Structuralists
Ferdinand de Saussure
Structuralism starts in linguistics, particularly in the work of the 
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. He can be considered as the 
founding father of structuralism. Some aspects of his main ideas 
were mentioned in the preceding discussion. Saussure emphasized
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the distinction between the signifier and the signified. Such a 
distinction is pertinent in structuralist approaches, for example, the 
sound image made by the word "dog" is the signifier, and the c o n c e p t  
of a dog is the signified. The structural relationship between the 
signifier and the signified constitutes a linguistic sign, and language 
is made up of these signs. The linguistic sign is arbitrary; this means 
it stands for something by convention and common usage, not by 
necessity. Saussure also stressed the point that each signifier 
acquired its semantic value only by virtue of its differential position 
within the structure of language. In this conception of the sign there 
is a precarious balance between signifier and signified. There can be 
no signifier without a signified and vice versa. He also argues that 
there is no intrinsic relationship between signifier and signified.
Meaning, for Saussure, derives from the system of langue,  from 
its formal relationships and rules, and not from its relationship to an 
outside, independent world. In other words, meaning arises not from 
objects, but from the relationships of signs. Saussure (1959) insists 
on the arbitrariness of the sign and remarks that "in language there 
are only differences without positive terms" (p. 119). In brief, for 
Saussure (1959), meaning arises out of "oppositions" (p. 119). For 
example, the color of yellow is what is not red or blue, it is defined 
by its relationship within the color system. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that meaning, in Saussure's view, is derived from the 
differences arising from the relational qualities o f language, not in 
the isolated words themselves; there are no positive properties in 
words themselves. This differentiation, in Saussure’s words, is "their
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most precise characteristic that they are what the others are not" 
(Saussure, 1959, p. 59). It gives meaning:
Signs define one another neutrally by means of their 
differences from one another. . . . “The” and “this” are 
meaningful only in so far as they are implicitly distinct 
from “a” and “that.” (Saussure, 1959, p. 59)
W hile he argues that language has no positive characters, what 
Saussure calls its "value," he is saying that it is constituted by 
internal "oppositions," the differences. In short, there can be no 
meaning without difference. Identity is entirely a function of 
differences within a system. As Jonathan Culler puts it, in O n  
D econstruction  (1982), "meaning is the product of a linguistic system, 
the effect of a system of differences" (p. 110). This is the "chain of 
signifiers," which means exactly that a signifier is always dependent 
upon, and thus elucidated by another signifier, since no one has a 
"positive" property (Culler, 1975, p. 11).
The problem of language has been a central focal issue for most 
philosophers since antiquity. Traditionally, language is conceived as 
a mere carrier or medium of information and meaning. For some, 
language is not only the fundamental element of thought, the 
condition of knowledge, rather it co-exists with knowledge. As Lev 
Semenovich Vygotsky contended, in Thought and Language (1962), 
the development of thought is "determined by language, i.e., by the 
linguistic tools of thought and by the sociocultural experiences of the 
child" (p. 51). He also believed that "a word without meaning is an 
empty sound, no longer a part of human speech. Since word meaning 
is both thought and speech, we find in it the unit of verbal thought
we are looking for" (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 5). In short, there are 
intrinsic relations between language and thought.
Saussure (1959) says that "language is necessary for speech to 
be intelligible and to produce all its effects; but speech is necessary 
for language to be established; historically, the fact of speech always 
comes first" (p. 134). At the same time, it is no longer to see reality 
as something "out there," a fixed order of things which language 
merely reflects. On this (false) essentialist assumption, there is a 
natural connection between word and thing; for the structuralists
this connection is arbitrary, historical, social.
Claude Levi-Strauss
Simon Clarke states, in his The Foundations of Structuralism 
(1981), that "for Levi-Strauss knowledge can never be based on 
subjective experience, it must have an objective foundation" (p. 31); 
this foundation is exactly what Levi-Strauss sought to achieve an 
"objective synthesis o f experience and reality" (Clarke, 1981, p. 31). 
The foundation of this objective synthesis is the unconscious. Levi- 
Strauss called the human subject—the center of being—the "spoilt
brat o f philosophy" (Clarke, 1981, p. 12). He stated, like other
structuralists, that the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to 
constitute man but to dissolve him (Levi-Strauss, 1963). For he 
claims that the isolated symbolic orders as a privileged reality of 
which we can have direct knowledge depends on its ability to 
identify the meanings constituted by such orders independently of 
any particular subjective interpretation of these meanings. In other
2 3
words, he seeks to discover the objective residue of meaning that 
remains when rational abstraction has been made from all such 
subjective interpretations. Clarke (1981) lists the main themes of 
Levi-Strauss' structuralism:
The attempt to discover an objective meaning 
immanent in the object defined without reference to 
anything outside the object; the structuralist reduction 
of that meaning to the formal relations between the 
parts of the object and so the reduction of the content 
to form; and the theory of the unconscious, (p. 186)
The supposed opposition between nature  and cul ture  
dominates the thought of Levi-Strauss. For him, we have lost our 
respect for nature, have cut ourselves off from it, and are not 
prepared to live under its rule. He insists that the only solution is a 
reduction of culture to nature. In looking at Levi-Strauss' structural 
analysis o f "myth" one can reach the same conclusion found in 
looking at Chomsky's structural linguistics. In the relation between
language and reality, Levi-Strauss sees that the objective
unconscious meaning o f particular symbolic systems is to give access
to a privileged order of reality.
In Levi-Strauss' The Elementary Structures o f Kinship (1969), 
the discovery of a theory of unconscious provides the foundation for 
a rationalist, human philosophy displacing the concept of 
"reciprocity" from the center of structure. The symbolic is itself 
underlain by the formal structuring capacity of the unconscious, 
supposedly revealed by structural linguistics. This formal 
unconscious is universal and atemporal, prior to subjective 
experience and to the temporal modality of that experience. For
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Levi-Strauss (1966), a proper structural analysis of a myth will 
decompose the story into component parts which will reveal the 
"unconscious infrastructure" that underlies textual surface 
manifestations (p. 40). He is searching for an universal underlying 
system which constitutes segmented parts and their rules of 
combination. Levi-Strauss puts it, there are "those universal laws 
which are the substance of the human unconscious" (Perpich, 1984, 
p. 37).
Jacques Lacan
Lacan's theory, a reformulation of Freud's psychoanalytic theory, 
is partly founded on the discoveries o f structural anthropology (Levi- 
Strauss) and linguistics (Saussure). One of his main arguments is that 
the unconscious, as a hidden structure, resembles language. The 
unconscious is comparable in structure to language. In fact, Lacan 
argues that language is the condition for the unconscious, that it 
creates and gives rise to the unconscious. For Lacan, following Levi- 
Strauss, the individual psyche is created in the process of 
socialization in which the individual is assimilated into symbolic 
orders, while at the same time being individuated within them 
(Lacan, 1977). The subject is created by a language which pre-exists 
the individual. Lacan’s conception of the "subject" is regarded as 
constituted in language which can interpellate the subject and put it 
in its place. The system of language preexists the individual. Thus, 
anything said about the world should be placed in quotations; "the 
subject is spoken rather than speaks" (Lacan, 1977, p. 71). As Clarke
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(1981) remarks: "It is simply a way of living out a particular mode
of integration into the symbolic orders of society" (p. 215). The order 
of language then constitutes both the subject and the knowledge of 
the subject.
The notion of "I" is first articulated in what Lacan calls the 
"mirror stage." The mirror stage, Lacan argues, is a moment of 
alienation, since to know oneself through an external image is to be 
defined through self-alienation (Lacan, 1977). The subject, then, has 
a profoundly ambivalent relationship to that reflection. It loves the 
coherent identity which the mirror provides. However, because the 
image remains external to it, it also hates that image. The subject 
experiences many radical oscillations among contrary emotions 
(Lemaire, 1977; Said, 1985).
Saussure regarded the relationship between signifiers and 
signified as stable and predictable. Lacan insists that we are all 
immersed in everyday language and cannot elude it (Lacan, 1977).
In a Lacanian view of language a signifier always signifies another 
signifier; no word is free from "metaphority" (one signifier in the 
place of another). Since any signifier can receive signification 
retrospectively, after the fact, no signification is ever closed, ever 
satisfied. There is no natural link between signifier and signified. In 
repression, Lacan sees one signifier coming to substitute for another.
The old signifier and what it signifies are "pushed down" to the 
unconscious.
Lacan believes that the discourse within which the subject finds 
its identity is always the discourse of the Other—of a symbolic order 
which transcends the subject and which composes its entire history.
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Lacan, following Freud, stresses that the real can not be apprehended 
or investigated except through the intermediary of the symbolic.
One Lacanian tenet is that subjectivity is completely relational; it 
comes into play only through the principle o f difference, by the 
opposition of the "other" or the "you" to the "I." In other words, 
subjectivity is not an essence but a set of relationships. It can only 
be induced by the activation of a signifying system which exists 
before the individual and which determines his or her cultural 
identity. This approach is quite similar to the development o f the 
Saussurean notion of sign (Ulmer, 1985).
Roland Barthes (earlyl
Barthes started as a structuralist, with his later work moving 
toward post-structuralist approaches (Sturrock, 1986; Harland,
1987). He once defined structuralism as a mode of analysis of 
cultural artifacts which originates in the methods o f contemporary 
linguistics (Barthes, 1977). He has contributed the notion of writing 
and reading, in its playfulness and pleasure, to demystify those 
apparent, natural, familiar and "self-evident" elements of literary 
texts. In doing so, he opens the text to multiple possibilities of 
meaning, not simply residing in and of a literary critic's self- 
consciousness. Barthes focuses on the "self-reflexivity" of text itself 
in order to demonstrate the text's plurality through a 
"decomposition" of the forces —in terms o f "codes" in his famous S /Z  
(1 974 )—within the texts.
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Barthes has proclaimed the death of the author in order to 
question the humanist assumption that subjectivity, the individual 
mind, is the source of meaning and action. He defines structuralism 
as a method of analyzing cultural works, whose aim is not to discover 
the meaning of a work, but to reconstitute the rules governing the 
production of meaning. He further insists on "the freedom of the 
reader"; however, this freedom is not a mere return to individualism, 
nor the free will o f transcendental consciousness, nor the coherent 
subject of a self or an "I." For Barthes, it is a "divided subject, even a 
pluralized subject, that occupies, not a place of enunciation, but 
permutable, multiple, and mobile places" (Kristeva, 1980, p. 111). As 
Barthes (1977) puts it, "the text only exists in the movement of 
discourse. . . the text is experienced only in an activity of production"
(p. 157). In other words, it is a "demystification" of literature.
Limits or Problems of Structuralism
Since structuralism arrived in the United States in the 1970s, 
literary studies have undergone a radical revision, namely the New  
Criticism movement (Berman, 1988). Structuralism challenges the 
role of the literary critic in reading the text. Interpretation of 
literary text is what readers bring to literary works—a whole bank of 
tacit assumptions and anticipations. Language is thus viewed as a 
structure o f phonetic differences, rather than an aggregation of terms 
(words), each corresponding to a component o f objective reality 
(th ings).
Structuralism is based upon the assumption that only on the 
ground of a structure of networks, in relations to one another, do
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elements of a system function or exist meaningfully. Culler (1975) 
points out that "if human actions and productions have a meaning 
there must be an underlying structure or system of traditions and 
conventions which makes this meaning possible" (pp. 21-22).
William Ray, in his Literary Meaning: From Phenomenology to 
D econ stru ction  (1984), makes clear the implicit assumption of the 
structuralists:
Events, phenomena, and objects are culturally 
functional only to the extent that they have meanings, 
and objects that have meaning are by definition social 
phenomena best understood in terms of the shared 
structures through which that meaning constitutes 
itself, (p. 110)
This underlying "shared" structure is, for Saussure, the system of 
sign; for Levi-Strauss, the idea of symbolic order; for Lacan, the 
notion of the unconscious; for Barthes, the multiplicity o f "text"; all of 
which are derived from a kind of anti-existential humanism which 
claims that we can know a world independently o f its symbolic 
representation and that we can know ourselves independently of the 
symbolism that constitutes a particular conception o f ourselves.
This Saussurean based language system implies a kind of 
"idealism," which asserts that language does not create meanings but 
reveals them, in other words, meanings pre-exist their expressions.
This is exactly what Derrida strives to deconstruct; for Derrida, there 
can be no meaning which is not formulated, in brief, we can not 
reach "outside" language (Derrida, 1976).
Through analyzing structuralists' historical and philosophical 
horizons, there are basic assertions in their notions of identity,
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meaning, subjectivity and history—though all interrelated—which 
appear to be somehow problematic. In its confidence and all- 
embracingness, structuralism seems to answer a fundamental human 
need for order and coherence. I will address briefly these issues 
im plicit in structuralist analysis.
The main problems o f structuralism include the concept of 
subject, the notion of identity and meaning, the idea of history and 
the over reliance on reason. The philosophy of the subject is and has 
been the focus of modern philosophers. Structuralism is a 
consequential development of disappointment with that branch of  
humanism which asserts the primacy of the human su bject-  
existential humanism. Structuralists’ claim  the relationship between 
the individual and society, the term "I," is to be understood only in 
terms of the social whole. Therefore, the subject "I" is decentered or 
dispersed. Thus, subjectivity is to be thought of in relation to the 
individual and structures; in terms of the Saussurean model, this is 
the embeddedness o f "the sign in the language" (Saussure, 1959, p.
67). Saussure insists that a word has meaning only in the context o f 
to ta lity —langue  (Saussure, 1959). Therefore, the centered subject— 
which is self-conscious, self-aware, self-determ ining—is displaced by 
a structural system; human beings, for structuralists, are carriers or 
"bearers" o f structures and those structures determine their 
individuality. The eradication of subjectivity is a rebellion of 
subjects against a system that negated them as such. Jurgen 
Habermas, for instance, raises interesting questions about the 
problem of the structuralists' treatment o f subjective intentionality 
(Habermas, 1990). He argues that "subjectivity and intentionality
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are not prior to, but a function of, forms of life and systems of 
language; they do not 'constitute' the world but are themselves 
elements of a linguistically disclosed world" (Habermas, 1990, p. ix).
The concept of subjectivity was first decentered by the
structuralists, mainly Levi-Strauss and Saussure, who reversed the 
traditional perception of subjectivity residing with consciousness or 
inner mental images. The structuralists regarded the subject as the 
function of the whole structure whose relation to each individual is 
where meaning is founded. Continuing this tradition, the post­
structuralists distrust the idea that structure has its center and origin 
beyond each individual's reach. Their concept of relation becomes 
more central and problematic. Furthermore, Foucault argues that the 
question of the status of the subject is dismissed by structuralists.
The dissolution of subject appeals to the question of "origin,"
foundation, and the problem of "representation" which post­
structuralists seek to reexamine. The question of the subject, for 
Foucault, has been intimately linked with the related questions of 
subjection, domination and exclusion (Foucault, 1970, 1972).
The question of identity is interwoven with the notion of 
difference. For structuralists, Saussure in particular, the meaning of 
a word is constituted by its differences or oppositions within a 
language system. Saussure defines language as a system of signs.
What gives a sign its identity? Saussure argues that signs are 
arbitrary and that each sign is defined not by some essential 
property but by the differences which distinguish it from other signs. 
This notion of difference or differentiation implies the "metaphysics 
of presence" or "logocentrism," deconstructed by Derrida, which will
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be discussed later (Derrida, 1976, 1981a). Structuralism maintains, 
on the one hand, that no terms of the system are ever simply and 
completely present, for differences can never be present. And on the 
other hand, it defines identity in terms of common absence rather 
than presence. Identity, the central element of metaphysical 
thinking, is made purely relational. The question of presence and 
absence also gives way to the problematic o f writing and speech that 
Derrida strives to deconstruct. There is also the involvement of the 
hierarchization of identity and difference.
The difference, in terms of structuralist's binary oppositions— 
sign ified /sign ifier, speech/w riting, subject/object, nature/culture, 
presence/absence, intelligib le/sensib le, etc., entails the question of 
"supplement," which undermines Western logocenttic and 
metaphysical thinking. Logocentrism assumes the priority of the 
first term in the bifurcation just given, and regards the second in 
relation to it, as a "complication," a negation, a supplement (Derrida, 
1978). The notion o f supplement, insisted Derrida, is "always 
already" present and, in fact, functions to constitute the privileged 
term; in other words, it implies that there is no origin and nothing 
exists until it is supplemented (Crowley, 1989; Hayles, 1990).
The notion of ’history" is quite different for structuralism and 
post-structuralism; for structuralism, history is to be seen as a series 
of shifting configuratives opaque with the passage of time. The 
notion o f history, in a structuralist sense, is synchronic or ahistorical. 
Structuralism attempts to investigate any structure from a more 
"impersonal" or "scientific" perspective than that of the intending 
subject. Derek Attridge, G eoff Bennington and Robert Young (1987),
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commenting on structuralist notions of history, state that 
"structuralism addressed questions to history even as it tended to 
repress the question of history" (p. 3). Saussure’s synchronic mode 
of analysis seems to ignore the existence of history. It is a concern 
with structures rather than with chronologies. Structuralists' claim, 
according to Norris (1982), that "historical understanding is only 
possible in so far as it adopts a synchronic standpoint, 'classes of 
dates each furnishing an autonomous system of reference'" (p. 78).
The central issue, according to Michel Foucault, is that of the denial of 
the singularity of events, of the discredited, o f the neglected, and of a 
whole range of phenomena (Foucault, 1970, 1972). These
phenomena, known as "naive knowledges," the structuralists located
low down on the hierarchy, beneath their required level of 
scientificity. Through Foucault's geneaological analysis, to be 
discussed later, we see the problematic as the insurrection of 
subjugated knowledge which runs through the whole of Western 
historical analysis. In the post-structuralists' view of history, mainly 
that of Foucault, there can be no constraints, no essences, no mobile 
forms o f uninterrupted continuities structuring the past (Foucault,
1 9 7 2 ).
For some writers, history is always realized as "ex post facto" or, 
as Hegel declared, consequent on Minerva's flight. All the social actor 
can do is to survey a world that can only be characterized as an
impregnable efface, which is the traditional facade associated with all
forms or realism. Structuralism as a whole is necessarily 
"synchronic"; it is to investigate particular systems or structures 
under artificial and ahistorical conditions, dismissing the systems or
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structures out of which they have emerged in the hope of explaining 
their present functioning. Some find the threatening of "historicity of 
history" proposed by post-structuralists to be unbearable. Perry 
Anderson (1984) for example, in the name of Marxism and its 
concept o f history, has dismissed all post-structuralism on the 
grounds that it represents "the randomization  of history" (p. 114).
Nevertheless, history is traditionally thought of as grand 
explanatory system s and as linear processes constituted by discrete 
events and uninterrupted continuities. Post-structuralism not only 
"reintroduces" history into structuralism or "shows that effects o f  
history have been reduced," but also questions the traditional 
concept of history itself. Derrida (1973) remarks:
If the word "history" did not carry with it the theme of 
a final repression of dif ferance ,  we could say that 
differences alone could be 'historical' through and 
through and from the start, (p. 141)
Furthermore, Foucault’s genealogical analysis, follow ing  
Nietzsche, questions the legitimacy of the present by separating it 
from the past (Foucault, 1977, 1979). The role of cause or 
explanation is thus rejected. The gap between the past and the 
present underlines Foucault's historiography. He claims that when 
the technology of power o f the past is exercised, the present 
assumptions which posit the past as "irrational" are undermined.
Those notions o f discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, lacunae, and 
thresholds, argues Foucault, have been excluded throughout Western 
thought since Plato.
Another problem of structuralism is its over-reliance on reason. 
Structuralism, in general, seeks a universal foundation in order to 
secure logical consequence. The question of how the human sciences 
are historically possible and what the consequences of their existence 
are have not been fully answered. According to Foucault, madness, 
chance, and discontinuity have been excluded by reason. The 
"otherness" of reason allows the transgression which makes all 
possible become possible, all differences become "differentiated" 
(Foucault, 1973). In curriculum practices, mainly in bureaucratic 
organizations, the notion o f reason is transformed into scientific 
rationality (Schon, 1983). The objective of scientific rationality is to 
gain control and mastery over the physical and social environment. 
Following Nietzsche, Max Weber argues that scientific rationality 
focuses on means but not on ends, such instrumental reason can be 
but of limited help to us as we live our lives.
Foucault reiterates and criticizes this scientific rationality by 
arguing that science uncovers the mythology in the world, but 
science itself is a myth which has to be superseded. Madan Sarup 
(1989) observes, follow ing Foucault, that "scientific knowledge has 
brought about a disenchantment with the world" (p. 76). He 
continues to argue that means can be calculated with efficiency—i.e., 
technical rationality—but ends and values become increasingly 
problematic to determine. One effect of the rise of instrumental or 
technical rationality is the process o f reification which has produced 
disen ch an tm en t.
Structuralist approaches decenter the subject by emphasizing 
relationships and not individuals. Meaning is rooted and fixed in
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structures, not in individuals; but the displacement of the individual 
from the center of meaning is questionable. As we have seen, in 
From Prague to Paris (1986), Merquior argues that structuralism has 
been "vocal in asserting the centrality o f culture (and suggesting its 
autonomy) and so reluctant to accept any talk of 'hard' 
infrastructural determination of the cultural realm" (p. 115).
Meaning, for the structuralists, is fixed or rooted within the structure 
of language. But meaning, argue post-structuralists, is interminable 
or always already indeterminate.
In Structuralist Poetics (1975), Culler asserts that to debunk 
structuralism, it is best to approach it through its linguistic 
foundations. He insists that "linguistics is not simply a stimulus and 
source of inspiration but a methodological model which unifies the 
otherwise diverse projects o f structuralists" (Culler, 1975, p. 4).
Derrida is in the forefront o f those questioning the structuralists' 
assumption. In his view of language, the signifier is not 
subordinated to the signified, as an image to a mirror. There is no 
isomorphic correspondence between the level o f signifieds in 
language. There is no fixed distinction between signifiers and 
signifieds. Derrida argues that meaning is not retrieved from 
apparent unmeaning, but rather consists in the repression of 
unmeaning. For him, any specification of meaning can only function 
as a self-defeating attempt to stabilize and restrain what he terms 
the "dissemination" of the text (Derrida, 1981b). To know the 
meaning of a signifier leads to a process which is not only infinite but 
also circular. Signifiers constantly transform into signifieds, and vice 
versa, and it is impossible to reach a final signified which is not a
signifier itself. Meaning is dispersed along the whole chain of 
signifiers; it is an endless interplay of presence and absence. In 
short, the meaning of a sign, o f what is present, depends on what the 
sign is not, on what is absent.
Meaning, then, is not immediately present in a sign. Since the 
meaning of a sign is a matter of what the sign is not, this meaning is 
always absent from it. This notion of the unstable overturns 
structuralists' conception o f definable and stable structural analyses. 
The stability of structure, according to structuralists' thought, is 
questionable. No element is absolutely definable within the 
structure or system. Furthermore, Derrida's concept o f writing and 
"differance" is a challenge to the idea of structure; for a structure 
always presumes a center, a fixed principle, a hierarchy of meaning 
and a solid foundation. It is exactly these notions which the endless 
differing and deferring of writing puts into question. For curriculum 
practices, this means that the projected "end" of knowledge could 
ever coincide with its "means" is an impossible dream. Sarup (1989) 
puts it well by saying that "no one can make the 'means' (the sign) 
and the 'end' (meaning) become identical. . . . The sign must be 
studied 'under erasure,' always already inhabited by the trace of 
another sign which never appears as such" (p. 36). Deleuze (1988) 
rem arks:
Truth offers itself to knowledge only through a series 
of "problematizations" and that these 
problematizations are created only on the basis of 
“practices,” practices of seeing and speaking. These 
practices, the process and the method, constitute the 
procedures for truth, "a history of truth." But these 
two halves of truth must enter into a relation,
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problematically, at the very moment when the 
problem of truth denies any possible correspondence 
or conformity between them. (p. 64)
Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined major tenets of the structuralists' 
enterprise along with several important and fundamental limitations 
or problems within structuralism. As we have seen, in Saussurean 
perspectives, language is conceived as a system of signs whose 
relations and differences within a system make meaning intelligible  
and independent of an external world (Saussure, 1959).
Structuralism can be summarized, according to Sarup (1989), as 
performing four basic operations:
F irst, it shifts from the study of conscious linguistic 
phenomena to the study of their unconscious 
infrastructure; s e c o n d , it does not treat term 
independent entities, taking instead as its basis of 
analysis the relations between terms; third, it 
introduces the concept of system or structure; f in a lly , 
it aims at discovering hidden  general laws. (p. 43; 
underlining added)
Having outlined several limitations and problems of 
structuralism—the conceptions of identity, subjectivity, meaning and 
history, through contrasts between structuralism and post­
structuralism—we w ill see in the next sections that the structuralist- 
minded movements in curriculum studies have faced the same 
problems. I w ill now explicate post-structuralism in relation to these 
questions and point to their implications for curriculum theory and
practice. In doing so, I w ill also lay out the problem concerning 
"rationality"—reason itse lf—which reverberates through the field  
curriculum in general.
CHAPTER TWO  
REVIEW  OF CONTEM PORARY POST-STRUCTURALISM
Knowledge without illusion is an illusion through and 
through, in which everything is lost, including 
knowledge. A theorem of it might be sketched like 
this: There is no myth more innocent than that o f  a 
knowledge innocent o f  myth.  (La Traduction, cited in 
Descom bes, 1986, pp. 91-92)
Critique of Reason or Enlightenment Rationality
The Western philosophical paradigm was built upon a 
"reasoning" process that involved no interventions in the 
phenomenal world. To reason, Maxine Greene (1984) remarks, was 
to "take the stance of the contemplative spectator and 'see' with the 
eyes of mind" (p. 547). Starting from Plato, the philosopher detached 
him self as a temporal being from the material world. The objective 
patternings and the meanings of appearance, Plato believed, could be 
achieved only through rational faculty. For Aristotle, human 
rationality entailed the ability to grasp the design or the "telos" of 
reality; he stated, that "to know what excellence is, is not enough; we 
must endeavor to acquire it and to act accordingly" (T he  
Nichomachean Ethics. 1920, p. 1179b).
Following this ancient tradition, Francis Bacon stressed that if  
reason could be freed from error then the notion that reason 
unassisted could come to know the truth could be retained. Thus he 
introduced an "inductive logic" to replace Aristotle's "deductive logic." 
We all remember and are haunted by one of Francis Bacon's well- 
known dicta: "knowledge is power." For Nietzsche, knowledge is "the
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will to Truth," and is manifested in "the will to power" (Nietzsche,
1966). Nietzsche replaces reason with the will to power.
Baruch Spinoza (Benedict de Spinoza) insisted "clear and distinct 
ideas" are true when compared with confused ideas. For him, 
reasoning occurs through sequences o f propositions; and the highest 
certainty is found in intuition. He called reason and knowledge of 
the second kind (distinct from opinion or imagination) as that 
emanating "from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas 
of the properties of things" (Spinoza, 1949, pp. 107-112). John Locke 
believed all knowledge to be founded in experience. He was 
convinced that external objects were presented in experience by 
ideas, which might or might not resemble what actually existed 
outside (Locke, 1924).
In the early seventeenth century, Rene Descartes invented his 
great "dualism"—idea and matter, mind and body—that we have 
been haunted by from its inauguration. The dualism that Descartes 
constructed worked steadily through the decades to clear the path 
for a more careful study of the world of things. Outside the human 
head was the world of objects and things. Descartes was concerned 
to relate these two worlds, the world of time and space and the 
world of mental activity. It laid the way for the development of the 
so-called hard sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology. It 
also conceived the subjective world as independent from the 
objective world.
Descartes' predication of existence upon cognition—"I think, 
therefore I am; I am a thing that thinks"—has been questioned 
throughout the last century (Descartes, 1968). Many contest the
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dualism that the relation between "I think" and "I am" proposes 
(Heidegger, 1962; Silverman, 1987; Soloman, 1988; Prigogine, 1989).
For Descartes, "I think" precedes "I am." On the contrary, argues 
Merleau-Ponty (1961), really "the 'I think' . . .  is re-integrated into 
the transcending process o f the 'I am', and consciousness into 
existence" (p. 439). In short, the notion of a priori  status assigned to 
"reason"—the "I think"—is rejected. Lacan (1977) argues in his 
discussion of the "gaze of the other," it is the gaze of the other which 
makes the "I" possible. He insists that "I think where I am not, 
therefore I am where I do not think" (p. 166). Lacan believes that 
how we present ourselves—the "I" of the "I think"—is always subject 
to the interpretation of others. I do not exist alone.
As Lacan has reversed Descartes so Derrida (1982) has 
deconstructed Roger Bacon. Roger Bacon's view of the place of 
experimental philosophy is the focal point of his empiricism. He 
differentiates the relationship between "speculative knowledge"
{scientia speculativa)  and "simple empiricism (scientia operativa ) "
(Fr. Roperi Bacon quaedam hactenus inedits . 1859). The purpose of 
experimental science, he says, is to confirm the understanding of the 
natural and man-made things. He insists that experimental science is 
the "mistress" of all previous knowledge and the end of deductive 
reasoning. Derrida (1978) characterizes this claim as "thinking b y  
metaphor without thinking the metaphor as such" (p. 139).
David Hume concluded that we can not "really know" the world 
at all. He believes in reason and the empirical appeal to the senses, 
and he detested obedience to authority on such non-rational or 
nonsensical matters as metaphysics. His skepticism centers upon his
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denial that we ever actually experience the necessary connections-- 
"causes"--between events; no such world exists outside our 
experience, insists Hume (Hume, 1951).
Immanuel Kant in his "critical" philosophy (see his three 
Critiques of Reason, 1952, 1956, 1958), attempted to reconcile the 
seventeenth century's scientific world view  with a conception of 
human freedom, and he undertook, follow ing Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
to redefine reason from the standpoint of a moral account of its end.
He devoted much of his career to articulating "the limits of reason."
His proposed solution for resolving this crisis in the modern world is
illustrated in his doctrine of the "crisis o f reason." At the heart of his
works is an expansion of the concept o f self, the "transcendental" self 
or ego, suitable for all people at all times and under all conditions. 
Knowledge of the world, for Kant, is possible because the self 
determines the structure o f our experience. Contrary to the 
Cartesian solitary ego and Kant's transcendental subject, argues John 
Dewey, reason is social rather than solitary, historically rooted rather 
than tim eless, pragmatic rather than theoretical (D ew ey, 1929).
Dewey's reconstructive aim was to undermine the authority o f the
inherited theories o f reason and to legitimate the pragmatic,
experimental reason already at work in modern science. Despite his 
differences with Kant, Dewey could agree with the Kantian maxim:
"They learned that reason has insight only into that which it 
produces after a plan of its own" (Kant, 1958, p. 20).
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Rationality after the Enlightenment
The rationality of the Enlightenment includes both rationalism  
and empiricism. Human rationality has been critiqued by Nietzsche 
and his followers as the dialectic o f reason itself. In defending 
Enlightenment ideas, preserving the legacy of Western rationality, 
the contemporary critical theorist Jurgen Habermas attempts to work 
out the concept o f "communicative rationality," quite different from 
instrumental-technical rationality, in order to restore the 
Enlightenment project and to revitalize modernity—still "an 
incomplete project" (Foster, 1983, p. 3). In his books, The Theory of 
Com municative Action (Vol I, 1984; Vol II, 1987), Habermas 
contends that "universal pragmatics" enables us to understand the 
foundation for emancipatory self-reflection, grounded in 
intersubjective communicative competences. W hile rejecting 
Enlightenment's solitary or "subject-centered" reason, he does defend 
reason through "consensus." Communicative reason is universal 
consensus without constraint. Consequently, Richard Bernstein 
(1985) calls Habermas the "guardian of reason" (p. 25). In his recent 
book, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1990), Habermas 
continues to argue that the philosophical discourse initiated by Kant 
has shown the notion of subjectivity to be the principle o f modernity.
In contrast to modern French philosophies, Habermas insists that 
"the basic conceptual a po r ia s  o f the philosophy of consciousness, so 
acutely diagnosed by Foucault in the final chapter o f The Order of 
T h in g s, were already analyzed by Schiller, Fitche, Schelling, and 
Hegel in a similar fashion" (1990, p. 295). As Richard Bernstein
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portrays it, the project o f Habermas has been the search for reason 
as a central theme in the western tradition, in hope of its 
revitalization (Bernstein, 1985).
Habermas raises the interesting point that reasons are of a 
special nature. These reasons, he sees, can always be expanded into 
arguments which we then understand only when we "recapitulate"
(n a ch v o l l z ie h e n ) them in light of some "standards" of rationality.
This "recapitulation," for Habermas, requires a reconstructive activity  
in which we bring into play "our" own standards of rationality, at 
least intuitively (Habermas, 1984, 1987). He continues to say, 
according to Bernstein (1985), that "the interpretative reconstruction 
of reasons makes it necessary for us to place 'their' standards in 
relation to 'ours,' so that in the case of a contradiction we either 
revise our preconceptions or relativize 'their' standards of rationality 
against 'ours'" (p. 204). In other words, we can not understand 
reasons without at least im plicitly evaluating them.
Conversely, Richard Rorty raises questions about the contingency  
of language (Rorty, 1986a, 1989). After the collapse of analytical 
philosophy, he sees that there is opposition to foundational thinking 
or the view that there exist representations privileged by the fact 
that they mirror some independent empirical reality (Rorty, 1979,
1989). He insists that language foregrounds human existence and 
understanding by contrasting "metaphysicians" (Plato-Kant tradition) 
with "ironists" (Derrida), and he illustrates the distinction between 
reality being "discovered" and "invented" or created. Rorty (1989) 
rem arks:
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Truth cannot be out there—cannot exist independently 
of the human mind—because sentences cannot so exist, 
or be out there. The world is out there, but 
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of 
the world can be true or false, (p. 5)
Rorty thus focuses on the problematic of "representation"; he 
insists that reality is created, rather than out there waiting to be 
discovered. He strives to work on the nature and the status of 
philosophic discipline. Rorty warns us that the temptation to look for 
criteria (in terms of Habermas' "standards") is part o f the temptation 
to think of the world as possessing an intrinsic nature, an essence.
Rorty also argues that the human self is created by the use of a 
vocabulary rather than expressed in a vocabulary. He remarks 
(1986a) that "what is true about this claim is just that languages are  
made rather than found, and that truth is a property of linguistic 
entities, o f sentences" (p.3). After announcing the demise of all 
foundational thought, he claims that the desire for "vocabularies-as- 
wholes" or "final vocabulary" is to keep the conversation going, on 
which a sense of "solidarity" or "community" can be built (Rorty,
1982, pp. 376-377; 1989). The claim to reason always entails a 
"transcending power," remarks Bernstein. For it is renewed with 
"each act o f unconstrained understanding," and with "each moment of 
living together in solidarity" (Bernstein, 1985, p. 32).
Phenomenology and the Rise of Post-structuralism
Modern French philosophers, post-structuralists in particular, 
insist that the main problem of Western philosophical thought is 
exactly, in various disciplines, the hegemony of language and the
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death o f subjectivity (Descom bes, 1986; Champagne, 1990). The 
"disappearance" or "death" o f man is one of the most important 
claims laid out by post-structuralists. It is a critique of humanism as 
the metaphysics of subjectivity, a break with the indissolubly  
humanist and dialectical philosophy of Hegel and Marx. Luc Ferry 
and Alain Renaut, in their French Philosophies o f The Sixties (1990), 
remark that this non-humanistic and non-dialectical culture had 
appeared in Nietzsche and Heidegger, long before it is echoed in the 
structuralist enterprises (as in Levi-Strauss, who practiced the death 
of the subject in the birth of structures).
Phenomenology, as an investigative method, proposed by 
Edmund Husserl, marks the starting point for contemporary critical 
philosophy. The task of phenomenology is to minimize deception, to 
see things as they really are. It starts with the return of philosophy 
to scientific status, because scientists and empiricists simply rejected 
philosophy and its foundation without any attempt to demonstrate 
its validity. For Husserl, it is the "Absolute," though degraded by the 
historicist and relativist (mainly Nietzsche), where the truth is to be 
found (Husserl, 1962); in short, truth is to be found in transcendental 
consciousness. According to Robert Solomon (1988), Husserl's 
phenomenology is "the close examination of the essential structures 
of [transcendental] consciousness, with an eye to deriving 
[describing] necessary and universal truths of experience" (p. 130).
It is Husserl, according to Foucault (1989a), who defined "the horizon 
of reflection" for generations to come (p. 41).
Martin Heidegger, a student of Husserl, rejects his teacher's 
"reactionary Cartesianism." Heidegger insists, in Being and Time
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(1962), that we have lost our understanding of true "Being," for the 
very language we use blocks understanding. He sees that Husserl's 
phenomenology is the means to undermine Descartes' dualism—mind 
and body—and the mechanistic view of the world and the self­
enclosed illusion of self that it fosters. Heidegger's theory of 
interpretation and understanding aspires to reach the authenticity o f  
Being itself. Phenomenological approaches provide the most 
powerful principle for sorting through the many issues o f meaning 
that have emerged. We all remember his famous dictum: "Thing 
[shows itself] in itself" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 54). Further, his 
phenomenology is elaborated by Merleau-Ponty (1964): "Back to the
things themselves" (p. 25).
Post-structuralists owe much to Nietzsche and Heidegger, for 
both can im plicitly be found in most post-structuralists' works 
(Silverman, 1987). Following Nietzsche and Heidegger, against those 
who characterize post-structuralism as a repudiation of 
phenomenology (Descom bes, 1986; Brodribb, 1992), I would argue, 
though not at all in a chronological sense, that there are three 
"opening" dimensions of phenomenological thought. One is the 
phenom enological "existentialism" advocated by Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty; a second is the phenomenological 
"hermeneutics" put forward by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul 
Ricoeur; a third is the "reiterative," "transgressive" post­
structuralism, proposed mainly by Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze 
and Jacques Derrida. I will focus this study on the latter.
Focusing on language as the starting-point for a new mode of 
thought on politics and the subject, post-structuralists base their
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work on a new understanding of history as "discursive formations" 
and "text," and of writing (dcri ture)  as production and invention, not 
merely representation. They regard language as the scene of our 
finitude, the place where we confront with the limits or boundaries 
of our subjectivity (Moi, 1986; M ichelfelder and Palmer, 1989).
Through these boundaries or limits where the condition of possibility 
or the transcendental o f discourse is eluded the transgression of 
meaning can account for a unique relation. This relation, according to 
Derrida (1978), "is not an access to the immediate and indeterminate 
identity of a nonmeaning, nor is it an access to the possibility of 
maintaining nonmeaning" (p. 268). It is a transformation of the 
relationship between difference and opposition such that, if  it is true 
that "thinking" and "placing" the object in a system of oppositions are 
the same thing, there is "the possibility of thinking a relationship 
without thinking it" (Lyotard, 1984a, p. 139). Furthermore, argues 
Deleuze (1986b), this relation no longer concerns "the reproduction of 
figures but the production of a continuum of intensities in a 
nonparallel and asymmetrical evolution" (p. 13). This notion of serial 
discourses, proposed by Deleuze, can account for heterogeneity, the 
differences that "disappeared" as structures linked similarities.
Like structuralists, post-structuralists present the practices o f  
language as the bedrock for human sciences. However, Foucault 
employs the relation of power and knowledge to shed light on 
Saussure's language system; the system itself is contaminated with 
hidden structures and thus reveals what has been excluded and how 
it happened. It is Foucault's (1972) contention that discovering the 
margins of history and its discontinuities makes human
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representation of existence possible--"a theory o f discontinuous 
systematization" (p. 231). In brief, an "episteme" of the modern era 
is formed. For Derrida, language is a structure of material marks or 
sounds which are in them selves "undecidable" and upon which 
meaning has to be imposed (Derrida, 1978). Following this line of 
thought and in contrast to Hegel's idea that there is no thought 
outside of language, Rorty (1989) has warned us—by asking the 
question: "What is the relation of language to thought?"—that we will 
fall into the trap o f either "the evident failures of reductionism" or 
"the short-lived successes of expansionism" (p. 12). Relatedly, Rorty 
urges us to conceive of efficiency in our usage of words, instead of 
questioning whether our beliefs are contradictory. Rorty's notion of 
edification can be characterized as an attitude interested not in what 
is out there in the world, or in what happened, but in what we can 
get out of the world for our own uses.
Coinciding with Habermas and Rorty's critiques o f Enlightenment 
rationality and their questions regarding the nature of philosophy, 
post-structuralists recognize that there is a sense o f "crisis" in 
philosophical thought. They offer a different "diagnosis" of 
contemporary philosophical discourses. These post-structuralists 
reject Habermas' preoccupation with "tradition" whose different 
"interests" of Reason would lead to universal communication through 
his "universal pragmatics" or "inter-subjective reason." Lyotard 
argues that such a consensus implies the elimination of differential 
intensity by legitimation and "performative criteria" (Lyotard,
1984b). Rather, he urges us to search for "dissension," which is 
differential, imaginative and "paralogical," thus destabilizing and
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disturbing closures generated by self-regulated systems. This 
amounts to the continual openings transgression brings out, 
constantly deferring any possible closure or totality (Lyotard, 1984b, 
pp. 60-67). Although different from Habermas' understanding of 
"tradition," Rorty seems to want to have a master who says there is 
no master, solidarity with what holds solidarity to be only a 
contingent affair. He then wants the lack of philosophical mastery to 
be itself a tradition on which we can all come to agree. Foucault 
argues that the "we" is not, as for Habermas, the consensual "we" of 
practical reason, nor as for Rorty, the ironical one of liberal solidarity. 
John Rajchman (1991), following Foucault, points out that it is the 
question o f the "we" of the anonymity. Succinctly he notes that:
It is rather a community of those who would 
constantly expose their own thought to an experience 
of de-naturalization. And it is perhaps precisely the 
possibility o f this anonymity and this de- 
naturalization that lie at the heart o f fears and the 
anxieties we so often encounter when the purity of a 
nation or of its traditions is asserted or assumed, (pp.
1 8 - 1 9 )
What is Post-structuralism?
Answering this question is not an easy task, even though many 
have devoted extensive studies of these modes o f thought (Culler,
1975; Harari, 1979; M egill, 1985; Poster, 1989, 1990; Sarup, 1989; 
Champagne, 1990). Pecora notes that post-structuralism is, though a 
quarter century has passed, still difficult to interpret and represent 
in America. It is partly assimilated into "deconstruction" and is
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largely adopted, says Pecora (1986), as "a style of literary criticism"
(p. 34). In the context o f American pluralism or "America the 
scrivener," noted by Gregory Jay (Jay, 1990, p. ix), post-structuralism  
has no single unified meaning. Some (e.g., Berman, 1988; Rorty,
1982) have identified "deconstruction," "textualism," or "genealogical 
analysis" with post-structuralism. Others (e.g., Harari, 1979;
Merquior, 1986; Harland, 1987; Frank, 1989; May, 1989; Callinicos,
1990) have deployed or appropriated post-structuralism as "arch- or 
hyper-structuralism," "anti-structuralism," "superstructuralism," 
"antirationalism," "neostructuralism," a "contemporary form of  
anarchism," or the "successor of modernism." Even among post- 
structuralists, namely M ichel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Frangois 
Lyotard, Gilles Deleuze and Michel Serres, there is no unified theme. 
Josue V. Harari has explicitly raised this question, in his T extual 
Strategies: Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism (1979), and 
provides this answer:
The question is less ambitious than it might appear; it 
does not seek a clear or unified answer, but only 
tentative answers that may perhaps be reduced, in the 
end, to nothing more than a panorama only slightly 
different from that offered by structuralism. For this 
reason, among others, post-structuralism —like 
structuralism—invites a plural spelling, (p. 27)
Post-structuralists reject the question "what /$?," in order to 
understand what is embodied in the search for origin, essence or 
foundation. Thus, questioning is exactly the problematic in the first 
place. From this, we can understand why neither/nor logic runs 
through most post-structuralists' works. Simply, to define is to 
distort. Post-structuralism is paradoxical in nature. In another
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sense, as soon as we "name" or "designate" something or someone, on 
the condition that this be done with necessary precision and above 
all the necessary style, we "denounce" as well (Deleuze, 1990, p. 284). 
We can recall that Nietzsche’s answer to the question "What is?" 
would be "Which one?" and thus invites a "plural spelling." In the 
same manner, while defining the notion of "phrase," Lyotard (1984a) 
points out:
There is no definition of a phrase because every 
attempt of this sort leads to the concept of a "well- 
formed totality." On the contrary, we must say rather 
that "definition" is a family of phrases, and its demand 
for the "well-formed" corresponds to the universe it 
presents and varies according to whether the 
definition is logical, grammatical, linguistic or 
analytical, (p. 314)
Another concern, the ethical aspects o f post-structuralism, as 
Martin Jay (1989) points out, is related to the question of moral 
imperatives proposed and praised by Kant. Jay claims that post­
structuralism is "often taken to mean a valorization of impulse, 
desire, and transgression, which sanctions an ethical 'anything goes'"
(p. 70). David Carroll, in P araesthetics (1987), remarks that post- 
structuralists' projects are to attest to the multiplicity underlying any 
totality and to the possibility of alternatives to any totality. Jacques 
Daignault (1990) proposes an "ethics without morals" which, he 
insists, means that globalized understanding is not opposed to 
localized interpretation and knowledge; on the contrary, it is the 
"diagonal" sense between the global and the local, the universal and 
the particular which makes human existence meaningful.
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In discussing post-structuralist thought, it is my intention to 
single out some important post-structuralists' arguments or 
problematics, particularly those that can inform contemporary 
curriculum studies. Post-structuralist approaches begin with the 
recognition that the epistem ological consequences o f structuralism  
lead to an unraveling of the empiricist presuppositions of the 
Saussurean-based m odel—particularly because the original notion of 
the "signified" reflects a commitment to a form o f empiricist 
"knowledge" that evaporates under scrutiny. What any signifier 
signifies can not be divulged except by using more words, more 
signifiers. This is regarded as the chain of signifiers or, as Nietzsche 
observes, interpretation o f interpretations.
For structuralists, language points to itself: What exist are
"texts." However, the idea of a "knowable" reality is rejected by 
post-structuralists. In post-structuralism, knowledge o f the world 
derives from the interaction between a primary subjectivity and a 
language that pre-exists the user, which generates the "self." The 
concept of self should not be confused with consciousness, ego or id.
The self is, Foucault (1988a) explains, following A lc ib iad es. "to be 
found in the principle which uses these tools, a principle not o f the 
body but o f the soul. . . that is the principal activity of caring for 
yourself, not o f  'knowing' yourself.  . . and not the care of the soul-as- 
substance" (p. 25; emphasis added). In brief, post-structuralist 
strategies and forms of analysis focus on the philosophical issues of 
language, interpretation and "renunciation" of self; furthermore, they 
attempt to dismantle or to "shake up" the conventional and stable 
conceptions of meaning, subjectivity, identity and history.
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Mark Poster describes post-structuralist strategies succinctly in 
The Mode of Information (1990). He says that post-structuralists 
seek to abandon all forms o f reductionism, of totalizing 
interpretations of texts. He summarizes as follows: "For them [post­
structuralists] texts are not homogeneous, linear bodies of meaning; 
they are not expressions o f authorial intention or reflections of class 
position" (Poster, 1990, p. 115). Rather, texts separate the author 
from the reader and insert an important space that allows "acts of 
meaning" (Bruner, 1990) or "festivals of interpretation" (Wright,
1990) to set aside the author-ity of the writer and permit one to 
read the text as it is in writing. Foucault (1984) succinctly makes 
this point in his "What is an Author?"
For Derrida, meaning is inexhaustible (Derrida, 1978, 1981b).
Derrida insists that any specification of meaning can function only as 
a self-defeating attempt to stabilize and restrain what he terms the 
"dissemination" of the text. The notion of subjectivity, for post­
structuralists, tends to be not only the structuralist sense of 
"displacement," but also to be completely localized and 
desubjectivized. The idea of identity is not merely identity between 
identity and difference, in terms of the Hegelian dialectic, but is 
questioned further as the difference between identity and difference, 
through difference itself (Derrida, 1978). It is through post- 
structuralism that the negative power of the dialectic is called so 
radically into question. Deleuze (1983a) remarks, in the subversion 
of dialectical tradition in contemporary critical thinking:
Difference reflects itse lf and repeats or reproduces 
itself. The eternal return is this highest power, the
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synthesis o f affirmation which finds its principle in the 
will. The lightness of that which affirms against the 
weight of the negative; the game of the will to power 
against the labor of the dialectic; the affirmation of 
affirmation against that famous negation of negation.
(p. 197)
Post-structuralist Orientations
As we have discussed in chapter one, the limits and problems 
embedded in structuralism are illuminated by post-structuralism.
W hile raising questions about structuralist approaches, post­
structuralists provide insightful critiques and shed new light on the 
way we understand those issues.
S u b jectiv ity
Through Descartes' reflection, modern philosophy has become a 
philosophy of the subject. The locus of certainty and truth, 
subjectivity is the first principle from which everything arises and to 
which all must be reduced or returned. The primacy of subjectivity 
or consciousness is an explicit assumption. The concept of 
subjectivity is first questioned and decentered by the structuralists, 
mainly Levi-Strauss and Ferdinand de Saussure, who reverse the 
traditional perception o f subjectivity residing within consciousness or 
inner mental images. They regard the subject as the function of the 
whole structure, on which the relation to each individual meaning is 
founded. Althusserian ideology of self, derived from Marxism, is that 
the sense of oneself is not individual but is, rather, the ideal image of  
oneself that ideology has influenced to accept as oneself. Post­
structuralists distrust the idea that structure has its center and origin
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beyond each individual's reach. They emphasize that the movement 
made by each individual, therefore the subject, is not only 
decentered but rather "displaced" or "disappeared"; furthermore, 
argues Foucault, the subject is not one but "split," not an absolute 
origin but a "function ceaselessly modified" (Foucault, 1989, p. 61).
Lacan stresses the point that there is no subject except in 
representation, but that no representation captures us com pletely.
Lacan believes that how we present ourselves is always subject to 
interpretation by others. The Chinese philosopher, Chuang-tze, 
points out:
There is nothing that cannot be seen from the 
standpoint of the “Not-I.” And there is nothing which 
cannot be seen from the standpoint of the “I.” If I 
begin by looking at anything from the viewpoint of the 
“Not-I,” then I do not really see it, since it is “not I” 
that sees it. If I begin from where I am and see it as I 
see it, then it may also become possible for me to see 
it as another see it. Hence the theory of reversal that 
opposites produce each other, depend on each other, 
and complement each other. (Merton, 1965, p. 42).
There is no possible concept of subjectivity, insists Derrida. For 
deconstruction should be subjectless and through which it can be 
proclaimed "the death of subject" (Derrida, 1978). Derrida (1978) 
insists that "the concept o f a (conscious or unconscious) subject 
necessarily refers to the concept of substance—and thus of presence- 
-out o f which it is born" (p. 229). Discussing deconstruction, Paul 
Smith states, in Discerning the Subject (1988), that for Derrida, "there 
can be no concept at all o f subjectivity without a partaking in the 
metaphysics of presence and all its critical and decisive moves of 
interpretation" (p. 46). However, Smith argues that there is
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inevitable existence of the agent or operator o f that processes of 
interpretation through whom it passes. Smith (1988) remarks:
What is established in this absence of the “subject” and 
its identity, and through the erasure o f its desire, is 
then a machinery of language which more or less goes 
on without us. In other words, if it is not “I” who 
chooses, the machinery of language and thought 
chooses “me,” and any “I” exist only as the passive 
construct of a system of forces, (p. 48)
Similarly, Alex Callinicos (1990) argues from a Marxist point of 
view that the central project o f post-structuralists is the demotion of 
the subject from "constitutive" to "constituted" status. Derrida insists 
that the state or status of the complement w ill always be denied to 
the interminable of the "supplement." Deleuze claims that an 
"intellectual theorist has ceased to be a subject, a representing and 
representative consciousness. . . . there is no longer any 
representation, there is only action, theory's action, the action of 
practice in the relationships of networks" (Foucault, 1977, pp. 206-7). 
One of the main themes o f Foucault, found in M adness and 
C iv iliza tion  (1973), is how external imposition or control has been 
replaced by internalization. The birth of the asylum can be seen as 
an allegory regarding the constitution of subjectivity. Madness and 
C ivilization  is an indictment of modern consciousness.
Identity and Self
From the Aristotelian view, the law of identity serves as a 
foundation of categorization and exclusive definition; in other words, 
an entity is what it is precisely because it is not anything else.
V in cen t Descom bes (1986) remarks that "identity cannot be thought
except as differing from the different. Difference is what enables 
identity to be itself" (p. 40). Eagleton (1990) also remarks that the 
notion of identity is "coercive." It is the "ideological element of pure 
thought" and was "installed at the heart of Enlightenment reason" 
(pp. 45-54).
The problematic of the constitution of "self" is one of the central 
themes in post-structuralism, and we shall see later, o f prominent 
post-structuralists. M ichel Foucault, in his three (the announced 
fourth volume in the history of sexuality: Confessions of the Flesh is 
unfinished) volumes of The History of Sexuality (1978, 1985, 1986), 
developed a theoretical strategy to investigate the self in early 
centuries as an alternative to the phenomenological notion of self as 
consciousness and to the structuralist notion of self as an object of 
analysis. His project would be a genealogy of how the self 
constituted itself as subject. In other words, Foucault (1988a) 
focuses rather on "technologies of the self."
In his Critical Theory and Poststructuralism (1989), Mark Poster 
examines post-structuralism, mainly Foucault's thought, in contrast 
with critical theory as developed by the Frankfurt School, and 
establishes a set of "rapproachments" in order to show convergences 
between the two and to consolidate post-structuralist themes. His 
intention is to incorporate post-structuralist interpretive strategy 
into a social context, in terms of contextualizing its own position and 
in beginning a critique of the present. He then tries to integrate it 
into critical theory and to offer an autocritique of its inscription of 
reason for critical theory. Poster (1989) summarizes Foucault's 
developmental characterization of the self as follows:
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A critique of the self as rationalist by a strategy of 
reversal through madness vs. reason; (2) a critique of 
the self as centered consciousness by a strategy of 
displacement. The locus of intelligibility shifted from 
subject to structure; (3) a hermeneutics o f the self 
using a strategy o f historicism. The emphasis fell to 
the activity of self-constitution in discursive practices.
(p. 54)
The concept of self is contingent upon language. The self is a 
matter of the continuity o f one's self-understanding, but this 
continuity consists in constantly putting oneself into question and a 
constant being-other. We can see that the concept of self, as Rorty 
(1986b, 1989) insists, is contingent upon conversation within 
community. The conversation he argues for is that we as community 
members constantly work through dialogue or the mediation of 
language and thus keep the conversation going.
Totalization and Structure
The notion of "totalization" in structuralism is another important 
problematic for Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault. It is defined by 
structuralists on the one hand as useless ,  on the other as im p o s s ib le .  
Sartre's idea of "totalization" is related to his notion of history. He 
emphasizes that history unfolds its significance through a sweep of 
interpretive hindsight; conversely, history is dismissed by 
structuralists as a wishful belief in the wholeness and continuity of 
human experience. Christopher Norris (1982) argues that the 
socialization of cogito  in Sartre's fashion is to "fall into the twin 
Hegelian traps of 'individualism and empiricism"' (p. 78). Eagleton 
(1990) reasons that many of the concepts of totality are
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"objectionably homogenizing and essentialistic, superiorly excluding a 
range of crucial political struggles which they have decided, for one 
reason or another, can hardly be regarded as 'central'" (p. 381).
The concept o f structure is another problematic raised by post- 
structuralists. It is, for structuralists, regarded as a complete, closed  
system which encloses everything. Structuralism decentered the 
sovereign subject or c o g i t o , which remained unacknowledged since 
Descartes, and it recognized that the subject as a function of 
structures—social, mythical, linguistic, and so on—was not as a 
ground or source of knowledge. Post-structuralists argue that 
structuralism failed to escape the logocentric tradition that meaning 
is determined and fixed within and by the system. For Deleuze, it is 
the epistem ological status of those impersonal structures that 
regulate that subjectivity is in question. Like Derrida (1978, 1981b), 
Deleuze (1987a, 1990) recognizes those structures and then 
incorporates them into his philosophy of difference, or a theory of 
"singular points," to decenter the very notion of structure. Deleuze 
(1990) insists that "there is no structure without series (s ig n i f i e d  
series and signifying series), without relations between terms of each 
series, or without singular points corresponding to these relations. . . . 
without the empty square—place without an occupant , which makes 
everything function" (p. 51; emphasis added). In addition, argues 
Derrida, the very idea of structure always presumes a center, a fixed 
principle, a hierarchy of meanings and a solid foundation, and it is 
just these notions which the endless differing and deferring of 
writing puts into question.
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In his first essay of Writing and Difference (1978), Derrida 
asserts that structuralism, in the biological and linguistic fields, 
above all insists on preserving the coherence and completion of each 
totality at its own level. To be a structuralist, Derrida (1978) notes, 
is to
concentrate on the organization of meaning, on the 
autonomy and idiosyncratic balance, the completion of 
each moment, each form; and it is to refuse to relegate 
everything that is not comprehensible as an ideal type 
to the status of aberrational accident, (p. 26)
The problem of structure, Derrida (1978) sees, is from within: 
namely, "the possibility o f concealing meaning through the very act 
of uncovering it. To comprehend  the structure of a becoming, the 
form of force, is to lose meaning by finding it (p. 26).
Texts by post-structuralists have become common in a variety of 
discip lines—philosophy, linguistics and literature in particular—in 
which they question the notion of the "foundation" of a theoretical 
framework by interjecting concepts o f "discontinuity", "limit" or 
"boundary", "difference or differance", "rupture", "threshold" and 
"series" (Foucault, 1972). The Western tradition of the history of 
thought has been thoroughly examined by Hegel, Heidegger and 
Nietzsche. However, according to Derrida, these philosophers are all 
entrapped by the self-presence (self-assurance) o f a "metaphysics of  
presence" which stabilizes the "origin" of their critiques and secures 
their transcendental metaphysical operation o f exclusion. Derrida 
(1978) argues that there is no original text: "everything begins with 
reproduction" (p. 211). Foucault (1970) stresses, in a different yet 
related way, that the history of thought has been an exercise of
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exclusion and a structure of domination. Here, he provokes a 
theoretical reorientation o f historical investigation, which calls for a 
thematic of "discontinuity" in the present social formation.
Post-structuralists raise the question that the problem of "limit" 
or "boundary" of totalization has been excluded during the totalizing 
processes. They challenge the metaphysical presuppositions of 
traditional philosophy and the representational mode of thought, 
found in difference or "differance," that undermines the certainties of 
Western rationality. Derrida (1978) argues, from the standpoint of 
the concept o f "play," that "if totalization no longer has any meaning, 
it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a 
finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field- 
-that is, language and a finite language—excludes totalization" (p.
289). It is the interplay of presence and absence in the language or 
utterance that makes discursive practices possible. This movement 
o f play, conditioned by the lack or absence of a center or origin, is 
the movement of "supplementarity"—which, Derrida emphasizes, is 
the function of "differance" in play.
Prominent Post-structuralists
Michel Foucault: Discourse and the Power/Knowledge Relation
Michel Foucault has been studied by many scholars in all human 
sciences. Foucault's sudden death and the incompleteness of his 
projects have provoked innumerable studies of his illuminating 
thinking and elusive strategies dealing with the social sciences 
(Rajchman, 1985 & 1991). Studies are entitled even under his name,
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M ichel Foucault, such as those by Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton et 
al.'s (1979); Alan Sheridan (1980); Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan 
(1982); Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (1983); Mark Cousins and 
Athar Hussain (1984); J. G. Merquior (1985); Gilles Deleuze (1988);
David Shumway (1989), and Didier Eribon (1991); others are Janies 
Bernauer and David Rasmussen et al.'s The Final Foucault (1988);
Jean Baudrillard's Forget Foucault (1987); Jonathan Arac et al.'s A fter  
Foucault (1988), and Foucault Live (1989). He can be characterized 
as one of the most influential philosophers in contemporary thought.
Michel Foucault was a student of Louis Althusser whose 
"historical materialism" is considered a revision of Marxist economic 
determinism. Foucault not only recognizes Althusser's notion of an 
"epistemological break" to develop his own historical understanding 
of discontinuities within history, but he goes further to argue that 
the silencing of the "marginal" in history makes history itself possible 
through demonstrating the relations between power and knowledge 
(e.g., Foucault, 1972; Althusser, 1970). Foucault's style and position 
are most influenced by Nietzsche, whom he acknowledges; his 
"archaeological" and "geneaological" analyses resemble Nietzsche's 
pessimistic notions regarding the status of man in the human 
sciences (e.g., Foucault, 1970, 1972). Edward Said (1988) identifies 
Foucault as "the greatest o f Nietzsche's modern disciples" (p. 1).
The notion of "discourse" is exemplified in Foucault's (1972) own 
writing. He states that discourse is, first of all, "a possible line of 
attack for the analysis o f verbal performances" (p. 121). It refers to 
any language system in which consistent patterns of usage create 
communities of discontinuities or pariahs. Discursive formation
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means to refer "neither to an individual subject, nor to some kind of 
consciousness, nor to a transcendental subjectivity" (pp. 122-123). 
Rather, discourse is conceived as "a totality, in which the dispersion 
o f the subject and his discontinuity with him self may be determined"
(p. 55). Discourse is made of a group of "statements." Statements are 
not constituted by a formalization of what is possible based on 
another possible as propositions; nor by a dialectic o f oppositions 
which makes phrases possible. According to Deleuze's Foucault 
(1988), statements are "necessarily tied to a law and an effect of 
rarity" (p. 2). Deleuze observes that it is the case of de facto  and d e  
ju re ,  a logocentric order of argument, from local observations to 
universal truth-claims. These type of statements making up any 
given discourse do not cohere around unique empirical or 
transcendental subjects. Rather they are united by a set o f rules or 
relations which provide a variety of subjective positions in relation 
to a specific referential. It is in this sense that the subject is 
dissolved in discourse.
Foucault's goal is to establish a fundamental level o f description 
at which thought can be seen to be organized in that formation which 
he calls a "discourse." As Alan M egill (1985) remarks, discourse for 
Foucault, is "language from which all self-reference, all inner play, all 
metaphysical distortion are eliminated" (p. 208). And the function of 
discourse is to serve as a transparent representation of things and 
ideas standing outside it. Whatever Foucault means by "discourse," it 
arises out of a reconstruction—archaeology—of the analysis of 
theoretical formation undertaken by his philosophical forbearers. He 
proceeds from making no promise about the continuity or mutual
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meaningfulness of the layers of meaning it excavates. His main 
themes include the centrality of language in understanding social 
practices, the "illusion of autonomous discourse," the discontinuity of 
history, and the central place of political power in what the 
authorities prefer to present as scientific knowledge.
Discourse, in general, is understood as a "systematic set of 
relations," as the embodiment of power/relations within a system of 
statements, which is constitutive o f a group of discursive practices 
(Foucault, 1972). Foucault (1972) describes discursive practices as:
A body of anonymous, historical rules, always 
determined in the time and space that have defined a 
given period, and for a given social, economic, 
geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of 
operation of the enunciative function, (p. 117)
From this perspective, we can consider what "discursive 
practices" are implicated in curriculum as a function to construct its 
own "regimes of truth." These discursive practices are, according to 
Foucault (1977), "characterized by the delimitation of a field of 
objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of 
knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts 
and theories" (p. 199). These ensembles of constitutive knowledge, 
statements, and practices attribute to the formation of particular 
discourse at a historically specific moment, which Foucault terms as 
an "episteme" of the modern era. He proposes the self-constitution of 
the critical theorist through a practice of opposition to the dominant 
discourses o f the present conjuncture. Those dominant discourses 
can be conceived as "regimes of truth," as general economies of 
power/knowledge, or as multiple forms o f constraint.
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Power does not represent the ideas o f the founding subject.
Foucault rejects the tendency to recover a continuity of the past, a 
totalization of subject or any form of global theorizing. Foucault 
insists, in the Foucault Reader (1984), that we need an "attitude" as a 
mode of relating to contemporary reality which is both reflexive and 
transgressive, a way of thinking from within or without; in short, a 
relation of belonging and presenting itself as its task, which he in 
turn calls "the critical ontology of ourselves" (Foucault, 1984, pp. 47- 
49). Jacques Daignault (1990) argues that "local emancipation," as in 
Foucault's localized truth, or in Serres' and Lyotard's "local 
knowledge," or in Deleuze's "minor knowledge," is not opposed to a or 
the  universal truth, nor to claims of a global, uniform and central 
effort o f mankind, but attempts to reveal the multiplicity o f forces 
behind a localized power regime and the fragmentary nature of 
historical forms (e.g., Foucault, 1972; Serres, 1983; Lyotard, 1984b; 
Deleuze, 1986b). These relationships, or rather passages, between 
local and global, particular and universal, marginal and central are 
intertwined in a disorderly fashion among statements. Deleuze  
(1990) remarks:
Comparison between statements are therefore linked 
to a mobile d ia g o n a l  line that allows us, within this 
space, to make a direct study of the same set at 
different levels, as well as to choose some sets on the 
same level while disregarding others, (p. 3)
Discourse signifies a set of relations that gather as "events" not 
as "pure meanings." Foucault (1977) held to a "principle of 
singularity," which simply says "there are events in thought" (pp. 21- 
30). He wanted to open the space of a critical questioning that would
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be prior to who, at a time and place, we think we are. This means 
that he proposes to regard the discourses through which we think 
and act as events o f a particular kind; starting up, again, the history 
of our own self-conceptions, to "eventualize" that history and to ask 
again, "who are we today?" (Foucault, 1985) Foucault tries to 
"dehistoricize" history and points to his development of a 
discontinuous historiography, what John Rajchman (1985) calls 
"historical nominalism."
The concept of knowledge, for Foucault, is intertwined with the 
power relations. The knowledge that interests Foucault is 
information imposed by a privileged few to exclude certain groups of  
people. The tradition assumes that knowledge is logically  
independent of power, since to be known seems to mean to be 
acquired in conditions free from distortion and coercion. However, 
Foucault thinks that the interconnection among social institutions and 
the growth o f certain forms of knowledge becomes apparent, 
rendering the idea of interest-free knowledge appear as the anomaly 
instead of the rule. The unthought behind the acquisition and 
communication of knowledge is not some a p r io r i  of communication, 
such as Habermas' "ideal speech situation" as the counterfactual 
condition of truth assumed in any discourse (Habermas, 1987).
Rather, Foucault insists that the unthought that conditions knowledge 
is power. In brief, the dilemma of the educational enterprise, 
observes Foucault, is intertwined with power/knowledge relation 
and the constitution of self.
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Jacques Derrida: Text. Differance and Deconstruction
Derrida is probably the most renowned French thinker in recent 
literary theory and criticism in the United States. He was first 
introduced to the United States by the Yale Critics. One of his main 
projects or strategies—deconstruction— has been widely received  
and discussed in different disciplines (e.g., Jencks, 1987; Norris, 
1988). Books exclusively focusing on Derrida's deconstruction 
include Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction (1975), Christopher 
Norris' Deconstruction: Theory and Practice (1982) and What is 
D econstruction? (1988), John Sallis et al.'s Deconstruction and 
P h ilosop h y  (1987), and Hugh Silverman et al's Derrida and 
D econstruction  (1989). Derrida proposes an interminable 
deconstruction of the Western philosophical tradition, interminable 
because the internal structure of writing is trapped in an abyss of 
Cartesian binary oppositions. Deconstruction functions to dissolve  
the unitary meaning of texts.
Deconstruction, according to Derrida, targets an array of 
representatives o f traditional metaphysical systems: phonocentrism, 
logocentrism (mainly Heidegger's "metaphysics of presence"), 
phallocentrism and mimetologism. Deconstruction is not, Derrida 
(1978) insists, either a "method," a "technique" or a species of 
"critique" (p. 24). Christopher Norris (1987) characterizes 
deconstruction as "the dismantling of conceptual oppositions, the 
taking apart of hierarchical systems of thought which can be 
reinscribed within a different order of textual signification" (p. 19).
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To deconstruct is to play the "reversal of hierarchies" in the 
texts; it is ever incomplete. There is a double movement-- 
"overturning" and "metaphorization"—involved with deconstruction  
(Derrida, 1981a, pp. 6-10). Deconstruction, on the one hand, is to 
overturn hierarchical binary oppositions within texts, as Derrida 
(1981a) remarks:
We are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a 
v is -d -v is ,  but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of 
the two terms governs the other (axiologically, 
logically, etc.), or has the upper hand. To deconstruct 
the oppositions, first o f all, is to overturn the hierarchy 
at a given moment (p. 41).
On the other hand, deconstruction immediately proceeds to the 
next step to avoid the trap; warns Derrida (1981a), "the hierarchy of 
dual oppositions always reestablishes itself" (p. 42). The point o f the 
second stage is to keep process from degrading into structure. This 
process is involved with "reinscription" of writing. Derrida reminds 
us that there is a “perpetual double movement w ith in  the 
oppositions so that the positively-valued term (e.g., 'civilization') is 
defined only by contrast to the negatively-valued term (e.g.,
'barbarism') which continually threatens the former's sovereignty” 
(Norris, 1987, p. 34). In other words, separate, individual terms give 
way to “a process where opposites merge in a constant undecidable 
exchanges of attributes" (Norris, 1987, p. 35). It is this process of 
undecidability that underlies the movement o f metaphorization with 
its mutual crossings and implications, making it a means of textual 
"transportation" by which the writer is carried along. For Derrida, 
any attempt to reduce deconstruction to "a concept in terms of
7 0
method or technique," which is precisely deconstruction at work, 
represents an arrest o f deconstruction (Norris, 1987, pp. 18-27).
Derrida insists that it is necessary to dismantle systems, to 
analyze structures in order to view their processes, both when 
systems work and when they do not, why structures do not manage 
to close themselves off, and so forth. He starts from the position that 
our traditional ways o f thinking are structure-based and are 
therefore incapable of revealing the nomadic and often paradoxical 
character of movement or process. Derrida's project in 
deconstruction is to reveal the ambivalences, self-contradictions and 
"double binds" that lie latent in any text. The text is the field of 
operation of deconstruction. For him, "deconstruction" is not at all 
the first or the last word, and certainly not a password or slogan for 
everything that is to follow  (Derrida, 1981a, 1985). This double bind 
movement within the text, insists Derrida, is necessarily inevitable.
What is included and what is excluded are not only chosen by 
chance. Deconstruction is an event that does not await the 
deliberation, or organization of a subject. "It deconstructs it-self. It 
can be deconstructed. [£a se deconstruit .] The 'it' [Qa] is not here an 
impersonal thing that is opposed to some egological subjectivity"
(Derrida, 1988, p. 4). Furthermore, deconstruction is in 
deconstruction, is to lose its construction, is to deconstruct itself.
The difference, we recall from chapter one, in terms of 
structuralist's binary op p ositions--sign ified /sign ifier , speech/w riting, 
subject/object, nature/culture, presence/absence, 
intelligible/sensible, etc.--entails the question of "supplement," which 
undermines the Western logocentric and metaphysical thinking.
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Logocentrism assumes the priority of the first term and regards the 
second in relation to it, as a "complication," a negation, a supplement.
The notion of supplement, insisted Derrida (1978, 1981a), is "always 
already" present and, in fact, allows the privileged term to be 
constituted; in other words, it implies that there is no origin and 
nothing exists until it is supplemented (Crowley, 1989; Hayles, 1990).
In order to demonstrate the notion of difference, undecidable, 
and double-bind, Derrida uses "differance" to illustrate what the 
interplay or "trace" of presence and absence is and what those 
"differing" and "deferring" traces are. In short, "differance" suggests 
a displacement without reversal. Derrida (1976) notes:
There is no essence of differance', it is that which not 
only could never be appropriated in the as such of its 
name or its appearing, but also that which threatens 
the authority of the as such in general, o f the 
presence of the thing itself in its essence. That there is 
not a proper essence of differance at this point, 
implies that there is neither a Being nor truth of the 
play of writing such as it engages differance. (pp. 25- 
2 6 )
Derrida's main goal is to deconstruct the metaphysics of 
presence, mainly Husserl's transcendental phenom enology and 
Heidegger’s the truth of Being. In doing so, he calls for a "writing," a 
new concept of writing which he terms "grammatology" (theory of 
writing), which would undo its heretofore silent role in history. 
Furthermore, to give a voice to writing, as it were, would be to undo 
history itself. Such a move cannot (yet) be thought. Derrida insists 
that:
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A science of writing runs the risk of never being 
established as such and with that name. Of never
being able to define the unity of its project or its
object. Of not being able either to write its discourse 
on method or to describe the limits of its field, (cited 
in Crowley, 1989, p. 17)
The concept or "non-concept" of "differance" is the main theme 
of Derrida's entire project. In Margins of Philosophy (1982), Derrida 
devotes one chapter to explicate "differance" through Freud's analogy 
of the unconscious with "Mystic Pad"; it can be said as erasure of 
erasures, trace of traces. The notion of "always already" is Derrida's 
sort o f methodological strategy to imply, then to undermine, the
notion that meaning is fixed; or, in other words, that there is an
origin. In fact, Derrida argues, the very idea of origin is an illusion.
As Katheleen Hayles (1990) has shown us, differance  :
[A cknow ledges a before and after—that is, a 
constituting difference—but defers indefinitely the 
moment when the split occurred. No matter how far 
back we go into signification, we never come upon the 
originary difference that could act as ground for the 
chain of signifiers. (p. 179)
Gilles Deleuze: Difference and Sense
The concept o f "difference" has been interpreted and 
reinterpreted by many scholars, post-structuralists in particular. 
Post-structuralists' contention is to denounce the Platonistic concept 
of presupposed resemblance, similitude and identity. Rather, they 
advocate a celebration of "difference" and "aconceptual concept" or 
"non-concept" that undermines the certainties of Western rationality 
(Deleuze, 1990). In Deleuze's view, it is through the play of
"difference"—as the only alternative to a deadlocked dialectical 
tradition (to reason itself) as reason tries in vain to overcome its 
oppositional nature—at the origin of values—that new light can be 
cast on a way of life. Pecora (1982), commenting on Deleuze, states 
that "the history of reason in the West becomes, not the dialectic of 
pure conception, or pure representation, with an objective 'reality,' 
but instead the dialectic o f reason as  power" (p. 46).
Deleuze's (1983a) philosophy of difference is interrelated to 
Nietzsche's notion of an "affirmation of affirmation" and can be 
briefly put as "only difference(s) can resemble each other." It is 
contrasted to "only that which resembles differs" (p. 74). There are 
two ways of making difference: says Deleuze, affirmative and 
negative. He insists that it is not the reproduction of the same, but 
rather the repetition of the different which is important. Deleuze 
(1988) succinctly puts it: "Resemblance then can only be thought as
the product of this internal difference" (pp. 262-263). This internal 
difference is exactly where the world of simulacra are built. The 
simulacrum is regarded as the copy of a copy, in terms of Rousseau's 
model and copy (see Derrida, 1981a, p. 86; 1981b, pp. 206-207).
Deleuze’s philosophical thought adopts Nietzsche's notion of 
relation between knowledge and life. In N ietzsche and Philosophy 
(1983a), Deleuze insists that Nietzsche puts knowledge into action, 
not as itself an end, but as a simple means of serving life. And he 
warns us that "the opposition between knowledge and life and the 
operation which knowledge makes itself judge of life are symptoms, 
only symptoms" (p. 96). Furthermore, he avers that "knowledge is  
opposed to life, but because it expresses a life which contradicts life,
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a reactive life which finds in knowledge a means of preserving and 
glorifying its type" (p. 100). When thought is subjected to 
knowledge, knowledge becoming the legislator, Deleuze remarks that 
"knowledge is thought itself, but thought subject to reason and to all 
that is expressed in reason" (p. 101).
In his interpretation o f reason, Deleuze (1983a) depicts "reason," 
following Kant’s definition, as "the faculty o f organizing indirect, 
oblique means," contrary to culture (p. 99); doubtless the original 
means react on the ends and transform them, but in the last analysis 
the ends are always those of nature. Reason, states Deleuze, 
sometimes dissuades and sometimes forbids us to cross a certain 
limit or boundary. Because to do so is useless, would be evil, and is 
im possible—there is nothing to see or think behind the truth. He 
questions the notion by asking, "Does not critique, understood as 
critique of knowledge itself, express new forces capable of giving 
thought another sense? A thought that would go to the limit o f what 
life can do, a thought that would lead life to the limit of what it can 
do?" (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 101). Deleuze agrees with the Stoic saying 
that reason is a body which enters, and spreads itself over, an animal 
body.
W hile welcoming structuralist's dethroning the subject or 
attacking on the cogito ,  Deleuze questions the status o f impersonal 
structures that confine subjectivity. He thoroughly problematizes the 
structural m odel—Saussurean analysis o f linguistic structure- 
through a theory which emphasizes "singular points," "planes of 
consistence," "nomadic distributions," and his philosophy of 
difference. Deleuze (1990) argues that structuralist approaches may
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have no essential point in common other than "sense," regarded not 
at all as appearance but as "surface effect" and "position effect," and 
produced by the circulation of the "empty square" in the structural 
series (the place of the dummy, the place of the king, the blind spot, 
the floating signifier, the value degree zero, the absent cause, etc.). 
Deleuze (1990) remarks:
Structure is in fact a machine for the production of  
incorporeal sense (S k in d a p so s ). But when 
structuralism shows in this manner that sense is 
produced by nonsense and its perpetual displacement, 
and that it is born of the respective position of 
elements which are not themselves “signifying,” we 
should not at all compare it with what was called the 
philosophy of the absurd, nonsense is what is opposed 
to sense in a simple relation with it, so that the absurd 
is always defined by a deficiency of sense and a lack 
[there is not enough of it], (p. 71)
Following Deleuze, we can see not only that nonsense "makes" 
sense, this sense being precisely that it has none, but more 
importantly that the relation between sense and nonsense should not 
be based on a relation of exclusion. Rather, suggests Deleuze (1990), 
it should be considered "an original type of intrinsic relation, a mode 
of co-presence" (p. 68). It is an orientation that is not simply an 
alternative but a possible complement, conjugation or coexistent 
in teraction .
Unlike many deconstructionists, Deleuze's notion of meaning 
(sense) can be expressed in a sentence, but that meaning can only be 
designated in a second sentence, whose meaning must be designated 
in a third, and so on. This paradox of indefinite regression attests to 
the weakness o f the speaker, but "the impotence of the empirical
consciousness is here like the 'nth' power of language, and its 
transcendental repetition, the infinite power of language to speaks of 
words themselves" (Bogue, 1989, p. 64). In Deleuze's views, meaning 
is a s im u la cru m ,  a paradoxical, contradictory entity that defines 
common sense. Roland Bogue (1989) elaborates on it as following:
It is always expressed in language, but it can only be 
designated by initiating a process of infinite 
regression. It seems to inhere [subsist] in language, 
but to appear in things, (p. 73)
The understanding of "sense," Deleuze emphasizes, in Logic of 
S en se  (1990), is that words express things, but that which is 
expressed is an attribute o f things (i.e. an event). Meaning and 
events form a single surface with two sides, events only emerge 
within words, but that which emerges pertains to things. This 
surface of meaning/events forms the surface between words and 
things and functions as "the articulation of their difference" (p. 37).
In another book, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1986b), 
Deleuze regards Kafka as important because he invented a mode of 
w ritin g -m in o r  literature --that allow us to account for the different 
"machines" that condition our actual relation to the world, to the 
body, to desire, and to the economy of life and death. This can be 
portrayed through their understanding of art. Art, in modern sense, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987a) perceive, is no longer an art that 
proposes to "express" (a meaning), to "represent" (a thing, a being), or 
to "imitate" (a nature). Reda Bensmai'a (1986) notes:
It is rather a method (of writing)--of picking up, even 
of stealing: Of “double stealing” as Deleuze sometimes
says, which is both “stealing” and “stealing away”—that
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consists in propelling the most diverse contents on the 
basis o f (nonsignifying) ruptures and intertwinings of  
the most heterogeneous orders of signs and powers, (p. 
xv ii)
The notion of "becoming" is a pivotal point for Deleuze's (1987b) 
philosophical thinking; for him, in becoming there is no past nor 
future—not even present, there is no history. This means that it is a 
matter o f "involuting" (p. 29). It is neither progression nor 
regression; to become is to become more and more restrained, more 
and more simple, more and more deserted and for that very reason 
populated. Deleuze (1987b) explains:
This is what's difficult to explain: to what extent one 
should involute. It is obviously the opposite of 
evolution, but it is also the opposite of regression, 
returning to a childhood or to a primitive world. To 
involute is to have an increasingly simple, economical, 
restrained step. (p. 29)
To become is to reach a process whose synthetic principle is 
"complication," which "designates both the presence o f the multiple 
in the One and of the One in the multiple" (Deleuze, 1972, p. 44). To 
complicate the sign and the meaning is revealed in essence, not 
created by essence. Deleuze (1987a) remarks: M ultiplicities are
made up of "becomings" without history, of "individuation without 
subject" (pp. 239-254). Deleuze thus embraces Nietzschean  
perspectivism and aestheticism , arguing that all thought presupposes 
evaluation and interpretation, and that truth is created rather than 
d iscovered .
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Jean-Franyois Lyotard: D if fe r e n d . Metanarrative and the Post­
m odern
Jean-Frangois Lyotard is the most obvious advocate of post­
modernity among post-structuralists. His The Postmodern Condition: 
A Report on Knowledge (1984b) is one of the best representatives of 
the literature about the postmodern condition. He defines, in a 
simple term, the condition of postmodern as distrust toward "meta­
narrative." According to Lyotard, the postmodern condition is 
characterized by the multiplicity of "little narratives." He argues that 
the master narrative (meta-narrative) has lost its credibility, 
regardless o f whether it is a scientific or a non-scientific narrative.
He sees that the decline of the unifying and legitimating power of the 
grand narratives o f speculation and emancipation as an effect o f the 
advancement o f technologies, which has changed emphasis from the 
ends of action to its means. Madan Sarup (1989) asserts, following 
Lyotard's argument, that the attention from ends of action to its 
means, from truth to "perfomativity," is reflected in contemporary 
educational policy (p. 124).
Modernity, writes Lyotard (1988), is "not an era in thought, but 
rather a m od e  of thought, of utterance, of sensibility" (p. 314). The 
challenge of postmodernity to the modern one lies precisely in its 
power to upset the form, content, and cultural representation of 
knowledge. Not only are the distribution, organization, and the 
presentation of knowledge reified and naturalized, but knowledge 
itself is prescribed as something that exists transhistorically and 
outside of human praxis. Fredric Jameson (1981) has observed that
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the great meta-narratives may have passed underground, and still 
be affecting us unconsciously. He insists that "the political 
unconscious" expresses itse lf in the persistence to undermine master 
narratives.
Lyotard (1988) has remarked that "to judge is to open an abyss 
between parts by analyzing their d i f f t r e n d " (p. 326). The 
differends—phrases in dispute, proclaims Lyotard, are not like
litigations which are "disputes where all of the conflicting parties
recognize that certain criteria obtain which allow for the adjudication 
o f their disputes," rather differends are "disputes where such criteria 
do not exist" (Fritzman, 1990, p. 376). Lyotard (1988) suggests that 
a reality would be describable as "the consensus of all the libidinal 
regions about an intensity" (p. 62); but precisely this (the operation 
of an equilibration of charges and investment) is the object of 
Lyotard's consistent suspicion. Such a consensus implies the 
elimination of differential intensity on the libidinal band, and a 
necessary concealment of the event in the construction of a reality.
Lyotard's argument, in The Postmodern Condition (1984b), is 
that a discourse bound to the truth of its referent cannot presuppose 
the validity o f its own access to that truth (which would amount to 
not respecting, "in dispute," the referent at all, but merely its own 
internal discursive formation). It needs to have a recourse to a 
different type of discourse to provide it with a grounding. As
Lyotard (1984b) sees the problem;
Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known 
that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the 
other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its
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point of view is no knowledge at all. Without such 
recourse it would be in the position of presupposing its 
own validity and would be stooping to what it 
condemns: begging the question, proceeding on 
prejudice, (p. 29)
In analyzing the conditions of the legitimation of knowledge in 
contemporary science, Lyotard (1984b) defines postmodernism as 
"incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv). He argues that we do 
not establish stable language elements, the relation between 
narrative and knowledge, and there are many different language 
games, "a heterogeneity o f elements," which only give rise to 
institutions in patches, i.e. "localized knowledge" (Lyotard, 1984b, pp. 
61-66; Geertz, 1992). Lyotard (1984b) remarks:
Consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of 
language games. And invention is always born of 
dissension; it refines our sensitivity to differences and 
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.
Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the 
inventor's paralogy, (p. xxv)
In other words, Lyotard's paralogy focuses on constantly 
introducing new perspectives into the discourse that disagree with 
the existing ones, producing a focus upon "dissensus" rather than 
consensus.
Michel Serres: Science. Literature and Philosophy
Michel Serres is perhaps the least known post-structuralist to 
readers in American institutional academic circles (Daignault, 1989). 
Serres' connection of science and literature, and his description of the 
parallel development of scientific, philosophical, and literary trends, 
in my view, foresees the future direction for both the natural and
8 1
social sciences. He succinctly "translates" the passages between exact 
science on the one hand and the human sciences on the other. He 
identifies the "evolution" of modern knowledge through the "points 
of exchange" and the "conditions o f passage" that separate scientific 
knowledge and humanistic cultivation (Serres, 1983, 1989a).
Serres' provocative thinking, especially regarding the "parasite" 
or "the excluded third," is most important to rethinking our living 
and lived world. Serres' work challenges us to think otherwise. The 
parasite violates the system o f exchange by taking without returning; 
it introduces an element o f irreversibility and thus marks the 
commencement of duration, history, and social organization. Serres 
(1982) states:
The parasite invents something new. It intercepts 
energy and pays for it with transformation. It 
intercepts roast beef and pays for it with stories.
These would be two ways of writing the new contract.
The parasite establishes an agreement that is unfair, at 
least in terms of previous accounting methods; it 
constructs a new balance sheet. It expresses a logic 
that was considered irrational until now, it expresses a 
new epistem ology, another theory of equilibrium, (p.
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The appearance of parasite elicits a strategy of exclusion. In the 
beginning, the parasite enters as an irritable addition that it would 
be best to expel. However, it is the fact that the parasite is an
integral part o f the system. By exercising a perturbation and
subsequently integrating it, the system passes from a simple to a
more complex stage. Harari and Bell, in their introduction to H erm es:
Literature. Science. Philosophy (1983), note:
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By virtue of its power to perturb, the parasite 
ultimately constitutes, like the c l in a m en  and the 
demon, the condition o f  possibil ity  o f  the system. In 
this way the parasite attests from within order the 
primacy of disorder; it produces by way of disorder a 
more complex order, (pp. xxvi-xxvii)
Serres (1982) promotes a new communication as an intersection 
of social forms, and it is at those intersections of communication, 
individuals realize that "order is not the norm, but the exception" (p.
85). Such a conception of edge-breaking with conventional transitive 
communication does shed light on the dynamics o f classrooms.
Enacted in every pedagogy is the tension between the unified and 
systematic knowledge as well as the comparative and pluralistic 
epistem ology of the journey. Such transportation of relationship 
entails multiplicity of local fragments in the space of knowledge.
Serres also introduces a new mode of thought—"dialogue" or 
"translation"—to the effort to understand literature and science. The
notion of dialogue, in Serres' (1983) mind, does not establish a 
dialogue between two symmetrical ontologies but rather functions 
"to rethink the relations between order and disorder in such a way 
as to show how everything begins, ends, and begins again according 
to a universal principle of disorder" (p. 100). To hold a dialogue is,
Serres (1983) emphasizes:
To suppose a third man and to seek to exclude him\ a 
successful communication is the exclusion o f the third 
man. The most profound dialectical problem is not the 
problem of the Other, who is only a variety o f—or a 
variation—of the Same, it is the problem of the third 
man. (p. 67)
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The notions of passage and noise have significant implications 
for curriculum studies and practices, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. They are entangled with the processes of translation or 
dialogue. On the one hand, the meaning of a passage takes shape 
only against a background noise. On the other hand, it needs to 
exclude com pletely what needs to be included—background noise.
Often, teachers try to convey a message or transmit knowledge to 
students; inevitably, there are interruptions, extractions or 
something out of the conditions o f the process, even in Lyotard's 
sense of d if ferend  (irresolvable contradictions), which are, perhaps, 
felt and not known. These gaps or ruptures, where no one "can 
speak any longer, and we have the irrational or the unspeakable— 
the incommunicable, to be very precise" (Serres, 1983, p. 50), need to 
be connected, linked, or "dialogued" by teacher and students 
together. These processes o f linkage are where pedagogy is at work,
as Daignault for instance, insists.
In Serres’ (1983) view , it is necessary for us to bring out the real 
world in its multiple forms, uneven structures, and fluctuating 
organizations. He warns us:
No, the real is not cut up into regular patterns, it is
sporadic, spaces and times with straits and passes . . .
Therefore I assume there are fluctuating tatters; I am 
looking for the passage among these complicated 
cuttings. I believe, I see that the state o f things 
consists o f islands sown in archipelagoes on the noisy, 
poorly-understood disorder of the sea, . . .  the 
emergence of sporadic rationalities that are not 
evidently nor easily linked. Passage exist, I know, I 
have drawn some of them in certain works using 
certain operators. . . . But I cannot generalize,
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obstructions are manifest and counter-examples 
abound, (pp. 23-24)
Post-structuralism and Controversy
Many debates about and around "post-structuralism" have 
occurred since it was introduced into various disciplines. (Graff,
1984; Dews, 1987; Jay, 1989; May, 1989; Habermas, 1990; Watts,
1991) Even among those people who are claimed to be 
"representatives" o f this mode of thought (post-structuralists never 
claim them selves as representatives), stresses and tensions are 
evident. I do not wish to minimize these substantial differences; 
however, the differences among them while serious are much 
in terrela ted .
Basically, debates about post-structuralism or critiques of post­
structuralist thought are abhorred by critical theorists, some 
fem inists, and neo-Marxists, for post-structuralists want to extol 
everything that has been left out in the totalizing theories and 
processes these groups expound. In so doing, post-structuralists 
focus on the marginal, the excluded, on the boundary or limit itself 
which thus makes totalization possible. The question raised is how 
long can a group or movement stress the marginal without becoming 
marginal itself? Can the theoretical subject generate a discourse that 
represents the real, unmasks domination in the real, without itself 
introducing new forms of domination? Peter Dews (1987) states that 
the post-structuralist assumption that "the concept of the subject 
implies an immobile, self-identical, and constitutive center of 
experience seriously underplays the com plexities and subtlety of the 
ways in which subjectivity has been explored within the Western
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philosophical tradition" (p. xv). In short, he questions the dissolution  
of the subject, as well as the post-structuralist suspicion of the 
concept of truth.
Manfred Frank argues, in his book entitled What is 
N eostru ctu ra lism ? (1989), that neither hermeneutics nor 
"neostructuralism" (his replacement for post-structuralism) come to 
grips with the claims of individuality. He claims that human agency, 
individuality, is the central issue for human conceptualization. He 
insists on the notion of "the constitutive role of subjectivity as the 
primary factor in meaning" and of history by asking the question:
"How can one redeem the fundamental idea of modern humanism  
which links the dignity o f the human being with his use o f freedom" 
and "do justice to the fundamental fact that subjects can only form 
themselves, in linguistic, social, cultural, and historical orders?"
(Frank, 1989, p. x) Locating knowledge, meaning, or understanding 
of self and the world in a utopian project of the ultimate individual is 
exactly what the post-structuralists are trying to undermine.
Post-structuralism has been criticized or charged as "nihilistic," 
"morally deficient" or "politically bankrupted" (e.g., Merquior, 1986;
Jay, 1989; Crowley, 1989). Some (Giddens, 1987; Dews, 1987;
Habermas, 1990) view  post-structuralism, particularly 
deconstruction, as a reanimation of self-defeating relativism in the 
late twentieth century. As Martin Jay (1989) remarks, "post­
structuralism is often taken to mean a valorization of impulse, desire, 
and transgression, which sanctions an ethical 'anything goes'" (p. 70).
Its political implications or ethics without morals make many people 
uncomfortable. Anthony Giddens (1987), among others, claims that
8 6
structuralism and post-structuralism have failed to fulfill their 
proclamations, and warns us that they are "dead traditions of 
thought" (p. 75). Alex Callinicos (1990) embraces, from a Marxist 
standpoint, Andreas Huyssen's claim that "poststructuralism is 
primarily a discourse of and about modernism" (p. 69). Not 
surprisingly, Giddens and others find post-structuralism threatening, 
not because it lays a claim to authority—claiming to know what the 
text means in a direct challenge to established understanding—but 
because it denies the fundamental convention of meaning as 
p roperty .
Post-structuralism introduces unconventional yet critical thought 
into philosophical thinking by challenging the questionable tradition 
of metaphysics of presence and the age of Logocentrism in the West. 
Furthermore, as an attack on metaphysical thought, post­
structuralism has firmly and consistently recognized the importance 
of representations and the mediation of discourse in building the 
social and in the formation of subjectivity. Paul Smith (1990) 
remarks that "arch-poststructuralist" discourse, namely 
deconstruction, has led to a number of severe critiques of idealism  
and metaphysics in all their dispositions (p. 43).
Remarks
This chapter has attempted to introduce post-structuralism, 
which in the next chapter I will connect with curriculum discourses, 
to shed light on a new direction for curriculum studies. Curriculum 
theory and practice have been dominated by structure-minded or 
modernist approaches since World War II. The central concerns
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have been predictability, order and systematic control, all operating 
to achieve predefined goals. Such a scheme of curriculum 
development brought forward m assive productivity, as w ell as 
savage inequality, to the educational enterprise. Structuralist 
analyses and applications supported many administrative educators 
view of schooling as a factory. However, educational reform reports 
during the 1980s echoed the ongoing discontentment of students' 
educational performance and achievement. These proposals for 
reform argued that present schooling is failing to provide essential 
knowledge needed for understanding of the problems we face (A.
Nation At Risk. 1982; Paideia Proposal. 1982; A Place Called School.
1984; Cultural Literacy. 1987; The Closing of American Mind. 1988).
The problem is not the insufficient effort put into reform, nor the 
direction toward educational "excellence" those reports advocate; 
rather what is at stake is what we want to do as students, teachers, 
administrators and parents, what kind of "educated" citizens we 
expect pupils to be, and what kind of curriculum should be 
communicated to each student. An advance in intellectuality is not a 
fulfillment of the wish to know but of the wish to think. Post­
structuralist thought may help us rethink the conventional categories 
regarding education and provide us with a critical perspective 
uncovering the underlying "structure" of educational reality. Lyotard 
(1990) describes "the desire o f the West as a wish to know, and the 
wish to know as an avoidance of responsibility, as a flirtation with 
the known in which the knowing subject 'never gets his fingers 
burned'" (p. 99). In a world of pluralistic perspectives, traditional 
Western standards are deplorable from certain vantage points and
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parochial from others; the need to include or explore the silenced 
vo ices—in terms of class, gender, and race/ethnicity issues in 
curriculum—is inevitable toward understanding the world we all live  
in and the ways we are.
Post-structuralism declares meaning to be the property o f one 
and each one, it restores to the text its own authority as an endless 
system and event; textuality constitutes texts in the form of history. 
Post-structuralism continues to be reexamined and debated; at the 
same time, it challenges us to rethink our present condition. Our 
sense of past and future must necessarily be constructions of present 
discursive formation and the episteme of modern era. The conditions 
o f possibility and im possibility are illuminated.
Chapter three will focus on contemporary curriculum discourses.
We will explore the possibility that post-structuralism can shed light 
on curriculum studies, in part by an analysis of the prevailing 
structuralism in present curriculum studies.
CHAPTER THREE 
POST-STRUCTURALISM  IN CURRICULUM  STUDIES:
BEGINNINGS
The embodiment of knowledge and knowing in the 
human se lf led--for som e—to autobiography, an 
interest in telling stories of life history in order to 
reconceive the relation o f self to knowing, a relation at 
the center of curriculum understood as 'currere,' the 
running of the course. (Pinar and Grumet, 1976, p. 53)
To be sure, children don't live as our adult memories 
would have us believe, nor as their own memories, 
which are almost simultaneous with their actions, 
would have them believe. (D e leu ze  and Guattari,
1986c, p. 79)
C on tem p orary  C u rr icu lu m  D iscou rse
The historical development of the field of curriculum studies has 
been ideological and full o f conflict (e.g., Franklin, 1986; Kliebard, 
1986; Kridel, 1989; Tanner and Tanner, 1990). Many stories have 
been told, stories of and about developing and organizing the 
curriculum field, by various scholars from their own interests and 
ideologies (Pinar, 1988b, 1992). Cleo Cherryholmes (1988) asserts 
that curriculum history is:
marked by repeated turmoil and conflict, because it is 
always possible to question its purposes, beliefs, 
values, assumptions, metaphors, and orientations that 
fix its purpose and meaning, (p. 131)
Curriculum discourses have emerged from various and diverse
disciplinary approaches and m ethodological orientations. Historical
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awareness might release us from the prisons of our current 
conventions o f understanding.
At present, traditionally, the problems of curriculum have been 
uneasy and complex ones, their conceptualization has been based 
upon scientific efficiency, technical rationality, predictability, order 
and control (e.g., Cherryholmes, 1988; Lather, 1991; Doll, in press).
The issue at stake is that the concepts o f predictability and control 
are enhanced by a deterministic, technocratic and scientific 
"structural" approach—im plying p r o c e d u r a l  neutrali ty .  The 
closedness o f this approach deprives pedagogy of meaning and 
fragments the processes o f teaching and learning. The concept of 
knowledge has been limited to certain discrete information-givens 
and memorizations; it is based upon complementary conceptual 
models, such as Tyler's rationale and Bloom's taxonomy advocate.
Since 1969, when Schwab announced that the curriculum field was 
"moribund," there have been diverse yet significant shifts and 
movements towards the rethinking of curriculum (Huebner, 1976).
Many curricularists, such as Michael Apple (1979, 1986), Elliot Eisner 
(1979, 1991), W illiam Pinar (1975, 1988b), Henry Giroux (1981,
1989), Herbert Kliebard (1986, 1992), Jacques Daignault (1984,
1992), Ted Aoki (1983, 1990a), to list but a few, continuously strive 
to reconceptualize curriculum field. These scholars contribute 
intriguing theses to the curriculum field and provide new "meaning," 
substantial arguments, and different approaches to the field. As 
William Pinar remarks, in Contemporary Curriculum Discourses 
(1988b), the "reconceptualization" of the curriculum field has 
occurred and continues to proceed. It is on the shifting grounds of
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transforming knowledge that curriculum undergoes dramatic 
alterations in its representations o f socio/historical production.
New possibilities in curriculum thought, such as post- 
structuralism, implicitly suggest even deeper senses of what the 
nature of curriculum might be, and provide us with ways of asking 
pertinent questions about the very purpose of curriculum studies. In
education, particularly curriculum, post-structural criticism  and 
analysis challenge the prevailing structuralist approaches and 
question the fundamental assumptions upon which these approaches 
rest (e.g., Daignault, 1984; W exler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Pinar, 
1988a, 1992; Doll, 1991; Whitson, 1991). A key assumption of 
structural approaches is that all phenomena are constituted by an 
underlying, organizing and originating structure, an assumption of 
the Tyler rationale and Bloom ’s taxonomy (Daignault, 1986; 
Cherryholmes, 1988; Pinar, 1988a; Lather, 1991). To understand this 
underlying structure is to understand the scientific-technocratic 
tradition. These structural assumptions, often scientific in principle, 
remain unproblematical and thus immunized against criticism; 
rather, they are incorporated into preferred structural analyses, 
interpretations, and organizations promoted by the promise of o r d e r  
and rat ional i ty .  The notion of "rationality"—scientific or instrumental 
in essence—has been the dominating force o f curricular planning and 
development for several decades. The problem is not only that 
reason (or scientific observation) has turned into domination, but 
that we do not fully recognize its domination and exclusion. Not only 
has post-structuralism given us a new theoretical approach for
9 2
transforming curriculum phenomena, it also shows us new ways of 
being, thinking and doing.
Post-structuralism and Curriculum
Post-structuralism has had a growing impact on critical 
curriculum studies (e.g., W exler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Lather,
1991; Pinar and Reynolds, 1992). Post-structuralism provides 
curricularists with new modes of thinking. Foucault offers a kind of 
thinking o f "threshold," "boundary," "transgression," or "rupture," 
which means to think the conditions of the possibility which are 
unrepresentable; in other words, to think through the unthinkable or 
what is unthought. Derrida (1976) challenges us to subvert and 
destabilize where we are and what we do. This attitude can be 
described and comprehended as deconstruction o f texts, implied in 
his well-known phrase: "There is nothing outside the text" (p. 227).
The separation of "world" and "consciousness," embodied in the form 
of hermeneutics, leads to the crippling dehistoricization of both the 
subject and the world. This leads to the destabilization o f structures 
and subjects. The process of destabilization is crucial to the post- 
structuralist project. In curriculum, the destabilization is 
characterized by provocative questions—raised by the students and 
the teacher—that move from exhausted predestinations to the 
unanticipated. It is opened during times of spontaneity, 
improvisation, interpretive risks, crises, when one reflects upon 
taken-for-granted ways of knowing. Contrary to totalizing critical 
theory, it moves away from the grand dream of interpretive 
mastery, the desire to gain control and to stabilize. Instead, it leads
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to localization, particularity, and non-discursive formation.
Therefore, any "meta-narrative" is under suspicion and thus rejected 
(Lyotard, 1984b, p. xxiv).
Let us recall related post-structuralist analysis and criticism. 
Foucault attempts to discern how the paradoxes of "excess" and "lack" 
presented in exegetical hermeneutics follow s from a notion of 
signification still linked to the dialectical play of "signifier" and 
"signified"—such as structural binary oppositions. The 
"commentator" is unable to move out of this space of signification 
into the exterior fact of the "historical appearances of discourses," 
because his/her own humanism is caught up in the autonomy of this 
mode of signification. This sense of autonomy has been already 
produced, sanctioned and valorized by the humanism that gives 
status as "meaning-maker." In moving away from such a critical 
posture, Foucault identifies his mode of analysis as directed to the 
discovery of "discursive structures," and in identifying the rules of 
objectification that make these structures possible.
Derrida presents us a shifting and, at times, distorted image of 
the world, and thus breaks the molds, conventions, and routine 
patterns which fossilize both our world and ourselves. It is up to us, 
the reader, to decipher what he tells us about our world; what he 
brings to light through metaphors and sim iles, or through 
contradictions and absurdities; and what he tells us about the 
possibilities of changing our world as well as changing ourselves. He 
makes it inevitable for us to question our own assumptions, and thus 
come to a better understanding of our own beliefs. However, this is 
but one approach to Derrida's te.w., one among many, for there are
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"as many images of the object as eyes to contemplate it, as many 
images of essence as minds to understand it" (Herbert, 1964, p. 13).
As beliefs in long-standing traditions of understanding and objective 
knowledge fall apart, the critical issues of curriculum stand to be 
transform ed .
Derrida also begins his "Exergue," in Of Grammatologv (1976), by 
focusing the reader's attention on the "ethnocentrism which, 
everywhere and always, has controlled the concept o f writing" (p.
64). Although the Newtonian positivist theories and traditional 
science, mostly concerned with closed systems and linear 
relationships, were challenged by developments in areas such as 
relativity, non-Euclidian geometry or quantum theory, the domain of  
the humanities appeared much slower in accepting "those aspects of 
reality which seem to characterize today's social changes: Disorder,
instability, disequilibrium, nonlinear relationships . . . and 
temporality" (Prigogine, 1984, pp. xiv-xv). If we accept instability, if  
we seek to remain "[open] to surprise, puzzlement, confusion," in
order to function efficiently in "chaos," a whole new set of skills is
needed, based as much on the non-rational as on the rational (Schon, 
1983, p. 66).
Like post-structuralists' attention to "difference," critical 
curriculum scholars and educators raise the issues of diversity, 
exclusion, and marginalization. Differences are not merely a matter 
of what each person wants to believe. Furthermore, meaning is a
social construction. Not only is each individual's perspective
informed by interaction with others, but such also reflects the 
perspectives of an individual's broader historical and sociocultural
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understandings. In such a way each person constructs one's being- 
in-the-world. Hence, finding many voices and creating more spaces 
within curriculum understandings, in terms of Bakhtin's 
"heteroglossia," is crucial to curriculum discourse (Whitson, 1988;
Miller, 1990). Therefore, curricular meanings are embodied in the 
complexity of classroom life and the multiplicity o f identities elicited 
by the discourses.
However, the goal is not just to silence another voice and replace 
it, nor to integrate it into a "universal" voice. Instead every voice 
stands on its own and speaks for itself; more importantly, it is to 
"translate" voices into one another. Here is pedagogy at work.
Pedagogy refuses to achieve the sublimation of oppositions, but 
instead exhibits the process and thereby makes sense, or "translates," 
as Michel Serres (1983) would say. Harari and Bell (1983) explain 
Serres' project as the following:
To translate the several voices o f the “language” of the 
world's disorder into different languages, to translate 
one language into another, to pass from one 
vocabulary to another, and thus to establish a world- 
encompassing network of communication, (p. xxiv)
And, as the teacher is asked for answers to educational 
problems, teaching is pressed into developing a more differentiated 
and expanded vocabulary. A plurality of voices searches for the 
right to reality—to be accepted as legitimate expressions of the true 
and the good. The point is not how to keep up with an incessant flow  
of passing voices, but rather how to sustain a valued heritage- 
understanding of difference itself.
9 6
Knowledge and Curriculum
This shift away from the traditional use of writing and books has 
strong implications for instructional methods, especially if  we 
consider the particular status and function within which language 
has been vested throughout the history of formal schooling.
Education has often appeared as a powerful device for control. Its 
aim has traditionally been to "reproduce the dominant values of 
society and to legitimize the authority of the State" and the class 
structure. It has been accused of being an "instrument of class 
power" (Anyon, 1979, pp. 317, 341). Derrida's "step beyond" may be 
applied to curriculum, encouraging educators to go "beneath" 
conventional pedagogy and to devise new approaches better fit for 
an era of informationalism (Poster, 1990). The responsibility is the 
teacher's to understand the system of transmission of ideas between 
and among students and teachers. At issue here are the modes of 
transmission of ideas, of instructional modes in post-structuralist 
epistem ology, and of the teacher as model and authority keeper and 
perpetrator of the "truth." Our educational curricula are mostly 
controlled by those who know; the educational system operates to 
sustain the existing structure of power.
In Applied Grammatology (1985), Ulmer suggests that "the 
problem of the 'preface', discussed by Derrida in 'Outworks,' is 
identical with the problem of pedagogy in general" (p. 161). It is a 
problem of communication between the supposed keeper of 
knowledge (teacher) and those who believe they are to learn from 
him/her (students), thus becoming the teacher's "disciples." Ulmer
draws a parallel between the position of the teacher as a text's 
preface, each of whom "knows" the text, and of the students and 
readers, who depend on the former to be introduced to that 
knowledge. Derrida's (1982) comments apply the preface directly to 
the relation between students and teacher: "To seek to know before
we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of Scholastics, not to 
venture into the water until he had learned to swim" (p. 47). It also 
underlines the roles o f dialectic and rhetoric, and the fact that 
pedagogical exposition, just like every reading, adds something to 
what it transmits, a "supplement." Derrida (1981a) notes:
Grammatology must deconstruct everything that ties 
the concept and norms of scientificity to ontological, 
logocentrism, phonologism. This is an immense and 
interminable work that must ceaselessly avoid letting 
the transgression of the classical project o f science fall 
back into a prescientific empiricism. This presupposes 
a kind of double register in grammatological practice:
[I]t must simultaneously go beyond metaphysical 
positivism  and scientism , and accentuate whatever in 
the effective work of science contributes to freeing it 
o f the metaphysical bounds that have borne on its 
definition and its movement since its beginnings, (pp. 
3 5 -3 6 )
Knowledge, Sharon Crowley insists in her A Teacher's 
Introduction to Deconstruction (1989), is necessarily contextualized: 
that is, "no object o f perception can be altogether known when it is 
studied in isolation from the system that gives its meaning, from 
other objects that are both related to it and different from it, both in 
space and time" (p. 11). Knowledge is also interrelated with the 
constitution of power relations. Power and knowledge, according to 
Foucault (1980), are fused in the education practices that comprise
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history and that discourses partake of power, not knowledge alone.
The issue is the relationship between claims to truth and the 
distribution of power in discourse. Foucault (1980) insists that "we 
are subjected to the production of truth through power and we 
cannot exercise power except through the production of truth" (p.
93). Cherryholmes (1988) argues, from Foucault, that knowledge 
exists in relation to the constitutive interests that lead to its 
production. Knowledge, Wexler (1987) remarks, which is "elusive, 
associational, and com plexly connotative enables the fragmented 
decentered subject to push forward, interiority, toward realizing a 
residual desire for integration" (p. 103). Objective knowledge, 
accumulated throughout a given time, is dependent upon a particular 
perspective, in terms of Kuhn's (1970) "paradigm." What counts as 
objective truth is not the result of rationally subjecting hypotheses to 
empirical test, but emerges from a network of social agreements, a 
network o f power relations.
Compounding the problem of delay between emergence of 
knowledge and access to that knowledge in a pedagogical setting are 
the traditionally conservative characteristics o f the educational 
system. Derrida (1978) believes that the practice of education 
should catch up with contemporary epistem ology, and that the 
epistemic breaks of grammatology aim to help pedagogy do just that. 
These breaks challenge the dominant episteme and offer the 
possibility o f displacing that episteme. One of post-structuralism's 
central subjects is an interrogation of the production of knowledge as 
a complex contextual activity. Curriculum should not be a matter of 
replacing one "poor" with another "superior" knowledge. Curriculum
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should be a dialogue, in which all sub-discourses may benefit from 
the discourses of their neighbors. As Grisoni (1976) remarks: "Every
university puts language in this position of delay or derivation in 
relation to meaning or truth" (P. 62). In other words, knowledge is 
contextual and relational.
Curriculum Praxis
Tony W hitson, in "Post-structuralist Pedagogy as Counter- 
hegemonic Praxis" (1991), insists that "post-structuralist principles 
are needed now for an effective counter-hegemonic praxis" (p. 78). 
However, warns Whitson (1991), there is a danger of being simply an 
oppositional discourse, therefore, reintegrated into a hegem onically  
dominated social order. He explains:
The distinctive character o f hegemony as a mode of 
domination achieved precisely through the structural 
articulation of diverse interests, which functions partly 
by incorporating oppositional interests into articulated 
structuring (or meaningful “jointing together”) of 
disparate elem ents within hegemonic order itself, (pp.
7 9 -8 0 )
Thus hegemony, argues Whitson (1991), can be seen to "operate 
through articulation of conflicting elements by putting opposition 
into a supportive place within the structure" (p. 80). This can be 
achieved through deconstruction to shake up or dismantle the 
structure. However, the reversal o f the hierarchy 
(dominant/marginal or oppressor/oppressed) is neither an exchange 
o f position, nor a sublation o f contradiction into some superior entity.
It is in the ways in which teachers and students interact with
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knowledge and the meanings produced by such interactions which 
reveal something about what actually happens to school knowledge 
when it is acted upon. Traditional (the Enlightenment) epistemology 
which defines knowledge in terms of absolute truths that are 
acquired by individual autonomous subjects recedes from view.
Foucault situates all discourse on the surface of a 
power/knowledge relation and treats discourse as a form of action, 
as a movement within a field of forces. The question of the origin or 
foundation (or lack of) o f discourse seems to have little relevance 
when the principal questions being asked of discourse are how it 
performs and what its effects are. Instead Foucault is interested in 
exploring the different discursive formations of knowledge and how 
these discourses have been deployed at different historical periods.
Each discourse represents a different deployment of knowledge and 
pow er.
Reading and Curriculum
Reading is always involved with interpretation and rereading.
In deconstructive terms, reading is "rewriting" the text and of 
ourselves (Lyotard, 1987; Crowley, 1988; Scholes, 1990). Roland 
Barthes' definition of reading is suggested:
We never stop adding to the “Search,” we never stop 
writing it. And no doubt that is what reading is: 
rewriting the text of the work within the text of our 
lives, (cited in Scholes, 1990, p. 10)
Here, we can understand that reading is rewriting. Reading 
means not simply literal translation of symbols, nor the destructive.
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On the contrary, it is through such a reading, as Sharon Crowley
(1989) puts it, looking for "places in the text where a writer's 
language mis-speaks her, where she loses control of her intention, 
where she says what she did not 'mean' to say" (p. 7). What is 
present (said) is always "implied" in what is absent (not said). As 
Paul Ricoeur (1974) remarks, "what is gain from one point of view is 
loss from the other" (p. 291). Also reading in such a way is neither 
"author-centered" nor "reader-centered," but centered in terms of 
hermeneutic understanding and Derrida's "protocols o f reading"
(Derrida, 1981a, p. 63; Scholes, 1990). Rewriting means to write 
what we have read, in a sense of "creativity," not simply text upon 
text or going back to the origin. Rewriting is also a "working 
through," argues Lyotard (1987), "a task of thinking the meanings or 
events that are hidden not only in prejudices, but also projects, 
programs, prospects and the like, that are concealed even in the 
propositions or purposes of a psychoanalysis" (p. 4). Deleuze (1983b) 
insists:
Reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search 
of what is signified, still less a highly textual exercise 
in search of a signifier. Rather, it is a productive use 
o f the literary machine, a montage of desiring 
machines, a schizoid exercise that extracts from the 
text its revolutionary force, (p. 47)
Reading curriculum can be understood as working through its 
interweaving "textuality" (Scholes, 1985; W hitson, 1991). Curriculum 
practices, mainly in bureaucratic organizations, were organized and 
structured via scientific rationality. The objective o f scientific 
rationality is to gain control and mastery over the physical and social
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environment. Scientific rationality focuses on means but not on ends. 
Instrumental reason can not help us to live our lives. Foucault
(1989) reiterates this by saying that science uncovers the mythology 
in the world; but science itself is a myth which has to be superseded.
As noted earlier, "scientific knowledge has brought about a 
disenchantment with the world" (Sarup, 1989, p. 76). What is 
important about this one-dim ensionalizing, or desocializing of 
know ledge--instrum ental/technical rationality--is that it displays 
how the redefinition of knowledge is mediated institutionally 
between micro-classroom production and macro-integration of social 
regulation and interlocking networks of discipline and control.
Philip Wexler (1987) points out that structuralism views the 
curriculum as a set of rules or symbolic practices, and structuralism 
avoids "reducing knowledge to a static representation of social 
process" (p. 108). However, he argues that the centering of the sign 
of structuralism "returns language to being rather than signifying. 
Centering stabilizes the structure, allowing its predictive 
generalizability" (Wexler, 1987, p. 137). In view of school knowledge 
and its meaning, Wexler sees that the presence of some foundational 
essence becomes the target of deconstruction. Deconstruction is not a 
theory of meaning. Nevertheless, Derrida is much concerned about 
meaning; his claim about meaning is to present a conception of 
meaning where the conditions of possibility for meaning are to be 
found in iteration rather than contextualization. Deconstruction 
always involves both a reversal and an intervention. It does so not 
by passing from one concept to another, but by overturning the 
conceptual and nonconceptual order which is undecidable. The
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undecidability of a word or utterance has a twofold meaning of 
presence and absence always at play within any specific determinate 
sign ification.
P rob lem atics
In the structural analysis of curriculum, questions often come in 
pairs, implying binary opposition, contradiction, and tension.
Examples of binary distinctions that structure curriculum include 
theory/practice, fact/value, cogn itive/affective, teaching/learning, 
method/manner, prescription/description, action/thinking, subject- 
centered learning/learner-centered learning, etc,. Som etimes, these 
distinctions are either dismissed as unproblematical or simply taken- 
for-granted. In addition, they are individualized into a problem of 
ambivalence, not regarded as a structurally induced dilemma. As
Foucault (1986b) remarks "perhaps our life is still governed by a
certain number of oppositions that remain inviolable, that our 
institutions and practices have not yet dared to break down. These 
are oppositions that we regard as simple givens" (p. 23). All o f which 
are, according to Daignault (1984), necessarily embedded in the 
problematical relation between "what is"--what is described and 
"what ought to be"—what is prescribed (pp. 6-14). Daignault (1982a) 
elsew here remarks:
The curriculum field is full of many competing 
definitions or ideas , each one proclaiming to be the 
best one (what ought to be). . . and finally it decided to
look for consensus or to accept relativism because no
agreement seems possible, (p. 178)
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However, to address these problematics is not to achieve the 
sublimation or Hegelian "aufhebung" of these oppositions; instead it 
is to identify and to create (in terms of transgression) rather than to 
resolve. Cherryholmes (1988) claims that the strategic approach of 
critical discourse is not "turning the search for truth into a conflict or 
competition. . . . The pursuit o f the best argument is what is sought"
(p. 89). An example of the subversion of structural dichotomies 
within curriculum is the work of Madeleine Grumet (1988), Philip 
Wexler (1987), and James A. Whitson (1991). Grumet studies 
extensively the relation and constitution of private and public 
knowledge; W exler (1987) analyzes the polem ics between 
technological knowledge and cultural formation; Whitson (1991) 
argues for truly "counter-hegemonic" pedagogy to enable us to 
disrupt the structure —"hegemonic order" itself (p. 80). My intention 
here is to engage in problematization itself and to make connections, 
in order to create more senses. I also hope to make sense myself. A 
Zen master once said:
How to overcome the "dualist" world, in terms of 
subject-phenomena? The answer is to forget the 
question. For example, I am doing what I am doing, 
nothing else, (personal translation of U n d ers ta n d in g  
Zen  in Yuanwu, 1969, p. 26)
The above passage at first may seem to be nihilistic or 
relativistic. The issue concerns, I would argue, one's "forgetting" and 
"doing." It can be argued that this is not simply believing in nothing, 
nor an overture to conformism; rather, adopting Nietzsche's 
perspective of "active nihilism" or "cheerful nihilism," it implies a 
challenge to the causes and effects of disintegration by speeding up
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the process (Pefanis, 1991, p. 91). This also can be understood 
through Derrida’s concept of desire. Derrida (1985) remarks:
The desire for the intact kernel is desire itself, which 
is to say that it is irreducible. There is a prehistoric, 
preoriginary relation to the intact kernel, and it is only 
beginning with this relation that any desire 
whatsoever can constitute itself. Thus, the desire for 
the p h a n t a s m  o f the intact kernel is irreducible-- 
despite the fact that there is no intact kernel, (p. 115)
Here, Derrida opposes desire to necessity, to "ananke" (p. 116).
The ananke is that there is no intact kernel and there never has been
one. That is what one wants to forget, and to forget that one has
forgotten it. It is not absence instead of presence, but a trace which
replaces a presence which has never been present, an origin by
means of which nothing has begun. Derrida means to define trace as
that which always escapes, is deferred in the attempt to define
absolute knowledge as presence. The thought of the trace is the
radical other within the structure of "differance," always escapes the
binary system that is the hallmark of the being of presence.
Deconstructive Pedagogy
As noted in chapter two, "deconstruction" has been a fashionable 
word in various disciplines and studies. As a leading figure in this 
movement, Derrida and his deconstructive strategies have been fully 
recognized and abruptly applied in educational discourses. Several 
have paid extensive attention to the concept of deconstructive 
teaching (e.g., Yale French Studies. 1982; Scholes, 1985; Crowley,
1989). Some curricularists embrace Derrida's concept of 
deconstruction in part, in order to question and then to undermine
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our deeply embedded normative assumptions in curriculum (Ulmer, 
1985; Wexler, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1988; Crowley, 1989; Pinar,
1 988a ).
Derrida's involvement with the Group for Research on 
Philosophic Teaching (GREPH) has been the best exemplar of 
deconstructive pedagogy. In his essay "Deconstruction and 
Pedagogy" (1985) Vincent Leitch cites deconstructive thinking for 
suggesting a certain strategic stance and practice for pedagogy. He
remarks that the process of "depropriation" in deconstructive 
teaching would be necessary to suspend our ordained and 
naturalized belief and its own critiques. In order to succeed in this 
teaching, Leitch (1985) insists, the notions of "suspicious, critical, 
discriminating and optimistic" must be passed on to students. He 
points out that the classroom is always a problematic field, and he 
proposes ways of achieving a pedagogical project:
Uproot the frozen text; break down stereotypes and 
opinions; suspend or baffle the violence and authority 
of language; pacify or lighten oppressive paternal 
powers; disorient the law; let classroom discourse float, 
fragment, digress; seek ascetic or libidinal 
abandonment of the teaching body-self. (p. 21)
Further, a deconstructive pedagogy treats the "writing" process 
as it occurs always and everywhere. The writing process is not 
repetition, but differentiation. The notion of writing, in 
deconstructive terms, Leitch (1985) claim s, im plies that everything 
that we know is written; or, in other words, "Writing produces all 
our knowledge" (p. 23). As Silverman (1987) noted, following  
Sartre's ideas, to write is to be free, to be "engaged"; he remarks that
"being is acting and writing (to write, t c r i r e ) is to act" (p. 238). 
"Writing" for Derrida, according to Gregory Ulmer in A pplied  
G ram m atology (1985), is the "inven t io" of a new rhetoric, with 
"invention"—creativity—being the "mana" word o f the new pedagogy 
associated with writing. The function of notion, like "mana," is to be 
opposed to the absence o f signification, without entailing by itself 
any particular signification (pp. 163-165; see also Derrida, 1978). In 
other words, pedagogy is based upon a notion of invention or 
creativity. Thus pedagogy should be committed to change rather 
than to reproduction, and the classroom should become "a place of 
invention rather than of reproduction" (Ulmer, 1985, p. 162). We, 
students and teachers exist in a state of continuous construction and 
reconstruction; it is a world where anything that can be negotiated 
can occur.
The obstacle, Ulmer (1985) observes, that Derrida wishes to 
remove, is the conception of the "exteriority" of writing to speech and 
speech to thought—the view  that language is an instrument of 
thought, and writing only "the extension of an instrument 
(supplement)" (p. 79). As signs come into existence, independent of 
the intentions and temporality of the founding consciousness, and 
exterior to self-contained systems posited by structuralism, the 
event is always on the "exterior." Derrida wants to illustrate his own 
"grammatology," the practice o f a mode of writing which is no longer 
subordinated to speech and thought, a writing no longer functioning 
as a representation of speech, a practice in which the hierarchy of 
thought, speech, and writing is collapsed. In this sense, there is
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neither inside nor outside, neither originary nor supplement, but 
"differance" itself (Derrida, 1976, 1978).
Grammatology, applied by Ulmer (1985), cuts across the old 
divisions of knowledge, being concerned with all manners o f  
inscription, with the question of how any form of knowledge or mode 
of knowing relates to writing. Through deconstructive criticism of a 
structural view of meaning, Cherryholmes (1988) focuses on written 
text, and demonstrates that text speaks with many voices; he insists 
that "the meaning of what is present depends upon what is absent"
(p. 61). In other words, texts include traces of words and concepts
not present, and that which is not present makes possible that which
is present. Meaning, according to Derrida (1978), is in a legal sense 
subjectless, yet a conceptual necessity.
Meaning is determined by a system of forces which is
not personal. It does not depend on the subjective
identity but on the field of different forces . . . .  No one 
is free to read as he or she wants, (p. 22)
Robert Scholes (1985) suggests that teachers need to bring to 
students knowledge and skills that "will enable them to make sense 
of their worlds, to determine their own interests" (p. 15). The 
pedagogy which Scholes envisages seems to consist in a conscious 
attempt to empower students by letting them bring their own values 
and experience to bear on a text, and by illuminating the social and 
historical components of the text. Similarly, Ulmer relates Derrida's 
notions of deconstruction and writing to provoke a pedagogy, which 
recognizes that knowledge in and of humanities is precisely a 
knowledge of "enframing," of "media and mise in  seine" (Ulmer,
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1985, p. 183). In such way, stresses Ulmer, knowledge is understood 
not as a representation of something else but as itself a mode of 
action in the cultural world.
Selected Contemporary Curriculum Theorists
Peter Taubman: De-gendered Curriculum and the 
Student/Teacher Relation
In his 1979 doctoral dissertation, entitled Gender and 
Curriculum: Discourse and the Politics of Sexuality (published in 
1982), Peter Taubman employed Foucault's methodology to 
illuminate gender and fem inist issues in curriculum studies.
Taubman (1979) observes and analyzes the shifting movements of 
"sexual politics" through their discursive constitution within our daily 
lives. He proposes a "de-gendered" society as necessary to the 
transformation of curriculum (pp. 162-176). The underlying politics 
of selection (or exclusion) are typically obscured through the ways 
knowledge and curriculum are presented and organized. Curriculum, 
as a consequence of selection, distribution, and interpretation, 
symbolizes not only what is privileged as "formal" or real knowledge, 
but conditions the discursive practices that infuse this knowledge 
with power.
A decade later, he remarks, in "Achieving the Right Distance"
(1990), that it is significant to develop a psychoanalysis of 
relationship between student and teacher, more importantly, a 
relationship between the teacher and his or her self-identification.
Many believe anyone can teach, for it is easy to be the teacher and
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anticipate her or his practices. We teach the way we are taught. The 
issue at stake here is the taking up of an identity (public image) 
which requires suppressing aspects o f the self. To become a teacher 
thus means to become someone you are not. Taubman explicates the 
experience of coming to teach him self autobiographically. There is a
contradiction involving in the distance between student and teacher.
On the one hand, Taubman (1990) notes:
To compensate for the unconscious and forever 
unsatisfied need, the student, knowledge and the
privileged position as the one who knows are
substituted. . . . The desire to be, to know, to have is an 
unending desire that works in the direction of 
increasing distance between teacher and student, (p.
1 2 1 )
On the other hand, reiterates Pinar (1988a), "intimacy with 
students would require [a teacher's] dissolution of identity" (p. 127).
The "right" distance between student and teacher, suggests Taubman
(1990), lies "in the middle, at the midpoint" (p. 131). This midpoint 
can be related to the paradoxical instance found in post­
structuralism .
This process o f "achieving" the right distance, I think, is the focus 
to which pedagogical meaning aspires. In discussing this process, it 
should address the discursive formations of producing knowledge 
and the ways for interpreting the knowledge that can and cannot be 
produced. Taubman rightly notes that the assumption of particular 
forms of cultural authority has been mystified, in the realm of 
Lacan's the "imaginary." He remarks: knowledge is instructive in and 
of itself (Taubman, 1990).
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Cleo Cherryholmes: Post-structural Investigations
Cherryholmes, in his Power and Criticism (1988), took the task 
as "an interpreter of post-structuralism" (J. F. Soltis in Foreword) to 
demonstrate contemporary post-structuralist thought and its 
application to curriculum. He provides a clear and convincing 
introduction to post-structural approaches to the curriculum field; he 
asserts that the analytic tradition has influenced many educators, 
preventing them from accepting a less orderly, less controllable, less 
accountable framework. Cherryholmes (1988) offers his own view of 
"critical pragmatism" which incorporates post-structuralism into 
traditional American analytic philosophy (pp. 141-149).
Cherryholmes (1988) invites readers to "rethink" present 
structural educational discourse-practices (pp. 1-13). Through post- 
structural analysis and criticism, mainly Foucault's "discourse" (which 
he terms "interpretive analytics") and "power arrangement,"
Derrida's "text" (which he terms "deconstruction") and "meaning in 
play," coupled with speech-act theory, Cherryholmes (1988) 
insightfully criticizes structuralist analyses that have been 
deterministic and uncritical (pp. 33-40). He outlines and questions 
three influential structuralist-minded approaches in education:
Tyler's (1949) rationale, Schwab's "The Practical 4" (1969) as an 
extension and application of Tylerian rationale, and Bloom's 
taxonomy. He asks of Tyler's rationale—under what conditions can it 
be operative? He questions how we can make decisions about 
curriculum and instruction when these are socially embedded and 
determined by political, historical, cultural, economic, and linguistic
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settings. He regards the most troublesome characteristic of the 
structuralist approach as "value neutrality."
To the question of meaning, Cherryholmes (1988) draws on John 
Austin and John Searle's speech act theory to show that meaning is 
socially constructed and context dependent. At Derrida's insistence, 
writing makes speech possible. Cherryholmes then explicates this 
notion of absence of textual formation into the school's "hidden 
curriculum," arguing that the awareness of critical thinking needs to 
be raised. He points out: "Deconstructive analysis suggests that texts 
are never what they seem" (p. 61). This absence parallels the 
"noise," in Serres' (1982) "the parasite," as background signifying the 
presence and the message.
Cherryholmes (1988) recognizes that critical discourse or 
"pragmatism" is necessarily paradoxical in nature itself. He states 
that it "cannot eliminate structural conditions necessary for its own 
constitution. . . the desire to eliminate distortions is also a normative 
commitment" (p. 92). In addition, Cherryholmes suggests an attitude 
of playfulness to approach deconstruction. It is in this notion of 
playfulness that one can seek beyond what is in the text, that one 
can connect between words, utterance, or discourses and what is not 
there.
Cherryholmes basically demonstrates a circular triplet— 
construction, deconstruction, subsequent criticism —in his analyses of 
curriculum. In these analyses inheres a radical definition of the self, 
which in Europe has Marxist underpinnings, that Cherryholmes and 
others, who seek to "liberate" the self, find unappealing. He attempts 
to incorporate speech-act theory into post-structuralism, as if  this
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might remedy the post-structuralism with which, in fact, speech-act 
theory is incompatible. He, and other deconstructionists, customarily 
ignore post-structuralist epistem ology and focus on the analysis and 
interpretation of literary work. Such analysis is a project of 
description of the content of a poetry not subordinated to 
propositional truth.
Philip Wexler: After the New Sociology of Education
Philip Wexler, in his Social Analysis o f Education (1987), 
reapproaches the social analysis o f education through a postmodern 
lens. He focuses not only on historical analyses of educational 
change, but also reconceives education by viewing school knowledge 
as "processes of decomposition and dereification" (p. 83). He asserts 
critically that knowledge has been simply regarded as "skill and 
information," that a culture of scientism, heroic, self-centered and 
psychological, has been expressed through contemporary schooling.
He also rejects the concepts o f "reproduction" and "resistance," 
adopted by the so-called new sociology of education, as able to 
account for the social function of schools and society. He then 
introduces a synthesis o f post-industrialism and post-structuralism  
into his "social analysis" of education. He claims that education has 
been distorted, that the contradiction of education (like that o f the 
sociology of education) is that "it is at once a discursive blockage 
against realizing and articulating knowledge," which '"contains1—both 
includes and constrains—the most powerful, though diffused and 
fragmented, cultural resources of historical knowledge" (Wexler,
114
1987, p. 13). Wexler claims that representation is already an 
"audacious act against the autonomy of the subject" (p. 101).
W exler (1987) stresses that the conceptual formation from 
ideology to reproduction/resistance has functioned in a binary 
fashion--"individual-society," "structure-agency," that it presumably 
has a cultural autonomy similar to what it is criticizing. This cultural 
autonomy, Wexler observes, that is "linked to obscure the possibility  
of a collective historical understanding of social life" (p. 43). Wexler 
still believes the dialectic o f the "commodity" is where the disruptive 
diffusion and decentering current at play in social and literary 
modernism. He argues that those abstract cultural mystifying 
processes which once were hidden, congealed by post-industrialism, 
are now unravelled in the ordinary practices o f social production. He 
remarks that "the deconstructive decomposition of the sociocultural 
relations of production is now both a requirement o f advanced 
production, and secondarily, in the capitalization of information, an 
additional means of profit" (p. 14). For Wexler, the "subject" is
sometimes assumed by the term "socialization" and it "ruptures the
apparent naturalness o f the systematic objectifying pacification of  
self-conscious subjective identity and intentional action" (p. 115).
A lso she/he is a "self-parody," "multidimensional, decentered, and 
decentering" subject (p. 115).
Wexler (1987) further remarks that the centering of structure
"not only regresses toward essentialism, toward the view  of symbols
as 'expressing' some prior unitary being or thing, but also stops the 
m o v e m e n t  that inheres in language" (p. 137). The relational system  
of signs limits structuralism itself. He further explains that "the aim
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of decentering is to release the refined energy of textuality, and to 
offer an enlightenment not of reason, but o f movement" (p. 139). He 
is proposing that the free energy, informal culture of social 
interaction, performance-oriented rationality, emitted from  
textuality is also what conditions knowledge production taking place 
in the schools.
The discourse is secondary to the centered metaphysics of 
structuralism. The power of discourse, claims Wexler (1987), is not 
"an expression or representation of anterior objects" (p. 141). On the 
contrary, it is discourse, the socially constructed and regulating 
practices o f that "dispersed plane of knowledge, the episteme, that 
forms the object, referent, and being of last appeal, the subject,
'man'" (p. 141). Wexler stresses that the production of knowledge is 
not only the o b jec t  o f practice but also the social relationships it 
inscribes. As Foucault (1972) puts it: "Every educational system is a
political means of maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of  
discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it" (p.
227). The point is not to dissolve relations of power in the utopia of 
a transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules o f law, 
the techniques of management, and the ethics—the e t h o s --th e  
practice of self, which would allow these games of power to be 
played with a minimum of domination.
However, W exler (1987) is skeptical o f post-structuralism and 
regards it as "a form of cultural life as internal exile" (p. 15). In an 
essay "Curriculum in the Closed Society" (1989), he notes that post­
structuralism is a "literary face" of postmodernism (p. 10).
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Rebecca Martusewicz: Post-modern Feminist Critique
Those of us stand outside the circle of this society's 
definition of acceptable women; those of us who have 
been forged in the crucibles o f differences. . . know 
that survival is not an academic skill. It is learning 
how to stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, 
and how to make common cause with those others 
identified as outside the structures in order to define 
and seek a world in which we can all flourish. It is 
learning how to take our differences and make them 
strengths. For the master's tools will never dismantle
the master's house. (Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider i n
Barbara Johnson, 1987, pp. 1-2)
The fem inist movement has had enormous influence on 
curriculum since the late 1970s. Feminist criticism, according to 
Vincent Leitch (1988), started along with hermeneutics, literary 
criticism and sem iotics and post-structuralism to "expose patriarchal 
premises and prejudices; to promote the discovery and revaluation of 
literature by women; and to scrutinize the social and cultural
contexts o f literature and criticism" (p. 307). Gender in education has
always been an important issue in all levels o f policy-making and 
everyday practices, especially since the women's movement in the 
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M artusewicz details a post-modern or post-structural feminist 
perspective of curriculum field in her Ph.D. dissertation, The W ill to 
Reason: An Archaeology o f Womanhood and Education. 1880-1920
(1988). She attempts to lay bare the claim of "the reason of the
other" to account for the dismissal or "neutralization" o f women's
discourse by patriarchal domination (Martusewicz, 1988, p. 46). This
word "Other," insists Derrida (1978), is "circumscribed in silence by
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the capital letter which ever increases the neutrality of the o t h e r , 
and which we use so familiarly, even though it is the very disorder 
of our conceptuality" (p. 105). A lso reason is, in the Deleuzean notion 
of "a priori  other," the idea of neither presence nor absence, of other 
defining initially a certain way of treating the concepts of 
understanding--"a concept being given, reason seeks another which, 
taken in the totality of its extension, conditions the attribution of the 
first to the object to which it refers" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 294).
Woman's acquisition of power of voice thus grows not out of her 
identity but out of her division into the inside and outside o f reason.
M artusewicz (1988) depicts the discourses of women during the 
period from 1880 to 1920, which had tremendous impact on fem inist 
theory to date. For instance, she argues that "the female body 
became the object o f scientific gaze and the 'truth' of woman's nature 
was asserted, backed up with hard evidence" (p. 48). Woman's 
relation to knowledge is that the place of the "facilitator" of 
knowledge as mother and as teacher, servicing the knower but 
distant from and incapable of becoming the knower herself. Drawing 
on Foucault, she challenges dualistic, male-dominated ways of 
thinking, reproducing androcentric bias at the groundwork, not 
merely presupposing them. She questions the relation between the 
historical production of knowledge and woman as a social form and 
subjective position. For the subject is not the source of meaning; 
rather, Foucault (1980) asserts meaning and subjectivity are 
produced through a complex system of differences, through language 
and the wider symbolic system that we understand to be culture.
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Regarding the question o f knowledge production and of identity, 
Martusewicz (1988) raises the following:
First, many are interested in what women should be 
learning, what forms of organized knowledge would be 
beneficial to a woman's life. But, in order to come to a 
decision about such curricular matters, there would 
first have to be agreement about what constitutes true 
womanhood, (p. 4)
Martusewicz (1988) argues that the discourse on the body was
"articulated within a broader discourse on reason. . . women 
strategically emulated to justify their positions in the male- 
dominated world of knowledge production" (p. 144). She claims that 
reason legitimates women's exit from the private while ensuing the 
reproduction o f woman as inferior "Other," as woman struggles to 
have what man has. She then asks the question, raised first by 
Adrienne Rich (1976), of "whether women cannot begin, at last, to 
think through the body,  to connect what has been cruelly 
disorganized" (p. 284). "Thinking" is an active and expanding 
process; "knowing" are recapitulations o f past processes. Our 
thinking bodies are intertwined with our lives and our deaths. In
doing so, women "produced knowledge about their body, in 
particular about the female body and its regulation, about the female 
mind, and about the educated woman" (Martusewicz, 1988, p. 144).
She is suggesting a deeper understanding that reconceptualizes 
educational history and has the potential to problematize the taken- 
for-granted categories which produce knowledge and identity.
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William Doll: A Post-Modern Perspective
Notions o f postmodernity or postmodernism have stimulated 
vigorous debate for two decades (Arac, 1986). Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Habermas, Foucault, Lyotard, Rorty, and Jameson, among others, have 
variously discussed the project o f modernity in detail. Each has 
followed the tradition of Enlightenment and moved in his own 
direction. Postmodernism, started in Art and Architecture, has 
become a self-evident historical "category," an interdisciplinary 
specialization (Rajchman, 1991). It is generally accepted as an 
umbrella term for referring to the processes, changes and 
transformations that "come after" what before were generally 
homogenized, reducible, controllable, or predictable discourses.
In curriculum, postmodern approaches and analyses start to 
emerge follow ing different traditions. Burbules and Rice (1991) 
characterize three ideas o f postmodernism in educational studies. 
They are "the rejection of absolutes," "the perceived saturation of all 
social and political discourses with power or dominance," and "the 
celebration o f difference" (pp. 395-396).
Stanley Aronowitz and Henry Giroux (1991) approach the 
postmodern from a critical—neo-M arxist, Gramscian, Weberian— 
philosophical orientation; and they observe that what is at issue in 
education is the legitimacy claims of marginal discourses, the 
diversity of producing knowledge and its validity. Carol Nicholson
(1989) points out that a postmodern feminist pedagogy is not to 
"destroy tradition but to give students the opportunity to reinterpret 
it for themselves in the light of new problems and perspectives" (p.
1 2 0
204). Fritzman (1990) advocates a postmodern pedagogy, embracing 
Lyotard's paralogy, which instead of constructing a curriculum based 
on the ideal of a social consensus, teaches students "to be sensitive to 
the inevitable presence o f differends" (p. 379). In other words, the 
emphasis is on "dissensus" rather than consensus.
William Doll (1989, 1991) sets forth a "post-modern" view of 
curriculum, drawing heavily on post-quantum science and post­
positivist philosophy as a way to reinterpret Piaget, Bruner and 
Dewey, and as an alternative to the present prevailing modernist 
paradigm. He proposes a four R's curriculum inquiry, which are 
"richness, relation, rigor, and recursion" (Doll, in press). This 
approach suggests a different realm of pedagogy and practice.
Doll (1989) approaches the problem atic—deterministic 
orientation—of curriculum through a post-modern perspective, which 
he contrasts with modern Newtonian paradigms, and he outlines a 
possible post-modern view of curriculum. He then suggests that 
notions of "instability," "chaos," "self-organization," "complexity," and 
"recursion" should be considered in concerning the interactions 
between teacher and student in the classroom. Utilizing Piaget,
Bruner and Dewey, he exem plifies "equilibrium," "disequilibrium" 
and "reequilibration" at various stages of self-generative  
development in order to achieve the process pedagogy in schooling 
(Doll, in press).
Doll acknowledges the hermeneutics o f understanding and of self 
to embrace a notion of "community" which includes Rorty's notion of 
"conversation." He strives to introduce a post-modern view of 
curriculum through a "new" epistem ology which is hermeneutically
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oriented. This alternative to a traditional, systematic and linear 
Tylerian rationale proposed by Doll (in press) would help to vitalize 
curriculum .
William Pinar: Autobiography and the Architecture of Self
The notion of "currere," inaugurated and emphasized by Pinar 
and Grumet (1976), is the keystone of the "reconceptualist" 
movement of the 1970s. Currere stems from its Latin root, Pinar 
(1976) notes, suggesting that curriculum focus not on the external, 
the objective, the public, but rather to involve the search for the 
nature of the individual experience of the public—the existential 
experience of the educational journey. Recently, Pinar (1991) insists 
that "the significance of place" brings "the particularistic into focus"; 
it also "sharpens our understanding of the individual and the psychic 
and social forces that direct him or her" (p. 4). To the contrary,
Foucault (1986b) remarks:
We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of 
the world is less that o f a long life developing through 
time, than that o f a network that connects points and 
intersects with its own skein, (p. 22)
Pinar (1988a) questions the concept of "authentic self" through 
autobiography which would enable students and teachers to 
understand themselves and the world itself. The concept of an 
"authentic self" with knowable characteristics, such as rationality, 
emotion, and will, is dismantled. For Pinar (1988b), understanding of 
self is not narcissism, rather it is a "precondition and a concomitant 
condition" to the understanding of others (p. 150).
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Pinar asserts that the construction of self requires certain 
exclusions which, in terms of curriculum, as "enculturation," as 
political socialization (Pinar, 1988a). He is suggesting the 
construction of an inclusive architecture of self through 
autobiographical reflection. He insists that a self committed to 
education might w ell redistribute resources from the dominant self 
to those elements of the self that have been—via conditioning and 
choice—marginalized. He argues that "the self is fictive; it is an 
aesthetic creation, and the means by which the self is planned and 
'built' are story-telling and myth-making" (Pinar, 1988a, p. 18). He 
proposes using autobiography as a means for self-reflection and self- 
understanding in relation to the self, curriculum studies, and the 
world. This orientation, Merleau-Ponty (1961) suggests:
produces a table of diverse, complex probabilities, 
always bound to local circumstances, weighted with a 
coefficient of facticity. (p. 44)
Each reality of self gives way to reflexive questioning, irony, and 
ultimately the playful probing of yet another reality. The center fails 
to hold; it is deconstructed through increasingly awareness that the 
objects of which we speak are not so much in the world as they are 
products of perspective. The very concept of personal essences is 
thrown into doubt.
Pinar (1992) points out that post-structuralism has been rapidly 
recognized throughout the last decade and provokes certain 
controversies and debates among curriculum studies. Nevertheless, 
he embraces such a challenge for curricular scholars, through which 
educators may respond reflexively. As well, he recognizes that
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notions of "narrating" or "to narrate" in writing are highly suggestive
for curriculum theory and practice. As Robert Scholes (1990)
remarks, narrative is a central armature of human thought.
Ted Aoki: Sound of Pedagogical Calling
Ted Aoki proposes a kind of embodying of teaching. It is not 
simply representational reflective understanding, nor merely critical 
praxis, understood as critical theory searching underlying ideology  
which conditions our existence. This reflective "storying" and 
"theming," in Aoki's view , is concerned more about what we already 
are while we are existing in the world. Curriculum, insists Aoki, is 
regarded as the movement of lived-experience, relations between 
man and the world. Pedagogy for him can be considered as play 
which is purposeful without a purpose. Play is not random but 
coherent and meaningful, yet without a purpose in a conventional 
sense, because it is not for anything but just for fun, for self­
enjoyment, for "being-in-the-world." Such a view  has great practical 
significance. Free association is not just everything goes; free 
association still makes connections, because free association brings us 
back home to our self--in terms of Heidegger’s "dwelling-in-the- 
world." Pertinent here is a Zen story:
A blind man went to visit his friend far away. When
he was ready to leave, the sky was very dark. His
friend advised him to take a lamp to light the way, he 
answered that “I do not need a lamp, bright and dark 
are the same to me.” His friend said: “I know you do 
not need a lamp, but if you do not hold a lamp, maybe 
someone will come across you.” He then held a lamp 
and walked home. On the way home, one person 
knocked on him at his face. He yelled to that person:
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“Hey! watch your way, don't you see the lamp! Are 
you blind!” That person replied: “Hey sir, your candle 
was not lit.” (personal translation)
This story implies that holding other people's ideas in order to 
understand others is like the blind man holding the lamp; he would 
never know whether the candle was lit or not.
Aoki (1990a) believes that students’ and teachers' work and 
their self-reflexivities are central to the understanding of pedagogy. 
Stories are told, in terms of Heidegger's "telling," in their own voices, 
by students and teachers and they share with one another—
"listening to pedagogical being" (pp. 2-10). This pedagogy signifies 
an attempt to create spaces for expressions o f their concerns and 
thus brings us a sense of "belon g in g  together" (pp. 12-16).
A f t e r - t h o u g h t s
The implications of post-structuralist perspectives for 
curriculum are numerous. Post-structuralism invites us to rethink, 
to question the way we used to think. Curriculum as post­
structuralism is an intriguing reminder of the provisionality of 
knowledge. In this chapter, I have considered the initial examples of 
post-structuralist scholarship. Taubman and Martusewicz 
incorporate Foucault's m ethodology into gender-difference and 
identity-formation. Cherryholmes and W exler employ post- 
structuralist approaches to focus their critical theory perspectives.
Pinar and Aoki extend phenomenological aspects o f curriculum 
theory and practice toward post-structuralism. Doll argues for a 
post-modern vision in curriculum. These scholars can be viewed as 
transitional as they point toward a post-structuralist "view" in
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curriculum, a view currently most completely developed by Jacques 
Daignault.
In the next chapter, I w ill explicate Jacques Daignault's post­
structuralist curriculum thought. Daignault articulates post­
structuralism extensively , demonstrating curriculum studies and 
pedagogy post-structurally. In the "deconstruction" of curriculum 
many problematics start to emerge as post-structuralists' notions of 
the "condition of possibility," the "undecidable," the "trace," or the 
"events" are employed. These problematics as discursive formations 
point to curriculum understood post-structurally.
CHAPTER FOUR  
THE WORK OF JACQUES DAIGNAULT
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great 
philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal 
confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and 
unconscious memoir; also that the moral (and 
immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted 
the real germ of life from which the whole plant had 
grown. (Nietzsche, 1966, p. 13)
I can talk of Foucault, tell you that he has said this or 
that to me, set it out as I see it. This is nothing as long 
as I have not been able really to encounter this set of 
sounds h a m m e r e d  out, of decisive gestures, of ideas all 
made of tinder and fire, of deep at ten t ion  and sudden 
closure, of laugh ter  and smiles which one feels to be 
'‘idangerous' ,, at the very moment when one feels 
t e n d e r n e s s —this set as a unique combination whose 
proper name would be Foucault. (Deleuze, 1987b, p.
11 )
P o s t -s tr u c tu r a lis m  E n c o u n te r e d
This chapter discusses the major works of a major post- 
structural curriculum theorist—Jacques Daignault. It provides an 
overview of his thought and of its bearing on the central issues of 
contemporary curriculum theory. Since the influence of Gilles 
Deleuze on Daignault is enormous, a "reading" of Deleuze presented 
alongside a reading of Daignault w ill be presented as an intersecting 
"event." I would agree with what Foucault (1977) says when he 




Thinking of Jacques Daignault, whose complex and elusive style 
strikes me most, I am reminded o f Deleuze's encounter with Foucault. 
The "deep attention" and "sudden closure" revealed in Daignault's 
rigorous efforts suggest the metaphysical questioning of essence—
"what is the problematics?" to which I have no fixed answer. If I 
supplied an answer, then Daignault would ask: "Which one?" The
concept of "multiplicity" comes into play here.
The post-structuralist curriculum, Daignault (1983) conceives, is 
not simply the transmission of knowledge, or the transmission of  
values, nor the mastery o f method—"know-how" or "know-how-to- 
be"—but rather is a "manner" to "stage" knowledge through a 
"passage-way" (pp. 7-13). This passage-way is to think otherwise, as 
in Nietzsche's "will to" (as resentment), Heidegger's notion of 
"thinking" (thought-provoking) and Foucault's history of thought (as 
unthought), especially in the Deleuzean "sense" (French sens)- -  
surface and event (as the fourth dimension of language or fourth 
person singular). Daignault is suggesting such a notion of thinking or 
sense in which to think oneself as self-educative, means "to 
experiment and to problematize"; to make sense which by itself is a 
problematic and problematizing. Influenced by Kant and Deleuze, 
Daignault asserts that the separation of universality and 
particularity, subject and object, one's work and play, one's 
intellectual activities and everyday life, teaching and learning is all 
but unattainable. Binary oppositions are denied. Daignault thinks of 
the "excluded middle" (in Deleuze's term "sense-event") being given 
ready-made unproblematically in curriculum studies. The excluded  
middle is the interest of determinations of signification. He argues
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that sense (event) is presented both as that which happens to bodies 
and that which insists in propositions. As Ulmer (1985) points out, 
classroom is a place for teacher and students' inventions, not simply 
reproduction; he insists that "pedagogy is (a) theater that is not 
representation but 'life itself'" (p. 174). Lives become texts. Texts 
require interpretations and reinterpretations.
Daignault's Staging-Thinking
Jacques Daignault started his career in music. He was fascinated 
by the works of John Cage, Philip Glass and Steve Reich whose work 
resembles a musical version of post-structuralist thought. Daignault 
studied education at University of Laval, where he finished the Ph.D. 
in 1982. He has studied post-structuralism, mainly the works of 
Deleuze, Serres and Lyotard since 1976 in Quebec and in France. The
influence of Deleuze on Daignault is obvious; he employs the 
Deleuzean notion of "sense," "expressible and expressed," "surface- 
skin" and "paradoxes" in his own teaching and writing. He writes on 
post-structuralism and curriculum theory in a "unique" (there is no 
organizing principle) yet consistent way, and he has developed a 
"staging" (mise en scene) or "performative speech act" in his own 
educational pursuits (1986, p. 3).
In reflecting upon Daignault's writing, I hope to lay out an 
interpretation of his "ideas" without losing the diagonal senses of his
writing. These diagonal senses are "unsayable" (Foucault, 1972,
1977), akin to Derrida's "undecidable," or "trace," and Deleuze's "non­
parallel" revolution—which is a "heterochronous becoming" (Derrida, 
1978; Deleuze, 1987b). Language has invented the dualism, says
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Deleuze (1987b); therefore we must pass through dualism because it 
is in language. In other words, to pass through dualisms is not to get 
rid of them, but to fight against language, to invent "stammering"—
AND, AND, AND. . . (1987b, p. 17). For instance, in Platonic dualism, 
we recognize that it is not at all the dualism of the intelligible and 
the sensible, of Idea and matter. It is not the distinction between the 
model and the copy, but rather between good copies and simulacra— 
false copies (Deleuze, 1990). Deleuze states that "it is a subterranean 
dualism between that which receives the action of the Idea and that 
which eludes this action" (1987a, p. 3). However, I hope, this study 
can be grasped in a conventional as well as post-structuralist way to 
cast light on the connection between Deleuze and Daignault's thought.
In a series of essays written during the last decade, Daignault 
analyzed and demonstrated pedagogical implications of post- 
structuralism through his encounter with Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, 
Serres and Deleuze. He has staged the questions of future 
possibilities in curriculum theory and practice.
Post-structuralism "as" Pedagogy
For Daignault, the truth is not merely the subject o f enunciation 
nor the subject o f statements, but the "event" itself—the boundary of 
two sides. In a Derridean fashion, Daignault sees the concept of 
truth, as implied by harmonious agreement and that which defines 
the "true" opinion of what something means, as itself a naive notion.
Why study Daignault's essays historically? Because essays 
interweave with one another; there is no organizing principle. This
"staging" is a stage itself. Daignault deals with problematics in 
curriculum (his usage of education and curriculum is somehow  
interchangeable) post-structurally. For instance, Daignault remarks 
in his essay, "Curriculum as composition: who is the composer?"
(1 9 8 9 )
Education is the process through which the subject 
resists determinations. That is to say the subject is not 
the self-consciousness; actually, the subject is the 
subject of education. Thinking is the bridge between 
the expressing's self-consciousness and the subject of 
education. Thinking is the incarnation of curriculum 
as composition; it is what gives birth to an assemblage 
of notes, (p. 4)
His "translation" of post-structuralism into curriculum is 
insightful. Thinking means to "problematize," to go beyond subject- 
identity toward "the thought of difference" and "the production of 
sense" (Daignault, 1991, p. 376). This leads to an aesthetics of 
problematization that neither excludes the subject nor centers it. 
Daignault insists: This problematization does not exclude feeling or
emotion without reducing everything to it either.
The Indecent Curriculum Machine: Who's Afraid of Sisyphus?
(,19 8 2 a )
One day Sisyphus brought an indecent curriculum 
machine that functioned (got out o f  order)  only if  it got 
out o f order (w orked) .  Immediately Sisyphus 
hastened to start the machine and since it worked 
very well (got out of  order), it got out of order (b eg a n  
to work)  at once. Happy was he to see that his 
machine worked (got out o f  order)  but sad was he also 
to see that it was out of order (w orked) ,  (p. 194)
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In the beginning of his first (in English) article, with Clermont 
Gauthier, entitled "The indecent curriculum machine: Who's afraid of 
Sisyphus?" published in The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (1982), 
Jacques Daignault claims that the fundamental problem of the 
curriculum field has been the search for identity; in other words, its 
definition. Here, we can connect this quoted passage with Deleuze's 
(1990) comments on Mallarme, dialogue from Zen master, he states:
"'If you have a cane', says the Zen master, 'I am giving you one; if  
you do not have one, I am taking it away.' (or, Chrysippus said, 'If 
you never lost something, you have it still; but you never lost horns, 
erg o  you have horns')" (p. 136). The point is not to repudiate any 
identity nor to embrace every possibility whatsoever. There is a 
paradoxical element im plicitly being connected with the question of 
"What is curriculum?" raised by Daignault. This curriculum question 
and answer parallels the questions raised in post-structuralism. This 
paradoxical instance, therefore, has the property of always being 
displaced in relation to itself, of "being absent from its own place," its 
own identity, its own resemblance, and its own equilibrium. It is the 
question of "in-between" or "boundary" which runs into all possible 
directions at one and the same time.
Since its identity, the curriculum field, Daignault argues, was a 
"step-child" or "sub-discipline" to other disciplines. It was always 
associated with or derived from other disciplines and subject 
matters, such as psychology, political science, history, sociology, 
educational administration. Daignault contends that curriculum has 
been developed and became recognizable during the last two 
decad es.
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Daignault (1982a) does not define what curriculum is, rather,
"how it functions-how to be" (pp. 182-183). We can understand his 
intention via Deleuze's (1986b) statement that "it is absolutely 
useless to look for a theme in a writer if one hasn't asked exactly 
what its importance is in the work—that is, how it functions (and not 
what its 'sense' is)" (p. 45). This also parallels the "technologies of 
self" in Foucault's dealing with self-formation (Foucault, 1988).
Daignault, then, approaches this problematic o f identity through the 
concept of paradox, adopted from Gregory Bateson (1972) and 
Deleuze's (1990) series of paradoxes. Daignault argues that identity 
is inherited from difference, and he remarks that the concept of 
identity presupposes the concept o f "sameness." Two items have to 
be the same in order to be identical. Such a view has been explained 
in Hegel's dialectical thinking; it is the identity, both  between the 
identity of identity and identity a n d  between the identity of 
difference and difference (Descom bes, 1986), that constitutes the 
"difference" between identity and difference. However, Daignault 
goes further to argue that the problematic o f identity is focusing on 
the paradoxical instance of the "difference" itself, not yet 
differentiated. Paradox, says Deleuze, is at first that which destroys 
good sense as the only direction, but paradox is also that which 
destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities. Deleuze 
(1990) asserts that the function of the paradoxical instance is to 
"ensure the relative displacement of the two series, the excess of the 
one over the other, without being reducible to any of the terms of 
the series or to any relation between these terms" (p. 40). In other
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words, paradoxical instance functions to condition the possibilities of 
being related or divergent.
In this Deleuzean way, then, Daignault (1982a) insists that 
curriculum is a paradoxical and nomadic object, which is always 
transient (moving). In short, curriculum is "thought without image, 
object following an always moving empty space" (p. 182). Here we 
should not confuse the acts of thought with the image of thought; for 
him, the curriculum does not exist, but it happens. As Deleuze 
(1990) points out, the idea of "a place without occupant" and "an
occupant having no place" are not to be fixed or to be filled up in a
place, which would simply stop the game (an "ideal game" in his 
mind); to the contrary, he insists, the point is to keep on playing. The
empty place and perpetual displacement of a piece in a game is a
double sliding in a "perpetual disequilibrium vis-a-vis each other" (p. 
40). However, Deleuze (1990) remarks that "the paradoxical entity is 
never where we look for it, and conversely that we never find it 
where it is. As Lacan says, 'it fails to observe its place' (elle manque  
a sa place)" (p. 41).
Daignault does not propose that we should stop defining but, on 
the contrary, to m u lt ip ly  the definitions, to invite a plural spelling.
To define is to distort. His intention here, with which Deleuze would 
agree, is that to define is not a question of probabilities, combining 
the heterogeneous elem ents, simply putting them together. Rather, 
to define is to portray that there are varied lines, in the Deleuzean 
(1990) term "series ," made by people (or things) that do not know 
necessarily which line they are on or where they should make the 
line which they are tracing pass. The serial form is "realized in the
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simultaneity [of] at least two series" (p. 36). In short, there is a 
whole "geography" in people—with lines of flight, series o f event.
The notion of time-spatial can be found in Deleuze’s (1986a, 1989) 
"movement-image" and "time-image."
Another notion of "machine" that is articulated in this essay, 
related to Deleuze's (1987a) idea of "desiring-machine," is that of 
assemblage, an assemblage of enunciation, an activity of prolific 
writing. Thus the curriculum machine is in this sense of a writing 
produced wherever the curriculum is placed. The indecent machine, 
in Daignault’s (1982a) eyes, is exactly that this prolific writing is 
"contingent to the fantasies o f the unconscious and inscribes itself 
literally in the tempo of the poetical involvement at the risk of 
engendering delight" (p. 188).
The problematic of theory and practice also interests Daignault 
significantly; it has been one of the major issues of curriculum.
Daignault approaches the problematic by using Deleuze's series o f 
paradoxes to demonstrate the present dilemma within the 
curriculum field. For example, regarding the problematics of 
teaching and learning, Daignault claims that there are many 
differences among theoretical practices, yet theoretical practices 
cannot be confused with the application of theories. Both Foucault 
and Deleuze recognize this point and reiterate that "theory does not 
express, translates, or serve to apply practice: it is practice" (Deleuze, 
1988, p. 13).
Therefore the problematic involves, observes Daignault, adopting 
Deleuze's third and eighth series o f the proposition in Logic of Sense 
(1990), i.e. that the issue at stake is the distinction or gap between
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theory and practice. Daignault found this can be understood as the 
"gap" between "signans"—as signifying— and "signatum," as the 
signified, which is called Levi-Strauss' paradox by Deleuze (1990):
The Universe signified long before we began to know 
what it was signifying. . . . Man, since his origin, has 
had at his disposal a completeness of signifier which 
he is obstructed from allocating to a signified, given as 
such without being any better known. There is always 
an inadequacy between the two. (cited in Daignault,
1982a, p. 187)
What is in excess in the signifying is a place without an occupant. 
What is lacking in the signified series is a "supernumerary"—an 
unknown, an occupant without a place. Daignault asserts that two 
conditions are present: "First, the elements of each series have to be
determined by differential relations as in the case for phonemes and 
morphemes in the language" and second, there must exist a 
paradoxical instance which pervades both series without belonging to 
neither a place without an occupant nor an occupant without a place"
(p. 189). This instance has the function of articulating the two series 
to one another, o f making them communicate, coexist, and ramify.
Daignault (1982a) insists that the filling-up or abandonment of 
the gap or empty space between two series becomes "terrorism" or 
"nihilism." In terms of terrorism, Daignault argues that the filling-up  
of empty places requires (1) "all radical transformation of what 
exists in conformity with what we believe it ought to be"; (2) "each 
one (competitive doctrines or ideologies) tries to convince the other 
that his is the true one," and consequently calls for violence (p. 192).
In terms of nihilism, he observes that the abandonment of empty 
space becomes nihilistic in the sense that "our acts instead of being
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asserted for what they are reactive to something which does not 
exist, or becomes a "patched-up activity" (p. 193). Here, he is 
elucidating the "sense" that not only the gap between the two series 
is irreducible, but also that the paradoxical instance of the 
pedagogical complexity maintains and keeps two series (theory and 
practice) meeting each other constantly. He says: Curriculum can be
defined as "a prolonged hesitation between sense and sense" (p. 193).
Daignault (1982a) concludes:
One day Sisyphus bought an indecent curriculum 
machine that functioned only if it got out of order and 
that got out of order only if it functioned.
Immediately he hastened to start the machine and 
since it worked very well, it got out of order at once 
but also since it got out of order quite well, it began to 
function.
. . . this prolonged hesitation defined the curriculum.
(p. 194)
To Make Someone Know as We Make Someone Laugh: A 
Perverse Analysis of Promise and Desire in Curriculum H 982bl
In this amusing and provocative essay, Daignault succinctly 
illustrates the fundamental paradox of the pedagogical relation 
through the intriguing conversation between Don Juan and Don 
Quixote. The paradox, Daignault (1982b) sees, is exactly the link 
between desire and promise, teaching and learning; in other words, 
"the promise of the other's desire" (p. 18). As Lacan (1977) would 
say "the subject of a teaching is a learning" (p. 20). Along with these 
lines, he ironically parodies Marxist approaches which are succinct 
(sufficient) but too dogmatic. He writes wittily, "I would become sad 
as a Marxist should Don Quixote become a Roller Derby player!" (p. 3)
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In other words, Marxist approaches function to kidnap the readers to 
make them happy.
The notion of desire is the central point of this essay. We can 
recall the concept of desire, explicated by Derrida (1985). He states:
The desire for the intact kernel is desire itself, which 
is to say that it is irreducible. There is a prehistoric, 
preoriginary relation to the intact kernel, and it is only 
beginning with this relation that any desire 
whatsoever can constitute itself. Thus, the desire for 
the p h a n t a s m  o f the intact kernel is irreducible— 
despite the fact that there is no intact kernel, (p. 115)
The notion of desire is not the absence instead of the presence, 
but a trace which replaces a presence which has never been present, 
an origin by means of which nothing has begun. The opposite of 
desire, in terms of "ananke," makes possible the kernel desires itself- 
-the intact desire for intactness. (Derrida, 1987)
Daignault (1982b) reiterates the relation between "what is" and 
"what ought to be." The gap between what is and what ought to be 
has been one of Daignault's on-going interests. Here he confronts it 
with the notion of desire. Girard, Rosset, Lacan and Deleuze are the 
background figures. Now he is introducing a notion of desire as 
seduction which can be discovered in pedagogical situations. The 
notion of seduction means the interplay, dialogue and encounters 
between teachers and students. The object o f desire is to know and 
thus be seduced; it is unreachable or unattainable. We can never 
know absolutely and yet our quest to know never stops. Once the 
object of desire has been appropriated, it loses its status as desirable; 
possession means death. Incidentally, in this regard Taubman 
(1990) points out that pedagogy is the question of achieving the
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"right" distance between teachers and students in complicity with the 
Lacanian notion of "desire."
Desire cannot be a question of "interior drives," or Girard's "lack 
of being," for to think of it in those ways is to reestablish the realm 
of interiority common to Man, even if one is Woman. Daignault 
(1982b) insists that "such is the romantic lie to which is opposed the 
'romanesque' truth" (p. 5). According to Deleuze (1987b) and 
Daignault (1982b), the misconceptions of desire may be summarized 
as following three:
F ir s t , it can be put in relationship with lack or the law; 
se co n d ,  with a natural or spontaneous reality; third,  
with pleasure or, above all, the festival, celebration 
(i.e., reversal). (Deleuze, 1987b, p. 103)
We can see here desire represented as a lack, a function not of 
the presence of a desirable object, but o f its actual absence and thus 
of its sole imaginary and symbolic presence. On the contrary,
Daignault (1982b) asserts, desire is not "the inaccessibility of the 
object of Desire," but also the assumption that it comes from "an 
excessive appreciation of reality is rejected" (p. 6). Thus he argues 
that it is rather from "a radical 'differance' coming from the pure 
fabrication of a double" (p. 7). This is an undifferentiated whole.
This also can be interpreted in light o f Deleuze's contention that 
desire is production, or "desiring-production," not acquisition or lack. 
Ronald Bogue (1989), commenting on Deleuze and Guattari, remarks:
Desire is essentially unconscious, and hence unrelated 
to negation (there is no "no" in the unconscious), 
indifferent to personal identities or body images 
(central to Lacan's imaginary order) and independent
of linguistic expression or interpretation (the core of 
Lacan's Symbolic order), (p. 89)
In other words, desire is "not internal to a subject, any more 
than it tends toward an object" (Deleuze, 1987a, p. 89).
The notion of Other is much related to desire. Deleuze (1987a) 
defines: "The Other, as structure, is the expression of a possible 
world" (p. 134). This means that it is the structure of the possible; 
that the expressed possible world exists, but it does not exist 
(actually) outside of that which expresses it. Deleuze (1990) argues 
that "the error o f philosophical theories is to reduce the Other 
sometimes to a particular object, and sometimes to another subject" 
(p. 307). The Other is the subject. Without the other there is no 
subject.
In Daignault's staged conversation between Don Juan and Don 
Quixote, he sheds light on the nature of "dialogue" in its process. To
dialogue, as Serres (1983) asserts, is to require a third party and to
exclude him/her at the same time. To make someone know as to 
make someone laugh is exem plified best by an excluded third within 
a dialogue through Socratic irony. Daignault (1982b) describes:
Protagoras knows that brings him equally to know, but 
of a knowledge which brings one to think it is futile to 
know anything whatsoever that is true, not even to 
know that to really know consists in knowing that we 
know nothing. Socrates asserts that his conviction of 
being the wisest, which in fact consists in mere
ignorance, comes to him mainly through the contacts 
he has with the sophists. It is by questioning them, 
that this game brought him to know, but o f knowledge 
of mere ignorance, (p. 18)
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To make someone know is to dialogue and to make someone 
believe that the third party is excluded, "in pretending to say the 
truth" (p. 17). It is in such a way that to make someone know, not 
saying the truth, is like making someone laugh. The excluded third is 
in a paradoxical position. The paradoxical situations within all 
pedagogical relations, identifies Daignault (1982b), is "the promise of 
the Other’s Desire" (p. 19).
Analogy in Education: An Archaeology without Subsoil (1983)
In this long essay Daignault explicates analogy in education 
through "common sense" and "good sense." He employs his 
understanding of Deleuzean "sense" to inquire into curriculum 
problematics, such as theory and practice, teaching and learning. 
Analogy, commonly understood, is a nonconclusive reasoning that 
proceeds through a fourth proportional term (A is to B as C is to D).
For instance, a pen to a writer is as a gun to a soldier.
Analogy, in Greek term "analogia or analogos," (from ana,  "up," 
"upon," "throughout," and "continuous," and logos, "ratio," "reasoned") 
means the comparison of similarities in concepts or things. (Angeles, 
1981) For Daignault (1983), analogy can be shown as proportional 
identity by the means of analog communication. He proposes four 
categories o f analogy in education and further to fill a gap of 
"rigorous analogies” in education:
The analogies of good sense and common sense; (2) the 
scientific analogies (or theoretical models); (3) the 
artistic analogies (or poetical metaphor); and (4) the 
pedagogical analogies, (p. 20)
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Here, Daignault (1983) again connects these analogies with 
Deleuze's notion of sense, repetition and difference, and paradoxical 
instance between signifiers and signifieds to deal with the 
problematics between teaching and learning. Teaching and learning 
represent two series which meet in pedagogy. There is necessarily a 
gap between these two. One knows and the other does not. Let us 
recall that the notion of sense, Deleuze (1990) writes, is the fourth 
dimension of a proposition: It is
[N]either the designation (objective signification), nor 
the manifestation (subjective signification), nor 
signification (systematic signification). Sense does not 
ex-ist but sub-sists in the world and in-sists in 
language, (p. 38)
Daignault elaborates Deleuze's "sense" that it is expressed as an 
event o f an entirely different nature. Deleuze (1990) asserts that "it 
emanates from nonsense as from the always displaced paradoxical 
instance and from the eternally decentered ex-centric center" (p.
176). In short, sense is produced by nonsense—"a donation of sense" 
(Deleuze, 1990, p. 69). Daignault (1983) also uses Steve Reich's 
repetitive music to demonstrate that while "the shifting of the 
repetition [is being] accelerated at a constant speed," the differential 
value will be the same as the repetition itself to a certain extent; 
"repetition generates the difference"—interpreting the composition  
(p. 26). On the other hand, in the learning process, the difference 
needs to be annulled in order to repeat the same passage rigorously.
This means that "the repetition increases toward identity and the 
difference decreases to zero"; in other words, "difference gives birth 
to the repetition"—learning the composition (p. 27). We can see
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there is a paradoxical instance which circulates in the difference of 
teaching-learning process: "the 'non-sense' of the differential 
repetition of analogies analogous to themselves. And this sui- 
reference of the analogies is itself a function of the difference put
forth for the joy of teaching" (p. 27).
In this article Daignault (1983) deals with the notion of common 
sense and good sense again, but related directly to curriculum.
Common sense is a mechanism by which is conferred
an identity to things—identity by virtue of which 
things may be known—and, good sense, a mechanism  
by which is imposed a direction, a good order in virtue 
of which a moral—which gives sense to life—may be 
founded, (p. 4)
Daignault (1983) uses the analogy of common sense by reducing 
the teaching-learning processes as the transmission of informations—
what he terms "the problematics o f instruction." In the
commonsensical processes of teaching and learning, there is an 
analogy of "going from the known to the unknown." The analogy of 
good sense as transmission of values is as "the problematics of 
education." It is a "mediation of relevance" (pp. 3-4). Here, as we 
can see, he protests these two notions of "intellectual" sp a ce -  
common sense and good sense; he warns us that we must not take 
the explanation of a fact for granted, but rather the birth or the 
suspicion of the existence of this fact—a preconceived opinion 
depending upon good sense and common sense. Rather, he 
encourages us to "wage a battle against the truisms and prejudices of
[our] times" (p. 5). He is deconstructing the notion of common sense
and the good sense of "complex prejudices."
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Daignault (1983) proposes that curriculum is in a twofold 
paradoxical position, which is a "complex" prejudice. On the one 
hand, education transmits the cultural heritage of the past; on the 
other, it stimulates the youth to bring forth an improvement of 
present conditions--an example of an apparently contradictory 
prejudice as a paradoxical instance. We need not confuse 
contradiction with paradox, for the principle of contradiction points 
to the real and the possible, not to the impossible. The force of 
paradoxes is that they are not contradictory, but that they allow us 
be present at the genesis of contradictions.
Curriculum Beyond Words. With Words (T984al
While this paper focuses on the issue of curricular language, it 
also sheds light on the repudiation of an "overabundance of 
signifiers" proposed by many structuralists, by Levi-Strauss in 
particular. Daignault (1984a) says: "Curriculum is beyond words, 
that is what I say; with words, that's what I do" (p. 1). This gives 
rise to the problematic between the notion of "concept" or 
signification and "word," in the sense of Austin's dictum "to do things
with words" (p. 1). However, the idea of speech-act theory is
insufficient for Daignault to deal with curriculum. Daignault (1984a) 
is looking for the "performative" speech act, and he argues that "to
be meaningful is not to say the truth, but to succeed in the
'performance'" (p. 1). This approach implicates Lyotard's (1984b) 
paralogy—a principle o f performance—understood as the primary 
differences ("the heterogeneity of the rules" and "the search for 
dissent") for a model o f legitimation. This legitimation has nothing to
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do with maximized performance. Paralogy is a move played in the 
pragmatics o f knowledge.
The gap between philosophy as the content (the scientific) and 
literature as the form (the poetic) is applicable to curriculum.
Among the debates between science and art, he sees: There is a
double bind where curriculum stands. There is an excluded th ird- 
pedagogy—in teaching philosophy and literature. Daignault (1984a) 
refuses to exclude. He states:
When I teach philosophy o f education, the temptation 
is there, very often, to stop the teaching/learning 
process (that is: concrete explanations, examples, 
analogies, etc.), to jump into the philosophical work 
stricto sensu. . . .  So when I teach, I partly do 
philosophy. But that is not philosophy teaching (I 
mean common sense teaching), that is the practice of 
my second field of study as a third which I refuse to 
exclude; that is a third use of my second field of study: 
neither scientific, nor poetic, (pp. 4-5).
This issue can be related to the problematic of the identity of 
curriculum discussed previously (Daignault, 1982a). He considers 
curriculum as the excluded third in the debate between art (the 
poetic) and science (the scientific). He remarks:
Remember that the chemist who teaches chemistry 
does not accomplish the same thing in research as he 
does while teaching. . . . Why is it so? Because 
chemistry is not beyond words while education and 
curriculum are. Moreover, chemistry is a real first 
field of study while education is a second field of 
study. . . .While it is universal in science, it is local in 
education, (pp. 9-10)
Daignault (1984a) uses Lyotard's the "narrator," the "narrated" 
and the "narratee" to explain the relation between research and
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teaching (research and teaching in science and art). He argues that 
"teaching is the genesis o f the research and creative process itself" (p. 
11). In both science and art, the narratee is a virtual narrator and 
vice versa in the teaching process, for competition and selection will 
determine who will be the next master-narrators. However, there is 
the situation of the narratee becoming spectator (in the case of art 
and education). In curriculum, Daignault insists that there is a gap 
between what the narratees (students) are and what narrators 
(teachers) think they should be as narrators. This gap resembles the 
gap between theory and practice, and there arises a paradoxical 
instance between teachers and students. There are also dangers of 
being terrorist (dogmatic) or nihilist (doing nothing).
Curriculum, says Daignault, is the excluded third in the debate 
between art and science. Daignault also uses Serres' "dialogue" to 
explicate the excluded third in the communication process, which is 
the finding of "idealities" for science, the aesthetic piece for art. The 
question, he asks, is: What is the excluded third in education?
Daignault (1984a) answers: "The history of arts and the history of
sciences are a struggle against prejudices and cliches of an age, while 
the history of education is an incredible struggle to find the best 
prejudices and cliches" (p. 15). He then proposes to employ 
pedagogical analogy which can perform something meaningful even 
with scraps—this is the what is for curriculum.
Daignault (1984a) explicates the analogy (or metaphor) of 
Lacan’s interpretation of definition of the metaphor to demonstrate 
pedagogical performance o f analogous communication. He explains:
f(S’/S) = S (+) s
A metaphor is mathematical function such as the 
signifier to signify [S] is replaced by a prime signifier 
[S'] above the division's bar [/]. That is the condition 
[=] for the signifier [S] to reach [(+)] a signified [s]. (p.
17)
In the formula, any signifier to signify which belongs to a 
metaphor (in that case the word "metaphor") must be replaced by 
another signifier (in that case the formula itself). What is the
signified of the signifier of "metaphor"? There is no answer; there is
only "infinite regression" from signifiers to signifiers. Daignault 
(1984a) sees that "the chain of signifiers is Desire in Lacan's theory. 
And Desire is unattainable. So the definition of a metaphor is beyond 
words, with words" (p. 18). The concept of "word" can be explained 
through an analogy, according to Derrida (1978), to the notion of 
"exergue" in the values of money as "usure." Curriculum is analogous 
to the definition of the metaphor, asserts Daignault. Daignault 
(1984a) believes that "curriculum is a metaphor the signification of 
which is unattainable. The best we can do is to talk about it with 
analogies" (pp. 20-21). One of his hypothesis is the following:
We could learn to practice education as the third
excluded (from the debate between art and science);
we would refuse to be excluded from the so-called 
rigorous (scientific and poetic) debates. What I 
believe is that common sense and good sense opinions 
are the third excluded by art and science. (Daignault,
1984a, p. 6)
Daignault wrote this paper in English; his native language is 
French. Thus he is doing something now with words, something 
which is beyond words. He also develops a "second order rhetoric—a 
process in which someone acts like. . . like. . . the first 'like' is an
1 47
analogy, the second 'like' is an analog communication" (pp. 23-24). 
Deleuze (1986b) states that "writing has a double function: to 
translate everything into assemblages and to dismantle the 
assemblage. The two are the same thing" (p. 47). The dismantling of 
the assemblages, observes Deleuze (1987a), makes the social 
representation take flight in a much more effective way than a 
critique would have done and brings about a "deterritorization" of 
the world that is itself political and that has nothing to do with an 
activity o f intimacy.
The problem again, Daignault sees, is that we confuse education 
with good sense and common sense. Paradox is opposed to doxa,  in 
both aspects of doxa,  namely, good sense and common sense. Deleuze
(1990) explains as follow:
Good sense is said of one direction only: it is the 
unique sense and expresses the demand of an order 
according to which is necessary to choose one direction 
and to hold onto it. Good sense therefore is given the 
condition under which it fulfills its function, which is 
essentially to foresee. . . . In common sense, "sense" is 
no longer said of a direction, but of an organ. It is 
called "common," because it is an organ, a function, a 
faculty of identification that brings diversity in 
general to bear upon the form of the Same. Common 
sense identifies and recognizes, no less than good 
sense foresees, (pp. 75-78)
Good sense and common sense are therefore undermined by the 
principle of their production, and are overthrown from within by 
paradox. This paradoxical instance is linked to Derrida's insistence 
that we must first try to conceive of the common ground, and the 
"differance" of this irreducible difference. For instance, Zen appears
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to be anti-metaphysical, and yet Zen masters often make statements 
which are quite metaphysical. Zen masters seem to be fond of 
ordinary language, and yet their use of language is often 
extraordinary. This "paradoxical instance," for Zen masters, is the 
original teaching of Zen.
Curriculum and Action-Research: An Artistic Activity in a 
Perverse Way (T984bl
This essay Daignault (1984b) returns to the relationship between 
theory and practice, or between research and practice. Daignault 
(1984b) is suggesting a particular "geography" of pedagogical thought 
to inform curriculum theorists and teachers. He distinguishes two 
kinds of "rapport" between theory and practice. The first 
corresponds to "technological space" or Platonistic  geography,  and the 
second to "political space"or Nietzschean geography  (p. 5). The first 
kind of rapport is considered as "an activity describing and 
explaining objectively a certain portion of reality, and the diverse 
possible applications which enable this reality to be transformed"; 
the second aims at "the practice itself o f the setting up of a relation 
between two opposite conceptions o f theory: objective and 
normative" (Daignault, 1984b, p. 5).
This is a point where Daignault goes back to the concept of 
Nietzschean "geography" of thought and Deleuzean "nomadic 
movement" and "lines of flight," in order to demonstrate the "spaces" 
o f knowledge. There are "technological," "political" and "pedagogical" 
spaces, suggests Daignault (1984b). According to Deleuze (1986c), 
the nomads have no history; they only have geography. "It is false to
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define the nomad by movement. Rather he is who does not move. . . , 
and he is only seated while moving" (p. 51). Daignault argues that 
the notion of space, in a different episteme which represents modes 
of thought, is the constituting force of knowledge and its background.
The space is the "gaps" or "rapports," he sees, between theory and 
practice, teaching and learning signifying the problematics of 
curriculum theorizing.
Daignault illustrates the significant difference between “de facto”
(by fact) and "de jure" (by right), a posterori and a priori, a 
distinction also made by Kant and favored by Derrida, which 
identifies the difference between pure reason and practical reason.
This difference among the spaces of knowledge and the problematic 
between theory and practice are reapproached. Knowledge, for Kant, 
is a synthesis of representations, "we think we can find a predicate B 
outside the concept A, a predicate which is foreign to this concept, 
but which we think we ought to attach to it" (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 97). 
When it depends on experience it is a posterori; on the contrary, it is 
the a priori synthesis which attributes a property to the object which 
was not contained in the representation, "rational knowledge and a 
priori knowledge are identical" (Kant,1966, Preface). Daignault is 
questioning whether de jure and de facto are reducible to political 
space or technological space.
Daignault (1984b) connects the differences and gaps with his 
proposed concept of "pedagogical city" to describe the circulation of 
places and occupants in the middle, or in-between technological 
space and political space. Daignault (1984b) states:
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One of the main traits of the technological space and of 
the Platonistic geography of thought consists in setting 
as a strict problem of competence (knowledge, know­
how-to-be and know-how), the passage from theory to 
practice. "Being" always assumes that somewhere 
exists a passage altogether possible and desirable, (p.
8 )
He demonstrates that in three historical stages (antiquity to the 
Enlightenment, Middle Age, Renaissance onwards) o f pedagogical 
knowledge production there have also been corresponding changes 
between the gap of "what exist" and "what should be." Daignault 
(1984b) claims:
Education, no matter how it is perceived, has never 
been, at least until recently, indifferent toward the 
great dreams of humankind. For Plato, education is 
seen as a process leading, ultimately at least, to the 
realization of certain ideals. . . . We will in succession 
come upon three kinds of knowledge: knowledge, the 
"know-how-to-be" and the "know-how," and the three 
corresponding educational institutions: society, school, 
and the individual. To each of these three moments of 
a dual evolution correspond three great conceptions of 
Evil. (pp. 6-7)
First, technological space is evil as "ignorance, knowledge and the 
educational city": The gap between "what is" and "what ought to be"
is constituted by the only thing "that is" (Daignault, 1984b, p. 11). 
Knowledge is implied by the passage from the sensible world to the 
world of ideas. The obstacle to the passage from one world to 
another world is "ignorance." Second, it is "radical evil, the know­
how-to-be and the school": The passage from "what exists" to "what
should be" is no longer justified by knowledge as the guarantor 
(Daignault, 1984b, p. 12). A new conception of the educational 
process is required to deal with adopting moral behavior. The
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process of conversion guarantees the passage from one state to 
another. School becomes "a place in relation to the City of Men" 
(Daignault, 1984b, p. 13). Third, it is evil as "an obstacle, the know­
how, and the individual": The emergence of the Subject transforms
all knowledge. Reason substitutes for the laws of the nature and 
those of God in constituting knowledge (Daignault, 1984b, p. 14). The 
gap between what is and what ought to be points to the realization of 
possibilities inscribed in our world: an authentic know-how. The 
pedagogy o f the space o f know-how presupposes an individual force 
which is education's role to develop and guide.
Each of these three technological spaces in curriculum is 
involved with the possible application of these knowledges; these 
prescriptions of the possibilities are chosen and regarded as the 
guarantors o f later success. The question of the prescription of 
objectives calls for a political decision treated as question of fact, as 
the prescription of means. Daignault (1984b) remarks that "the 
Platonistic geography in constantly folding down the technological 
space upon the political spaces treats the prescription of ends as a 
simple prescription of means" (p. 15). In other words, technological 
decisions underlie political considerations.
The question of "folding down" is related to the concept of a
Nietzschean geography of thought. This can be explained through
Deleuze's notions regarding "perspectivism" in Nietzsche, analogous to 
Daignault’s notion of "pedagogical city." For both Deleuze and 
Daignault, the pedagogical city is not the questioning of divergence 
nor disjunction, because divergence is no longer a principle of
exclusion, and disjunction no longer a means of separation. Rather,
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"incompossibility" becomes now a means of communication. In 
Deleuze's terms, each vantage point o f the city points to a city which 
corresponds to each different vantage point, always a different city 
within the city.
This rapport between theory and practice in political space has a 
paradoxical nature. Daignault continues to explicate the rapport or 
gap through the paradox of signification and sense. The interest of 
the determinations of signification lies in the fact that they engender 
the principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, instead 
of these principles being given ready-made. The paradoxes 
themselves enact the genesis of contradiction and inclusion in the 
propositions stripped of signification. This can be recalled as Stoics 
display so much interest in the connection of propositions—things 
and words (Daignault, 1984b).
Action-research focuses on the investigation political space and 
on a question of de jure.  As Serres (1983) says:
To think the concept of disorder does not mean to 
establish a dialogue between two symmetrical 
ontologies but rather to rethink the relations between 
order and disorder in such a way as to show how
everything begins, ends, and begins again according to
a universal principle o f disorder, (p. xxvii)
It is, then, necessary to rethink the world not in terms of its 
"laws" and its regularities, but rather in terms of perturbations and
turbulences, in order to bring out its multiple forms, uneven
structures, and fluctuating organizations. Foucault links discontinuity 
and power relation to the laws, ethics, and social formation in France 
at the time (Daignault, 1983).
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Deleuze (1988) remarks that "the unthought is therefore not 
external to thought but lies at its very heart, as that impossibility of 
thinking which doubles or hollows out the outside" (p. 97). The 
theme, which has always intrigued Foucault, is that of the "double," 
but the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it 
is an interiorization of the outside. Deleuze (1988) asserts that "it is 
not a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a 
reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different" (p. 98).
For Deleuze, a problematization of thought has triple roots which are 
knowledge, power and self.
Daignault (1984b) concludes:
The type of authorized prescriptions by action- 
research would never be derived from the “having to 
be” but from the interdiction to desire it really: to
never prescribe, to never proscribe and never abstain
oneself, (p. 26)
Semiotics o f Educational Expression (19861
This essay deals with the problematics between text and 
knowledge in order to illustrate a "genre" of teaching. Daignault 
observes (1986) the preponderance of signifiers over signifieds has 
been the cornerstone for modern French philosophy and literature.
For instance, Derrida points out that writing (in the sense of trace) is 
the logical prerequisite for speech. Daignault (1986) asserts that "we 
do not write with ideas, but with words" (p. 1). More emphasis upon
signifiers instead of signifieds is employed. The style, rhythm, and
opacity of writing constitute aspects o f the work's meaning.
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Daignault (1986) explains: "Hidden into the text, under [a] word's 
thickness, concepts become almost undiscoverable" (p. 2).
Many would object to this kind of playing on words or pun, for it 
creates unnecessary difficulties for the reader to understand the
work. Daignault insists this is a misunderstanding of the notion of
the text. He continues to argue the preponderance of text over 
signification lies in the gap between science and literature. Many 
scientists and logicians would consider writing as a transcription- 
written words of their thoughts. For them, thinking is a mental 
activity. In positive sciences and scientific communications, the sine  
qua non condition is the preponderance of signifieds over signifiers. 
Knowledge is made of concepts, not of words. The representations of 
the world is constituted by concepts as their boundaries or limits.
Such representations are called theories. Word’s opacity, cacography 
and noise make the understanding or usage of theories difficult.
Daignault (1986) believes we need a bridge between words and 
concepts; the bridge is a new genre—"textual staging of knowledge" 
for education (p. 5). The linguistic expressions of this genre are 
reducible neither to words nor concepts. Daignault (1986) insists:
This is not to say that I do not want any more to use
words to write and to use concepts to think! When I
say words I mean the matter of text, that in which
signifiers have a preponderance over signifieds. And 
when I say concepts, I mean the matter of knowledge, 
that in which the preponderance is inverted, (p. 5)
To speak a language is to use linguistic signs which are 
necessarily made of signifiers and signifieds. Daignault (1986) says:
"A word is a sign, not a signifier; a concept is a signification, not a
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signified" (p. 5). The instrumental use of language is to mean 
something with words. There are rules for using language both in 
science and literature. In science, we need to create concepts; in 
literature, we need to give form to the text. We can understand 
these rules are limits or thresholds. These limits in science and 
literature entail a gap or "road" between signifiers and signifieds.
The gap is constituted by the boundaries—"the no concept's locus in 
signifieds" and "the no word's locus in signifiers" (Daignault, 1986, 
pp. 5-6). The former is called "expressible," the latter "expressed."
Both are the third excluded.
The boundary itself is what conditions the existence of creating 
concepts in science and of giving form to text in literature. For 
example, in science, one must build a boundary between what is and 
what is not the concept. The boundary functions as a condition that 
"the identity of a concept is warranted and at the same time what is 
not the concept can be declared different" (Daignault, 1986, p. 6).
Here, the difference is regarded as negation. The boundary itself is 
neither a part of the concept nor a part o f the difference. The 
boundary itself is a Derridean "differance." Daignault (1986) 
remarks: "The expressible sub-sists between the world and the
language" (p. 7). This can be also applied in literature. The 
"expressed" itself as boundary is a condition that a "tightness" 
between signifiers is required to produce rhythms; at the same time, 
the boundary gives forms to the opacity o f language. Therefore, the 
expressed "in-sists" between the language and the world (pp. 8-9).
In filling the gap between science and literature, in which text 
and knowledge defend obstinately their boundaries, there is a
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boundary itself where pedagogy is said to be at work. Daignault 
believes our first intellectual activity in teaching as well as in writing 
about curriculum consists in textual staging of knowledge. In this 
regards, Serres (1989a) remarks:
We must imagine a way in which to teach, with the 
same genre, both the poem and the theorem, without 
wronging either and with mutual enrichment: 
experimentation and experience, the new world of 
scientists and the storytelling o f time immemorial, the 
immortal world o f scientific laws and the new age of 
the arts. (p. 34)
Daignault (1986) believes:
Education is the undying trace of the text of our day- 
to-day life, and such a text, which I call an expression, 
is nothing but the boundary itself. Writing about 
curriculum, in regards to the problematics o f  
curriculum, is neither on the road or in the field but 
subsists in the no man's land. (p. 8)
Daignault thinks that the bridge between words and concepts is 
exactly the text of our day-to-day lives. Curriculum is the ever- 
ending trace of the text o f everyday life. The trace , in disciplinary 
terms, is the boundary itself between literature and science. This 
trace is unnameable for it sub-sists in the world and in-sists in the 
language. What it "represents" cannot be represented. Or, as Derrida 
(1973) remarks:
The trace is not a presence but is rather the 
simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces, 
and refers beyond itself. The trace has, properly 
speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very 
structure of the trace. Effacement must always be 
able to overtake the trace; otherwise it would not be a 
trace but an indestructible and monumental substance.
(p. 156)
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The boundary Daignault (1986) refers to is that "the no concept’s 
locus in signifieds--expressible, no word's locus in signifiers— 
expressed" (p. 5). In Derrida’s terms, this boundary itself is exactly a 
"differance"—a undifferentiated whole: a difference which makes the 
difference between identity and difference. The "differance" 
undermines the metaphysical hope o f finding a "transcendental 
signified," a concept independent of language. The metaphysics of 
presence, which is self-presence, has been to find a stable place to 
stand outside, or above it. Derrida (1976) says "originary differance 
is supplementarity as structure" (p. 167). Here structure means that 
irreducible complexity within which one can only shape or shift the 
play of presence or absence: that within which metaphysics can be 
produced but which metaphysics cannot think.
The "textual staging of knowledge," I believe, can be understood 
through Derrida's notion of silence. For Derrida (1978), silence plays 
the irreducible role o f that which bears and haunts language, outside 
and agains t  which alone language can emerge. Ulmer (1985) puts 
the matter well:
The risk in talking about silence (as many teachers 
must do, and for which the operations of the Mime are 
an analogy) is that a meaning might be given to that 
which does not have one (and this fall back into 
discourse is also a return to Hegelianism). To control 
this risk, sovereignty (a precursor o f deconstruction) 
betrays meaning with in  meaning, betrays discourse 
within  discourse, by choosing words, like "silence" 
itself, that "make us slide." (pp. 184-185)
Although silence can save one from conceptualization, one should 
not be attached to and be bound by it, according to Zen. Thus the
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master Chap-chou was striking a flint for a light. He asked a monk,
"I call this a light. What do you call it?" The monk did not say a 
word. Thereupon the master said, "If you do not grasp the meaning 
of Ch'an (Zen), it is useless to remain silent" (Chang, 1959, p. 156).
The important point is not whether one should speak or should be 
silent, but non-attachment. It is an extreme to keep silent. Te-shan 
told his disciples, "If you say a word, you will get thirty blows. If 
you do not say a word, you will get the same thirty blows across the 
top of your head" (Chang, 1959, p. 133). One should allow the mind 
to operate freely, naturally and spontaneously.
Autobiography of a Stvle (T988al
The subject is this free, anonymous, and nomadic 
singularity which traverses men as well as plants and 
animals independently o f the matter of their 
individuation and the forms of their personality.
"Overman" means nothing other than this—the 
superior type of everything that is. This is a strange 
discourse, which ought to have renewed philosophy, 
and which finally deals with sense not as a p r e d i c a t e  
or a property but as an event .  (Deleuze, 1990, p. 107)
It is my hope that after reading the above passage we can better 
understand Daignault's performance. In this stylistic essay, Daignault 
(1988a) continues to evoke the Kantian idea o f style and manner in 
problematic of teaching and learning. Daignault (1988a) states:
Style is the most expensive form of writing. Style is 
always autobiographic and self-educative. I can not 
imagine working on style—even in a very intellectual 
activity—without becoming som eone else: m yself 
different; and without feeling the work of thinking on 
my skin and in my stomach. What we call inspiration
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is only a somatic writing process. We need 
eipistomachology.  (p. 36)
According to Deleuze (1987b), a style is managing to "stammer" 
in one's own language, but he asserts, not "being a stammer in one's 
speech, but being stammer of language itself" (p. 4). Being like a 
foreigner in one's own language, it can be a gesture of the body 
which prompts an understanding contrary to what language indicate.
In language, the equivalent of such gesture are called "sense" or 
"solecism," remarks Deleuze. The following passages from Daignault 
(1988a) portrays his illustration of "sense":
E lan  of the E s s a y  
Pedagogy and stylE: 
oRchestring at temPo 
chOrus and writing.
P R a ctice o f the E P o c h e  
Presence to sensE: 
aRchaeology of a scriPt 
sh0.t in my life  
P R O c ess o f the E P I e r a p h  
PausE 
pRom Pt 
chO Ice (p. 22)
This passage is anagrammatically meaningful. It is in a 
"diagonal" sense inherited in language that Daignault strives to get 
across the normative meaning embodied in common sense and good 
sense. We can see Prometheus and Epimetheus are implicated in 
these lines. Daignault (1988a) explains: "Scientific knowledge and
technical craft are gifts from Prometheus. But thinking is a gift from 
Epimetheus. The guardian of hope has modeled human time in his 
own image; he has created humanism" (p. 34). It needs to be 
understood, I think, through his performance—sty le—of presenting
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this study. What I am doing here, I think, is in a paradoxical 
position. As Samuel Beckett (1976) has done: to name the 
unnameable. However, I am "making" sense.
Daignault also exem plifies a difference between French language 
and English language. In some ways he masters both, in order to 
point out that not only being a stranger in Others is a very efficient 
way to be "outside," as he subsists in that of Others, but also as 
W illiam Pinar's conviction, cited by Daignault, that "the 
comprehension of the relations among one's life history, biographic 
present and one's intellectual works surmounts one’s engaging in 
educational work" (Daignault, 1988a, p. 9). So this neither means 
that speaking (mastery of a) different language is superior to those 
who only speak one language, nor simply to translate or to copy one 
into the other; but in the sense of Deleuze's "becoming," it is not 
phenomenon of imitation or assimilation, but of a "double capture, of 
a non-parallel evolution, o f nuptials between two reigns" (1987b, p.
10). To become is a matter of "involuting"; it is neither regression 
nor progression. Deleuze admits that it is difficult to explain, yet he 
states:
[T]o what extent one should involute. 'I' is obviously 
the opposite of evolution, but it is also the opposite of 
regression, returning to a childhood or to a primitive 
world. To involute is to have an increasingly simple, 
economical, restrained step. (1987, p. 29)
Deleuze praises the following as to what the definition of "style" 
is, as Marcel Proust remarks, "great literature is written in a sort of 
foreign language within our own language" (Deleuze, 1987b, p. 54).
In other words, we might be better to speak a kind of "foreign"
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language within  our own language. In A Theory of Semiotics (1976), 
Umberto Eco insists that "to re-write in another language means to 
re-think" (pp. vii-viii). We can clearly see the Daignault's endeavors 
present a re-thinking in English language of French, a re-thinking of 
what curriculum means.
To think over something is to think oneself: That is in this view,
what thinking means. To know is not the same as to think. We can 
know many things, while not knowing ourselves: that is a matter of 
thinking. In regard to this matter, Michel Serres (1983) has 
pointedly made a simple yet comprehensive comment. Serres states: 
"For Plato and a tradition which lasted throughout the classical age, 
knowledge is a hunt. To know is to put to death—to kill the lamb, 
deep in the woods, in order to eat it" (1983, p. 28). In brief, to know 
is to kill, to rely on death. Embracing a Deleuzean notion of thinking, 
Daignault insists that to think is to experiment and to problematize. 
Deleuze (1988) puts it: "Knowledge, power and the self are the triple
root of a problematization of thought" (p. 116).
In examining Rousseau's writings, E ssa y . Derrida explicates the 
problematics o f the relationship between speech and writing 
(Derrida, 1978). Derrida insists:
The difficulty of the pedagogy of language and o f the 
teaching of foreign language is, Emile w ill say, that one 
cannot separate the signifier from the signified, and 
changing words, one changes ideas in such a way that 
the teaching of a language transmits at the same time 
an entire national culture over which the pedagogue 
has no control, which resists him like the already- 
there preceding the formation, the institution 
preceding instruction. (1978, p. 170)
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In his article, "The Professor of Desire," Steven Ungar (1982) 
argues that the impact of the importation and exportation of foreign 
discourse is not simply the abstract translation from one language or 
culture to another, but rather to heighten "our awareness of the 
social factors affecting the distribution of French ideas as something 
other than duty-free import" (p. 85).
. . .Yfl-X Cursus r. . .1 J IA 2. Arts aRe. . . (T988hl
This essay can be interpreted in its title itself, Daignault (1988b) 
explains, that the title is a "transli teration"  of the following three 
paragraphs:
Why an excursus, [now? To deal with the form. Is it 
possible to change the field without moving the 
comma? Anything goes in curriculum? To answer 
those questions, I propose an y-x dictionary of n 
elements instead of a function. A contribution to 
curriculum staging.] The above is an abstract the title 
of which is not yet known; only thought. The abstract 
is not an abstract o f this paper but a t r a n s c r ip t io n  of 
an « x » ,  teasing [a « t »  signe] here  and there, in the 
cursus  o f this paper, (p .l)
Once again, Daignault (1988b) discusses the difference between 
Kant’s concept of "method" and "manner." The former, Daignault 
notes, stricto sensu, is the notion of s tr u c tu r e . Derrida notes: This 
structure refers only to space, geometric or morphological space, the 
order of forms and sites (Derrida, 1978); the latter "manner", refers 
to Deleuzean "becomings", is style, morality of existence (Deleuze,
1987a). For Daignault (1988b), method is "singular and definite, 
which means that it is T H E  way; manner is singular but indefinite, 
which means it is A way; then he focuses on curriculum study and
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insists that it is always plural—W A Y s, which means it is neither 
definite nor indefinite" (p. 14). Daignault interprets the difference 
between transliteration and translation, which is "iter," as "way" (in 
Greek) or "repetition" (I=re[t]). He (1988b) notes:
In Latin, iter means "way" [hodos in Greek; as a prefix, 
it also means "repetition." I say it again: "I" = re-"t."
In the work of Roussel, anagrams (anaphones, actually, 
as in the work of Saussure) were only A way: iter or 
hodos; a manner. Saussure maybe tried to embed 
anagrams in THE way of semiotics: trans-iter or meta- 
hodos [to go across the way]; a method. I am trying to 
conceive of passages in many ways: iter-iter [way & 
repetition]; W AYS. Not all the ways—only some—but 
always plural. I try to transcribe flashes that emerge 
from the play of transliteration; that makes perhaps a 
translation, (p. 16)
Daignault is trying to show the passage between answer and
answer, question and question which means not the passage from a
question to an answer, but their absolute difference—in the 
Deleuzean term "unilateral distinction." The event, being itself 
im passive, involves the transformation o f relationship between 
difference and opposition. The absolute difference allows both active 
and passive to be interchanged more easily, since it is neither the 
one nor the other, but rather the effect of their common result.
Daignault is writing the text anagrammatically to connect what we 
normally acquire intellectually. He is building bridges to show other 
ways of writing and thinking. The connection he makes is not 
anything counts. Rather, Daignault (1988b) insists that "everything
is in everything: in many ways only" (p. 7). The bridge is
paradoxical, for Serres; it connects the disconnected. Daignault
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emphasizes that such a question "always implies an answer the 
destiny of which is to close space; that kind of space the opening of 
which is called problem" (1988b, p. 6). This can not be confused with 
the relation of cause and effect; rather, says Deleuze (1990), "[events] 
being always only effects, are better to form among themselves 
functions o f quasi-causes or quasi-causality which are always 
reversible [the wound and the scar]" (p. 8). It is to think the 
possibility o f thinking a relationship without thinking it.
Daignault strives to think of curriculum as a non-complete 
relative difference—unilateral distinction. Curriculum is, says 
Daignault, an intransitive verb -to  pass, only to pass, in terms of 
Joycean "riverrun." He also insists that curriculum is regarded as an 
"event," which subsists or inheres in language. Curriculum, like an 
event, simply happens.
The Language of Research and the Language of Practice: Neither 
One nor the Other: Pedagogy (1988c1)
This paper deals with that language, used by researchers and 
practitioners, that is caught up within the "intellectual" space which 
everything is reducible to either propositions or things. Daignault 
(1988c) states:
To worry about differences between the language of 
research and practice is to be concerned about the lack 
of  a common language , then of a dialogue, of a 
collaboration, of an involvement, and finally of any 
real improvement in education, (p. 46)
Here, on the basis o f the difference between research and 
practice, Daignault raises the question: Is a dialogue possible between
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researchers and practitioners in curriculum without any common 
language? The answer, insists Daignault, is "yes." The lack of a 
common language is a false problem to which no resolution can be 
reached if  it is seen as a real problem. The real problem is a twofold 
reductionism, argues Daignault. On the one hand, a reduction to what 
is common to both languages of research and practice—a weak than 
common sense—is a kind of nihilism. One the other hand, a reduction 
to know ledge—the absolute domination of research language—is a 
kind of terrorism.
Daignault (1988c) uses a Frank O'Hara poem to explicate 
differences between theory and practice, which is analogous to 
painting and poetry for him. He reiterates, cited from The Selected  
Poems o f Frank O'Hara (1974), which is appropriate here:
I am not a painter. I am a poet. Why? I think I would 
rather be a painter, but I am not. Well, 
for instance, Mike Goldberg is starting a painting, I 
drop in. "Sit down and have a drink" he says. I drink; 
we drink. I look up. "You have SARDINES  in it." "Yes, 
it is indeed something there." "Oh." I go and the days 
go by and I drop in again. The painting is going on, 
and I go, and the days go by. I drop in. The painting 
is finished. "Where's S A R D IN E S T  All that's left is just 
letters, "It was too much," Mike says.
But me? One day I am thinking of a color: orange. I 
write a line about orange. Pretty soon it is a whole 
page of words, not lines. Then another page. There 
should be so much more, not of orange, o f words, of 
how terrible orange is and life. Days go by. It is even 
in prose, I am a real poet. My poem is finished and I 
haven't mentioned orange yet. It's twelve poems, I 
call it O R A N G E S. And one day in a gallery I see Mike's 
painting, called SARDINES,  (p. 47)
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Daignault views this poem as an analogy to teachers and 
teaching. Daignault proposes that we can write something about 
teachers, entitled T each er , while doing so without saying a word on 
teaching. This something he calls pedagogy. Daignault (1988c) 
argues:
Differences between the language of practice and the 
language of research are not reducible at the surface 
level. . . . Nevertheless, language is language. At some
level, there are no differences between languages. . . .
Knowledge could be defined as the linguistic 
articulation of a symbolic exchange. . . . The world is 
not reducible to a general semiotics, (pp. 49-50)
The surface level is the one of vocabulary, the syntax and the 
style. Both languages "deserve" more than any reduction to what 
they have in common. According to the semiotics definition of 
language, anything could be seen as a sign to be exchanged against 
another sign. Within the limits of language, one could argue that 
there are similar structures between research and action, theory and
practice. The one of knowledge is an example. However, the
collaboration between researchers and practitioners at the language 
level must be encouraged, but not at the cost of reducing everything 
to fragmented knowledge or common language. For example,
Foucault (1973) argues that there is no such thing—common 
language—any longer; he demonstrates the relationship between  
madness and reason:
The constitution o f madness as a mental illness. . . 
affords the evidence of a broken dialogue [between 
reason and madness], posits the separation as already 
affected, and thrusts into oblivion all those 
stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in
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which the exchange between madness and reason was 
made. (p. x)
Daignault (1988c) again raises the question of boundary 
concerning the complexity of the world—what is "general text" in 
Derrida—to argue that "there is no possible knowledge of the world" 
(p. 50). Knowledge represents a focus on signs. The world is a 
complex interweaving of signs and "notes." The notion of note, claims 
Daignault (1988c), can be defined as "a force (a kind of differential) 
and a difference of intensity insisting on the fuzzy border of any 
sign" (p. 50). For instance, culture can be defined as "any plane of 
the world, any particular focus or folding of a given assemblage of 
signs and/or notes" (Daignault, 1988c, p. 51). A culture or a plane is 
a partition of three discourses: "text," "score," and "versification." 
Daignault (1988c) asserts:
A discourse made of signs only is a text. A discourse 
made of notes only is a score. A discourse made of 
both signs and notes is a versification. . . .  A partition 
made of texts only is a semiosis. A partition made of 
scores only is a notation. A partition made of verses 
only or any combination is a composition. The same 
partition can be seen at the same time as a semiosis, a 
notation and a composition; that is what composition 
means, (pp. 51-52)
Daignault proposes to define research and practice in curriculum 
as "compositions"; in short, curriculum as composition. Therefore, the 
pedagogy he perceives is a composition of texts and notes. Pedagogy 
is operating on the boundary between a simulacrum of prescription: 
a what ought to be curriculum and a simulacrum of description: a 
what is curriculum.
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Where Did the Subject Go? (1989a)
This essay is based upon Derrida's deconstruction—"differance" 
and Deleuze's concept of "different-ziation" to claim that the subject
is not dead, but "resisting with its skin" (p. 2). The resistance,
Daignault (1989a) remarks:
Against a structural reversal, with its pure and simple
liquidation of subjectivity; against the return of self-
consciousness as the center of the world; and finally
against the sublation (a u fh eb u n g ) o f the individual
subject into the collective subject as a broader center 
of the world, (p. 1)
The concept o f differance has been discussed previously (see 
Daignault, 1986; also chapter two). The concept o f skin, adopted 
from Deleuze, is that of the "surface" of events, things and states of 
affairs. The skin or surface is where our senses are working.
Deleuze insists, cited from Paul Valery, "what is most deep is the 
skin" (1990, p. 10). Everything happens at the boundary or limit 
between th ings  and p r o p o s i t io n s .  Everything returns to the surface, 
this is the result o f the Stoic operation—the unlimited return. 
Becoming-mad or becoming unlimited is no longer a ground which 
rum bles.
Daignault (1989a) argues that the irreducibility in discursive 
analysis is one of the major contributions of post-structuralist 
thought. He says:
It denotes “today's unthinkable” in the midst of 
structuralism, in the possibly hegemonic situation of 
language, because language today has also become a 
problem: [Tjhere is no way out of it; but not 
everything can be reduced to it. (p. 8)
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The concept of "flash" in the lightning of darkness, explained by 
Daignault, is exactly the sense of "differance" in relation to itself in 
which differentiation is realized; this also can suggest Derrida's 
"trace" which involves leaving a trace and erasing itself at the same 
time. As Lyotard's (1987) concept of difference within identity, 
passion within reason, in light lies our darkness. Also in Deleuze's 
notion of "between," a passage from Virginia W oolf cited by Deleuze, 
can be used to explain (which he recorded) that "I spread m yself out 
like fog B E T W E E N  the people that I know the best" (1987b, p. 27). 
Deleuze (1987b) remarks:
The middle has nothing to do with an average, it is not 
a centrism or a form of moderation. On the contrary, 
it's a matter of absolute speed. Whatever grows from 
the middle is endowed with such a speed. We must 
distinguish not relative and absolute movement, but 
the relative and absolute speed of any movement, (p.
2 7 )
Daignault insists that the global text—what Kristeva (1980) calls 
"general text"—is not reducible to the language, or symbolic order, or 
semiosis, but that it does not elude these things either. He is 
suggesting everything can be distinct from the global text, yet the 
global text can never be distinct from all those things—what Kristeva 
(1980) calls "particular text"—that are distinct from it—Deleuze 
terms "unilateral distinction."
Curriculum as Composition: Who is the Composer? (1989b)
In staging his own writing and teaching, Daignault starts this 
essay to deal with the problematics of the notion of subject or 
subjectivity found in many post-structuralists' works and his
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proposed "composition" (This essay was later published in 1991).
Many critical theorists, Marxists in particular, have been dissatisfied  
with and detested by the privileged "apparatus" of the notion of 
"general text"-textuality. Paul Smith (1989) argues that not only 
such a notion as textuality is questionable as that to which all 
conceptual phenomena must be submitted, but also problematic is 
the impotence to which the notion leads us, unless it leaves room for 
mediation by active subject/individuals. Daignault (1989b) 
emphasizes that the subject is neither a person, nor any form of 
individual, collective or transcendental consciousness; rather, the 
subject is comprised of the "dynamics of an analyzer and of a 
synthesizer both dealing with expressions I call notes" (p. 1), or as 
impersonal plural agency. In part this parallels the notion of "agency 
without agents" in Foucault’s "subject-positions." Foucault (1972) has 
said that a subject is not a "speaking consciousness," but rather "a 
position that may be filled in certain conditions by various 
individuals" (p. 115). Moreover, this echoes Deleuze's (1987a) 
"individuation with subject." Daignault (1989b) remarks that the 
subject o f education is the locus of the composition of a subjectivity 
in curriculum which makes sense. To describe a pedagogy qua the 
subject of education does not consist in analyzing the relations 
between the teacher and what he says, the students and what they 
say (or wanted to say); but in determining what position can be 
occupied by any individual if  he/she is to be the subject o f education.
Daignault emphasizes the composition of expressing that is "a 
process through which his self-consciousness offers less and less 
resistance to the reality o f transcendental e x p r e s s ib le s  and to the
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emergence of new empirical expresseds"  (1989b, p. 1). In Daignault's 
notion of "composer,"  we can clearly see that "expressing" is a 
present on-going process, the concept o f "expressibles" is a 
transcendental, ideal concept of "what ought to be"; the concept of 
"expresseds" is simply the emergence of new empirical presence. He 
remarks that the composer is constituted in the "dynamics" of both
"synthesizer" and "analyzer" in the work or play (pp. 3-4). This
dynamic process produces the expressed as the doubling of the
expressible, the doubling of a double. For the expresses has already
incorporated the expressible as interiorized double.
The issue of "sense," "expression," "expressible" and "expressed" 
can be found in Deleuze's (1990) "logic of sense," which dealt with 
the distinction between things and propositions, expressible and 
expressed. The concept o f "notation," adopted from Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, according to Daignault, has much to say about Derrida's 
critique of Rousseauistic phonocentrism. Notation is not simply a 
supplement of speech, rather it precedes speech and it does not exist 
without writing. It is unforgettable; it is to be rearranged, no longer 
to be spoken about, but to be written on as composition of the 
subject (Daignault, 1989b).
The mastery of the individual’s survival is one of the most 
significant successes o f science and rationality. The faculty o f reason 
is the major player in the Enlightenment. Yet we found in 
contemporary discourses that if one has multiple goals, and many 
ways to evaluate them, the concept of rational decision making is 
threatened. If everything is reasonable, then nothing is reasonable. 
Daignault's concept of "composition" and "decomposition" are
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somehow perceptible in a sense of the notion of "event" in Foucault’s 
project, it suffices to say the concept of "multiplicity." We can 
understand the problematic in terms of the multiplication in voices.
The breakdown of rational standards has led to an "anything-goes" or 
nihilistic attitude, as Feyerabend (1975) terms it. All competing 
voices have been silenced, causing society to become stagnant and 
stultifying. We need to discover by what forces problems transform 
themselves and to demand the constitution of new ways of thinking.
We have other problems to discover; we need to create a new series 
of events.
The no concept's locus is called "expressible" and the no word's 
locus, an "expressed." Both are not something. Both are not nothing.
The expressible "sub-sists" between the world and the language. 
Difference is identical to negation in defining a concept by scientific 
usage. Deleuze (1990) says that "they are not things or facts, but 
events. We can not say that they exist, but rather that they subsist 
or inhere" (p. 5). The subject can be reinterpreted, restored, and 
reinscribed. In conclusion, Daignault (1989b) remarks that "the 
subject of education [the frontier, once again, between an expressing 
and a composer] grows, through such a process o f composition, 
towards a continuing problematization of the ego" (p. 15). Such an 
event, composition and decomposition, functioning against all 
personalism, psychological or linguistic, promotes a third person, and 
even a "fourth person singular," the non-person or "It" in which we 
recognize ourselves and our community better than in the exchanges 
between an I and a You.
173
Education. Poststructuralism and Local Emancipation (19901
This essay, comprised of 111 passages quoted from post­
structuralist texts (most are his own translation from the French), 
contrasts Foucault’s notion of truth with Habermas' idea of 
emancipation. The debates (e.g., Graff, 1984; Dews, 1986; Ray, 1988; 
Poster, 1989; Habermas, 1990) between critical theory and post- 
structuralism has occupied the center stage of disputes regarding 
social theory in various disciplines. Daignault attempts to localize 
those arguments and to shed light on curriculum discourses. The 
major issue here is the difference between concepts of "progress" or 
human emancipation in post-structuralism and critical theory. The 
notion of progress for critical theorists, Daignault argues, is 
synonymous with "universal emancipation." Daignault (1990) also 
reminds us that the Enlightenment (A u fk laru ngl is the "foundation of 
the very idea of progress in modern and contemporary education" (p. 
1).
Daignault reviews several problematics, "local" rather than 
"global," of those debates and their consequences for contemporary 
curriculum theory. These problematics include the old 
Enlightenment meta-narratives, the notion of progress, the concept of 
truth, and universal foundation of reason. He then proposes an 
ethics (new ethics) without moral, power and interpretation, and 
"local emancipation." This new ethics, following Foucault's 
conception, is conceived as a very strong structure of existence, 
without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian 
system, with a disciplinary structure (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983).
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Traditional notions about our morality has been articulated in the 
idea of analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or 
economic or political structures (Foucault, 1983). The challenge is to 
problematize prevailing practices and to interrogate power relations 
inherent in all social existence. It is to support local and minor forms 
of knowledge and a dislocation of commonly held conceptions about 
experiences, practices, and events.
It is not only the truth is what enables the mind to think; it is 
also the truth that enables us is to care for oneself and others.
Foucault (1988a) insists that to know oneself is to care for oneself. 
Daignault (1990) notes that "any pretention to reach the Absolute is 
a movement through which something is excluded; there is no 
absolute truth" (p. 3). The project of Foucault is to particularize the 
universal, not to deny it. The way of telling the truth is an endless 
interpretation, and to tell the truth is independent o f a political 
regime which tends to be indifferent to truth and while prescribing 
the truth.
Daignault (1990) notes we move toward a relativism, to a 
thought which is independent of any system of thought. Daignault's 
thinking here refers to Serres' (1989b) notion to understand without 
a concept. Serres proposes to search for a new knowledge-- 
"knowledge without death" (p. 110). Serres (1989b) notes:
Alexander [the concept] reigns over all, including his 
opponents. His power is so great that none remains 
who can object. To contradict the king is to belong to 
the king, to oppose power is to enter into the logic of 
the powerful, (p. 142)
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Daignault insists that post-structuralism does not criticize the 
universal, but does criticize the juncture between the global and the 
universal. This juncture is what produces dogmatism. Dogmatism is 
conceived as any local victory which tries to impose itself as a norm. 
However, this local victory is simply a universal effect. Daignault 
proposes to avoid dogmatism by thinking of this effect locally, not 
globally. This "localism" may be regarded as "relativism," not a 
global philosophy, a "local effect of their [post-structuralists] 
commitment to reach the universal" (Daignault, 1990, p. 36). Post­
structuralism requires one to assume responsibility for truth. To 
champion localism  without committing to truth is what produces 
nihilism. Daignault (1990) concludes: "Local emancipation is not
nihilistic" (p. 36).
Commentary
Daignault's work revives the question of the construction of the 
subject. Structuralism is correct when it throws back into question 
the central position of the subject in humanism; it is by insisting on 
the fact that the subject is symbolically determined that it succeeds 
in decentering it, indeed even dissolving it. But structuralism leaves 
intact the question of the sensible and not merely symbolic 
relationship of the subject to the body. From my view, one merit of 
Deleuze's work is that it has completely revived this question.
Daignault (1989a) notes: "It is not a matter of going back to the
romantic or phenomenological subject, but of showing that the real 
fissure of the "I" comes into being also through differance-making
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and not just through becoming-differance" (p. 37). It is important to 
note that the articulation of understanding and speaking of the self 
are subjected to a different kind of reading. It is the novelty of 
shifting perspectives. The key concept, explained by Deleuze (1990), 
is consequently that of individuation. He states:
The essential process of intensive quantities is 
individuation. Intensity is individualizing; intensive 
quantities are individualizing. Individuals are signal- 
sign systems, (p. 47)
The question of signals is taken up again in A Thousand Plateaus 
(1987a) in reference to the synthesizer: the synthesis of continuous 
variation; it is precisely at that point that the sensuality of sense is to 
be found. Not that sense is sensible, but its synthesis is.
Furthermore, a synthesis im plies a surface for recording differences 
in intensity, a sort of skin of differentiating sense; the condition 
without which the subject would never be anything more than a sign 
in a differentiating structure, or a differentiation subordinated to the 
identity o f the plentitude of consciousness. Deleuze (1987a) remarks:
The individual is in no way indivisible, but never stops 
dividing as he changes his nature. There is no me in 
what he expresses; because he expresses [IJdeas as 
internal m ultiplicities made up of differential relations 
and points that stand out, of pre-individual 
singularities. And there is no I expresses there either; 
because there again he is forming a multiplicity of 
actualization, like a condensation of points that stand 
out, an open collection of intensities, (p. 143)
Jacques Daignault's curriculum theory draws upon French 
philosophers Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Jean-
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Fran?ois Lyotard and Michel Serres. In these essays reviewed here, 
Daignault analyzes and demonstrates pedagogical implications of 
post-structuralism and stages questions regarding future possibilities 
for curriculum. In my view , Daignault's major contribution to the 
curriculum field is to challenge us to rethink curriculum and 
ourselves as educators. He exhibits how we can understand and do 
curriculum p o s t - s t ru c tu ra l ly .  More importantly, to understand 
Daignault's work is to "listen" to his performative staging and to 
encounter. These essays hint at the minimum effect he has 
produced. Another summarized version of Daignault's work, "Traces 
at Work from Different Places," can be found in William Pinar's book, 
Understanding Curriculum as Phenom enological and Deconstructed 
Text (1992).
Daignault is provoking a new way of thinking in a complex way 
and in an elusive manner. This new way of thinking, he insists, is 
not analytical thinking, which is in terms of "either/or"; nor is it 
dialectical thinking which is "both/and" (Wilden, 1972). He provokes 
a notion of thinking or sense that to think oneself as self-educative 
means "to experiment and to problematize" (Deleuze, 1988; Foucault, 
1989) and to think otherwise; to make sense which by itself is a 
problematic and problematizing. Fundamentally Daignault's works 
can be grasped through the concept of paradox, the paradoxical 
instance and nomadic movement. The notion of paradoxical instance 
is the movement of forces which circulates between two series of 
oppositions and moves both directions at the same time. It is the 
moment of the simultaneity o f coincidence when an occupant without 
a place is the same as a place without an occupant. As Deleuze
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(1990) remarks, "the younger becoming older than the older, the 
older becoming younger than the younger—but they can never 
finally become so; if they did they would no longer be becoming, but 
would be so" (p. 136).
Daignault reiterates the relations between nihilism  and terrorism 
in pedagogy. Following Deleuze, he states that "there exist two great 
illness of structure. The filling-up of the empty case by its 
accompanying subject and the empty case left alone without 
accompaniment. The consequences in education are terrorism and 
nihilism" (Daignault, 1982a, p. 192). Such a twofold reductionist's 
tendency in curriculum theory and practice is evident in the gap 
between what is and what ought to be. In the play between what is 
and what ought to be one creates pedagogical meaning. Daignault 
remarks that this idea can also be related to the concept of structure 
which encapsulates what is and what ought to be and forms a closed  
system. He argues that the demotion of the paradoxical and endless 
movement within the structure is in question. Daignault rejects the 
presumption of a fixed principle, a center and a solid foundation 
which regulates structure, and thereby forecloses the system.
These essays exhibit the movement of his thought and style.
They "stage" the problematic between theory and practice.
Problematics o f binary oppositions (description and prescription, 
teaching and learning, thinking and action, method and manner, etc.) 
are presented as irreducible to either one. Daignault insists that they 
are inseparable from the movement of paradoxical instances. In 
short, sense as nonsense produces meaning (sens) .
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Daignault's thought is derived from understanding paradox. He 
offers us first, a definition of curriculum as paradoxical. He 
approaches curriculum through Deleuze’s notion of "sense," "occupant 
without place" and "place without occupants." To define is to distort, 
but Daignault does not propose that we should stop the project of 
definition; on the contrary, one works "to multiply the definitions." 
Second, he explicates the notion of desire, arguing that desire as 
seduction can be implicated in the pedagogical situation. Paradox is 
exactly the link between desire and promise, teaching and learning; 
in other words, it is "the promise of the other's desire" (Daignault,
1982b, p. 22). To teach, for him, is to promise the other's desire: to 
seduce through knowledge. Third, Daignault presents an analogy of 
common sense and good sense, in Greek, as doxa.  Common sense is a 
mechanism by which identity is conferred to things and is an analogy 
of the known to the unknown. Good sense is a mechanism by which 
a direction is imposed, a good order and is an analogy of the moral to 
be founded. Through contrasting with analogy, para-dox  is opposed 
to both aspects of doxa ,  paradox would provide us with pedagogical 
meaning. Fourth, he explores political space and technological space 
in curricular thought, questioning the "excluded third" between these 
two spaces. Whether "de jure" and "de facto" are reducible to 
political space or technological space is questionable. Fifth, regarding 
thinking, knowing and feeling, Daignault insists that thinking is 
different from knowing, but knowledge and feeling are not opposed 
to thinking. As Serres (1983) remarks: "To know is to kill, to rely on 
death" (p. 28). Sixth, regarding differance  and unilateral distinction, 
he explicates the notion of "text" and problem of language. He
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reexamines Derrida's readings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau to 
demonstrate the unilateral distinction to shed light on dif ferance .  
Seventh, regarding style, manner and method, he challenges us to 
think ourselves in provocative ways as self-educative. He elaborates 
Deleuze’s (1987b) definition of style, i.e., "great literature is written 
in a sort of foreign language within our own language" (p. 57).
Eighth, regarding dialogue and translation, the questions of 
curriculum planning and implementation, research and practice are 
raised to reinscribe the excluded third. He insists that curriculum is 
a non-com plete relative difference, an intransitive verb--to pass—or 
in the Joycean sense, "riverrun." Ninth, regarding the subject of 
curriculum, he questions and claims that it does not exist, but 
subsists in things and insists in language; this questioning of 
curriculum as "event" gives us new understanding of curriculum and 
curriculum discourse.
CHAPTER FIVE  
TOW ARD A POST-STRUCTURALIST CURRICULUM  AND 
PEDAGOGY: A TAOIST CONNECTION
Authentic teaching is watchfulness, a mindful 
watching flowing from the heeding of the call in the 
pedagogical situation that the good teacher hears.
Indeed, teachers are more than they do; they belong to 
that which is beyond their doing; they are the 
teaching. (Aoki, 1988, p. 16)
Starlight asked Non-Being: "Master, are you? or are
you not?" Since he received no answer whatever,
Starlight set himself to watch for Non-Being. He 
waited to see if  Non-Being would put in an 
appearance. He kept his gaze fixed on the deep void, 
hoping to catch a glimpse of Non-Being. All day long 
he looked, and he saw nothing. He reached out to 
grasp, and grasped nothing.
Then Starlight exclaimed at last: "That is IT."
This is the furthest yet! Who can reach it?
I can comprehend the absence of Being
But who can comprehend the absence of Nothing
(V oid)?
If now, on top of all this, Non-Being IS,
Who can comprehend it?
(The Way of Chuang Tzu. 1965, p. 125)
This study concludes by linking post-structuralist thinking with 
the Chinese Taoist and Zen perspectives, a linking that may suggest a 
next step for curriculum theory development. To begin this process 
of linking, I will review aspects of Taoism, Zen philosophy, and post­
structuralism as they speak to important concepts in contemporary 
curriculum discourse. We begin by examining briefly Taoism and 
Zen, then moving to commenting on certain connections among
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Taoism, Zen, and post-structuralism. From possibilities created by 
these connections, I will briefly reflect on the follow ing curriculum 
concepts: the self and its displacement, language as paradox, 
aesthetics, and listening. This reflection represents the end of the 
beginning.
Taoism and Zen Philosophy
Chinese Taoist philosophy, namely Lao-tze (Lao-tzu) and 
Chuang-tze (Chuang-tzu), is embodied in everyday life and seems to 
be more attractive to many Chinese than Confucian philosophy. Lao- 
tze's The Tao Te Ching (1989) is comprised o f approximately five 
thousand words. In Chinese culture, many people would contend 
that the less is said, the more is meant; it is understood as saying 
more by saying less. To many Chinese, Tao can not be known but 
felt. Some people combine The Tao Te Ching with the Book of 
C hanges (known as I-C hing) to explain the mystery and beauty of the 
universe, the meaning of life and death, the secret passage beyond 
the world of positive knowledge where there is a realm of forces 
unseen. Zen philosophy, mainly influenced by Taoist thought, has 
been always associated with the Buddhist school o f thought, known 
as Zen Buddhism. Zen has been regarded by some as a "psychological 
leaping of the unconscious" or a "metaphysical awareness of 
transcendental reality." Zen is often said to be "illogical" and "anti­
intellectual" in nature (Suzuki, 1949, 1963; Dumoulin, 1979).
Taoism and Zen philosophy are paradoxical in nature. Lao-tze 
says that "one who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not 
know" (Lin, 1948, p. 257). In the Taoist view, language can be
183
regarded as a paradox. In the opening of The Tao Te Ching. Lao-tze 
claims that "the Tao that can be spoken of is not the everlasting Tao.
The Name that can be named is not the everlasting name" (Chen,
1989, p. 51). Chuang-tze not only developed a complete theory of 
knowledge, but also felt and expressed more poignantly the pathos of 
human life. Chuang-tze states that "those who dream of the banquet 
wake to lamentation and sorrow. Those who dream of lamentation 
and sorrow wake to join the hunt" (Merton, 1965, p. 64). He 
continues: "What we love is the mystery of life. What we hate is
corruption in death. But the corruptible in its turn becomes 
mysterious life, and this mysterious life once more becomes 
corruptible" (Merton, 1965, p. 64). Zen, as noted earlier, appears to 
be anti-metaphysical, and yet Zen masters often make statements 
which are quite metaphysical. From the perspective of Zen, there is 
neither a fixed meaning nor a fixed referent for each term in 
language. Taoist and Zen master often employ multiple usages and 
meanings, and their meanings are not determined by extra-linguistic 
referents but rather depend on internal linguistic conditions.
In Taoism, the true character of "wu-wei" (literally translated as 
non-doing or doing nothing)—"do not act" is not mere inactivity but 
"perfect action"—because it is an act without activity (Chen, 1989, p.
81). In other words, it is action not carried out independently of 
"Tien" (heaven) and "Di" (earth) and in conflict with the dynamism of 
the whole, but in perfect harmony with the whole—Tao. However, 
we must not confuse "Tao" with "the sublation of 'aufubeng'  of 
Hegelian thought" (Daignault, 1989a, p. 3) or the structuralist's 
"transcendental signified." Tao is everywhere and nowhere at the
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same time. Wang Pi (1979), commenting on Lao-tze, argues that the 
relationship between Tao and Te (L ao-T ze is The Tao Te Chingl is a 
paradox. Tao is considered as substance and Te as function. In other 
words, with non-being as substance, all things will function well. At 
the same time, insists Wang (1979), "although it is valuable to have 
non-being as function, nevertheless there cannot be substance 
without non-being" (p. 67). The concept of "wu" (having not), or non-
be in g ,  nothingness (or void) is the most important element in Taoist
thinking. If being is to be understood or to be useful, it has to 
function through non-being. Lao-tze remarks:
Thirty spokes unite around the nave;
From their non-being (loss o f their individuality)
Arises the utility of the wheel.
Mold clay into a vessel;
From its not-being (in the vessel's hollow)
Arises the utility of the vessel.
Therefore by the existence of things we profit.
And by the non-existence of things we are served.
(Lin, 1948, p. 87)
He continues to say:
Tao produced the One.
The One produced the two (Ying and Yang)
The two produced the three.
And the three produced the ten thousand things (all 
things-creative universe).
The ten thousand things carry the Ying and embrace 
the Yang, and through the blending of the material 
force they achieve harmony. (Lin, 1948, p. 214)
Here Ying and Yang are introduced to implicitly invoke the "yu" 
(having) and "wu" (having not), ultimately to reach the One out of 
Tao. In a "Tai-Chi" symbol, we see a white dot within the black 
portion, a black dot within the white portion. Both complementary
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and contrasting features are present at the same time. Zen and Tao 
as the middle way would be committed to neither, in terms of any 
dualism; for instance, idealism is as untenable as realism.
Contrasting with Taoist and Zen philosophy, according to James 
Liu (1988), Confucius is the "one who knows it cannot be done but 
does it" (p. 25). In other words, Confucius had to use words to 
explain that words are unnecessary. It is this idea of "words do not 
exhaust meaning" that suggests more meaning than what is explicitly  
expressed-"you know what I mean" (Liu, 1988, pp. 1-37). This 
problematic o f language is central to post-structuralism, as w ell as to 
Taoism and Zen philosophy. Reflections on language and discourse 
led to Foucault's connections among language, knowledge and power, 
to Derrida's attack on dualism and his critique of logocentrism, to 
Deleuze's fourth dimension of language, to Lyotard's comments of 
"language game," and to Serres' dialogue in an information society.
The intellectual is no longer commissioned to play the role o f advisor 
to the masses and critic of ideological content, but rather to become 
one capable o f providing instruments of analysis. Foucault (1986a) 
notes:
[W]hat is philosophy today—philosophical activity, I 
mean—if it is not the critical work that thought brings 
to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the 
endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be 
possible to think differently, instead legitimating what 
is already known? (pp. 8-9)
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Connections Between Taoism and Post-structuralism
Heideggerian thought (later Heidegger) has much in common 
with Taoist thinking (Parkes, 1987). The influence of Heideggerian 
thought on structuralists and post-structuralists is quite significant; 
several structuralists (Barthes and Levi-Strauss) are fascinated by 
the influence of Zen philosophy in Japan and are interested in China. 
Barthes (1982) explicitly states that writing is in its own way a 
"satori"—a Zen event—defined as "a loss of meaning," "a seismism" 
which perturbs the thinking subject (p. 10). This event produces a 
speech-void. At the same time, this void makes writing possible. 
Post-structuralists are also intrigued by what has happened 
philosophically in the East; sometimes they explicitly acknowledge 
the difference between the West and the East (Foucault, 1970;
Derrida, 1982; Deleuze, 1987a; Serres, 1989b). Several elaborate the 
influence of Eastern thought in their writings (Deleuze, 1987a; Eribon, 
1991). Deleuze explicitly states that the notion of "Body without 
Organ" is much related to "Tao." Foucault is interested in the practice 
of Zen. China, Serres (1989b) notes, is the last "universalizing 
ideology" in the world. The implicit connection, I am suggesting here, 
is a first step toward the dialogue between the W est and the East in 
contemporary curriculum theory.
The connection between Western and Eastern thought has been 
elusive and not evident; from different interpretations of each 
tradition no consensual understanding could emerge. Gadamer 
writes, in Heidegger and Asian Thought (1987), that "the generation. .
. would be very reluctant to say anything in print about a philosophy 
if  he/she were him/herself unable to read and understand the
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relevant texts in the original language" (p. 7). Having written on 
Japan and China, Barthes (1982) seems to confront an unknown that 
is neither about Japan nor about China. This unknown refers back to 
his own language, and through his language, that of all the West. I 
wish to suggest certain passages between the West and the East 
tradition in light o f Post-structuralism, Taoism and Zen philosophy.
This passage-way may help Westerners to understand post- 
structuralist curriculum from a different, non-Western perspective.
For the purpose of linking the characteristic features of the post­
structuralist curriculum to Taoism or Zen philosophy, I would 
propose at this point to review several important concepts in post- 
structuralism: "paradoxical instance--the excluded middle," 
"preponderance of signifiers over signifieds," "deconstruction," and 
the postmodern turn. Some (Cohen and Goldman, 1990) characterize 
the philosophy of Chuang-tze as a Taoist deconstructionism. For 
Taoism and deconstructionism, a text does not fix a state o f affairs; 
nothing is fixed and every interpretation transforms the reading 
perspective. Both deconstruction and Taoism reject any philosophical 
system that accommodates Western metaphysics and the notion o f a 
transcendental and personal Being. Taoism provides a useful 
counterweight to Western logocentrism and the metaphysics o f  
presence at the same time. One can quote from Taoist texts to 
support Derrida's deconstruction o f Western philosophy, or 
alternatively, one can say that, from a Taoist perspective, such 
deconstruction is unnecessary. In deconstructive context, the 
attempt is not to ascertain the underlying wisdom of the texts, or to 
locate their internal coherence, but to explore the texts as
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expressions of ideology, culturally dominant values, and popular 
culture. This attempt tends to focus on differentiation rather than 
consolidation of the marginal, on the rise of new locii o f local 
struggle, and on the appearance of new technological communication 
m edia.
In post-structuralism, Foucault and Deleuze argue that things 
(meaning, history, etc.; contrary to propositions) are not joined 
together by a process o f continuity or interiorization, but instead 
they rejoin above and beyond ruptures and discontinuities (Foucault, 
1970, 1972; Deleuze, 1987a, 1988). The notion of discontinuity is 
neither the "arrow," nor the "cycle," nor the "pyramid." The point is 
not that there are no continuity and hierarchy in history, but rather 
that we treat any assumed continuity and hierarchy with suspicion.
This attitude moves out of the confines of history into the 
preconditions of the possible as possible. Foucault articulates an 
unquestionable suspicion toward any order through which 
knowledge is transformed into power and vice versa. In sum,
Foucault (1979) insists that there is "no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations" (p. 27). In Discipline and Punish (1979), Foucault also 
demonstrates that dualisms are molar or massive effects occurring 
within multiplicities. Deleuze (1988) emphasizes that "Body without 
Organ" is "a problem not o f the One and the multiple but o f a fusional 
multiplicity that effectively goes beyond any opposition between the 
One and the Multiple" (p. 137). The multiplicity of forces, the 
multiple being of force, Taoist observes, is "wu-wei"—an act without
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activity. These forces are unfolded on the surface of internal depth 
and then folded under the surface; any given perspective can only be 
validated by reverting to still other perspectives. Serres (1982) 
explicates the notion of "noise" (La Belle N o iseuse)  to implicate or 
"indicate" that the birth of order comes from the chaos or disorder, 
the functions of Hermes and the "parasite" points to undermining the 
certainty of being, expressions of indeterminacy, and any binary 
system. This thinking parallels Lao-tze's concept of "wu," the 
fathomless form, the formless foundation of all forms; all forms are 
derived from it.
Looking beyond a "hermeneutical circle" of the exchange 
between sense and utterance (or signifier and signified), Derrida 
intends a revolutionary thesis: le double didouble  ce qu'il redouble.  
D e d o u b le r  means "to split," to "cut in two," so that signifier can 
rebound and make "half" o f the signified into signifier. The signified 
itself is thus distributed into two functions, signified and signifier, 
which it can perform in turn or simultaneously (Derrida, 1978). This 
"differentialism" of Derrida, characterized by Robert M agliola (1984), 
is "between the Tao" (pp. 2-11).
Let us read a poem by Tao Yuanming:
In this there is true meaning;
I wished to wax eloquent, but have forgotten words.
(Liu, 1988, p. 43)
Post-structuralists are particularly concerned with the 
foundations and limits of theory. The lesson they learn from 
Nietzsche is that truth is not "a transcendent unity." They replace 
mind with "text" (as the locus of enunciation of meaning), and replace
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identity with "difference" (as the strategy of reading). They argue 
that the subject is the point of origin of meaning and the world 
consists o f actions amenable to the understanding of the subject—and 
yet the "subject" is displaced. Derrida (1978) notes:
Nothing within this language (the language of
everything that has participated, from near or far, in
the adventure of Western reason), and no one among 
those who speak it, can escape the historical guilt. . . 
which Foucault apparently wishes to put on trial, (pp.
35, 58)
Displacement of the Self
The notion of self has been central in curriculum studies. The 
traditional recognition of the individual self in the West seems to be 
the center of society; relationships are considered by-products o f 
interacting individuals. In the East, matters of self seem trivial 
compared to concern for family and community. The sense of self is 
stronger in the West than in the East. This attitude results in 
detailed study of human nature in the West; one is always in search 
of further individualization. One is attempting to grasp what is at the
basis of the individual soul. On the other hand, the East tends to
focus upon Nature and in so doing to obliterate the individual; there 
is often no sense of self.
One can not care for self without knowledge. Knowledge of self 
is also the knowledge of a certain number of rules and conduct or of 
principles which at the same time function as truths and regulations.
The care of self therefore is to employ and to explore these rules— 
the game of truth. The relations of power, according to Foucault,
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constitute a field of knowledge and operate between individuals.
Power and knowledge directly imply one another. Foucault exposes 
how the subject of knowledge and the subject o f power together 
compose the regime of truth in modern society along these lines. 
However, the aim is not to free truth from power but to open up the 
possibility of the constitution of a new politics o f truth.
The subject is to be understood as a "form" that "is not above all 
or always identical to itself" (Foucault, 1987, p. 121). This means 
that subjects are constituted differently in different discursive 
situations; and different forms of relationships with the self are 
established through these different modalities of subjectivity. The 
practices of self are, Foucault (1986a) insists, "not something that the 
individual invents by him/herself. They are patterns he finds in his 
culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by 
his culture, his society and his social group" (p. 122). These 
processes o f self-formation are not "natural" but are something done 
to the self, performed on the self. The "technologies" of the self also 
suggest the body as a set o f relations for experimentation and 
invention that may be exercised for the purpose of constituting the 
self. This eroding of the identifiable self is manifest in a wide range 
of practices of self. The disappearance of the subject from the center 
gives way to reflexive questioning, irony, and ultimately the playful 
probing of yet another reality. Our ways of understanding the self 
are thus displaced. Foucault (1977) also warns us an attempt "to 
capture the exact essence of things, their purist possibilities, and 
their carefully protected identities," is necessarily an essentialism.
He explains:
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[TJhis search [for the origin] assumes the existence of 
immobile forms that precede the external world of 
accident and succession. This search is directed to 
"that which was already there," the image of a 
primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it 
necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately 
disclose an original identity, (p. 142)
Language as Paradox
Tao [Yuanming], one of the greatest Chinese poets, has expressed 
reality as an undifferentiated whole, the same as that expressed by 
Chuang-tze. For Tao [Yuanming] to convey, in poetry, a sense of the 
undifferentiated state of reality, there is no medium other than 
words, which involves the making of distinctions. Tao [Yuanming] 
resolves the dilemma by accepting Chuang-tze's advice to "forget 
words" after getting the "meaning" as well as the latter's paradox, 
"great eloquence does not speak" (Merton, 1965, p. 27). The paradox 
is, of course, that Tao [Yuanming] has to use words to tell us that he 
has forgotten words, and since he is writing about his own act of 
writing this poem. His words may be taken as an example of 
Deleuze's "hammering" or Daignault's writing about curriculum as 
with words and beyond words. As noted earlier, Zen Buddhists seem  
to be fond of ordinary language, and yet their use of language is 
often extraordinary. This paradoxical nature, for Zen Buddhists, is 
the original teaching of the Buddha. This paradoxical instance is 
embedded within the undifferentiated state o f reality, which sheds 
light on Daignault's (1989a) "curriculum as composition." Language
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does not simply represent or mirror the reality; instead it is part of 
reality and reflects upon itself. Foucault (1970) notes:
Though language can be spread them [things] before 
us, it can do so only in an unthinkable space. . . we 
shall never succeed in defining a stable relation of
contained to container between each of these
categories and that which includes them all. (p. xvii)
This unthinkable space is similar to Daignault's (1988c) gap 
between "signs" and "notes," the relation between power and forces. 
Forces constitute power; forms constitutes knowledge. Power does 
not pass through forms but forces. To affect is a function of force, to
be affected is like a matter of force. Force as an exercise o f power
shows up as an affect, since force defines itself by its very power to 
affect other forces. This space is the condition of possibility o f the 
undifferentiated state o f reality. In this way the gap, detached from 
any specific use and any substance, attests to the sublimation from 
within the primacy o f paradox; it produces by way of paradox a more 
complex or bifurcated paradoxical instance.
In curriculum, the notion of paradox (para-doxa, doxa  as the 
dogmas of the times) might be brought into everyday classroom and 
practice. We need to attend a new sense of order—paradoxical order 
or chaotic order, by continuously questioning taken-for-granted 
assumptions. Since there is no resolution that can be reached, no 
possible choice that can be made, this disorder o f order, adding new 
dimensions to the discourse, may be imperative for curriculum  
theory. To identify the paradox, however, is not to resolve it.
Daignault (1989b) insists: "The translation of a ’t' too many is . . . 
passages between answers and questions, not the [or even a] passage
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from a question to an answer, but their absolute difference 
[differance]" (p. 361). The absolute difference is the paradoxical 
instance, the condition of possibilities o f undifferentiated whole. The 
strategy is not to produce answers or solutions to problems or to 
assist in the development of new social intervention. Rather, it is to 
make us experience that period's discourse as a specific self- 
sufficient web that can account for the whole o f its own world.
As noted earlier, Foucault (1973) insists that
[A]s for a common language, there is no such thing; or 
rather, there is no such thing any longer; the 
constitution of madness as a mental illness, at the end 
of the eighteenth century, affords the evidence o f a 
broken dialogue, posits the separation as already 
effected, and thrusts into oblivion all those 
stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax in
which the exchange between madness and reason was
made. (p. x)
This attitude locates madness in an area of unforeseeable 
freedom where frenzy is uncharted; if  determinism can have any 
effect, it is in the form of constraint, punishment, or discipline.
Curriculum and the Aesthetics of Existence
One day, Chuang-tze was dreaming about becoming a 
butterfly; it is so alive and flies wherever it wants
happily. He forgets himself so it does not notice his
existence. Suddenly, he wakes up and feels him self 
lively. He can not tell whether he, Chuang-tze, was 
dreaming as a butterfly or being a butterfly he was 
dreaming about himself. There must be a distinction 
between Chuang-tze and butterfly. It is called w u - 
hua. (personal translation of Chuang-tze Dreams
Butterf ly  in Wang, 1909, p. 12)
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This story is about the "fluttering" between Chuang-tze and the 
butterfly. It can also be said to be about reality and illusion, 
knowledge and ignorance, even about the reality of uncertainty. This 
notion of fluttering parallels Deleuze's (1987a) notion of "perpetual 
disequilibrium," or Daignault’s (1984a) "passage-way" (pp. 3-7).
There may be some questions about this story's verifiability or 
experience of a dream. Asking questions like these is like asking 
what shapes the clouds have. The clouds are neither square nor 
round, any more than dreaming or waking. A story is a story.
Whether or not I am Chuang-tze or a butterfly may be an interesting 
question, but that uncertainty does not detract from the story. The 
aesthetics of the story have to do with the "effect" of meaning rather 
than with its content per se. Story-telling may be another passage to 
understand curriculum. This approach has been implied by other 
traditions in critical pedagogy and teacher development: curriculum  
as "story-telling" (Aoki, 1983; Egan, 1986; Elbaz, 1991), "collaborative 
teacher's autobiography" (Raymond, Butt & Townsend, 1992) or 
curriculum as "autobiographical text" (Pinar, forthcoming). Another 
example is Graham's Reading and Writing the Self (1991). He 
employs autobiography in English teacher education and curriculum  
through "reading and writing" the self. His work suggests it may be 
possible to open the way to achieve authentic self understanding via 
curriculum. However, Deleuze (1987a) sees that:
No longer are there acts to explain, dreams or fantasies 
to interpret, childhood memories to recall, words to 
make signify; instead, there are colors and sounds, 
becomings and intensities [and when you are 
becoming-dog, do not ask if the dog you are playing
1 9 6
with is a dream or reality, if it is "your goddam 
mother" or something else entirely]. There is no 
longer Self that feels, acts, and recalls; there is a 
"glowing fog, a dark yellow mist" that has effects and 
experiences movements and speeds, (p. 162)
We live our lives as a story we are telling, reminds Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1969); "a man is always a teller of tales, he lives surrounded 
by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything that 
happens to him through them; and he tries to live his own life as if 
he were telling a story" (Sartre, 1969, p. 39). Story-telling is a way 
of life. For instance, science is a "story" in the language of a logico- 
mathematical system, as inductively and deductively tight as we can 
make it.
Telling stories can be playful. Gadamer (1988) argues that "play 
is really limited to representing itself. Thus its mode of being is self­
representation" (p. 97). Play must be purposeless and have no 
purpose outside itself. Inconclusiveness is conclusive after all, once 
it becomes an identifiable consciousness. Lyotard (1984b) describes 
this purposeless "space" or "scene" as that "which in the modern 
poses the unpresentable in the presentation itself. . . that which is 
concerned with new presentations, not purely for the pleasure of it, 
but the better to insist that the unpresentable exists" (p. 89). We 
write to be other than what we are. The purpose of writing is to 
"know to what extent the exercise o f thinking one's own history can 
free thought from what it thinks silently and to allow it to think 
otherwise" (Racevskis, 1987, p. 133). One tells a story in a voice that 
mingles with the voices of the other storytellers. We tell stories
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together. To tell a story about curriculum is to tell a story about 
stories and ourselves.
Another story is pertinent here. "The joy of fishes" (1965) is 
about Chuang-tze:
Chuang-tze and Hui-tze were crossing Hao river by the 
dam .
Chuang said: "See how free fishes leap and dart: That 
is their happiness."
Hui replied: "Since you are not a fish, how do you 
know what makes fishes happy?"
Chuang said: "Since you are not I, how can you possible 
know that I do not know what makes fishes 
happy?"
Hui argued: "If I, not being you, cannot know what you 
know, it follows that you, not being a fish, cannot 
know what they know."
Chuang said: "Wait a minute! Let us get back to the 
original question. What you asked me was how do 
you know what makes fishes happy? From the 
terms of your question, you evidently know I know 
what makes fishes happy."
Chuang continues: "I know the joy of fishes in the 
river, through my own journey, as I go walking 
along the same river." (Merton, 1965, pp. 97-98)
This story implies playfulness. Chuang-tze and Hui-tze were 
together for a long time; they were playing with each other.
Pedagogy and curriculum are enriched by constantly questioning 
assumptions among students and teacher. Clem Adelman (1992) 
suggests that play can be regarded as "a quest for vocation" and best 
be understood as an intermingling between the "imagination" and the 
"feedback from attempts to test the consequences on others and 
things of 'what i f  questions" (p. 139). Such a questioning entails an 
"opening" of perspectives, a multiplicity of voices. In curriculum,
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many are looking for correct answers to universalize, normalize and 
standardize their so-called "objective" agendas (Phillips, 1987;
Jackson, 1992); only a few are asking important questions to localize 
alternatives, to de-objectify objectivity.
Therefore, the role o f curriculum theorizing is not to formulate a 
global analysis of the ideologically coded, but rather to analyze the 
specificity of the mechanisms of power and to construct, little by 
little, strategic knowledge. Curriculum functions to displace 
discursive practices, such as self-formation, sense-making, historical 
awareness, rather than merely transform particular discourses. As 
noted earlier, these strategies are less interested in achieving a 
unified whole, either within collaborative communities (Miller, 1990) 
or within individuals, and more on exploring the possible connections 
among those fragmentations and differences. Derived from the 
analysis o f the discursive formation of schooling, curriculum theory 
becomes practice. Theory does not express, translate, or serve to 
apply practice: It is practice.
Bodv-effect and Self-stvlization
Another implication o f post-structuralism and Eastern thought in 
curriculum can be considered as a kind of body teaching and 
displacement of the self. Traditionally, teaching is merely connected 
to words or representation. Students not only acquire knowledge 
through "the movement of signifiers," (Derrida, 1978) but they also 
think knowledge by "thinking through their body" (Gallop, 1988) or 
by feeling (not merely knowing) the knowledge they explore.
Students are practicing "body reading" in the texts and everyday
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experience (Grumet, 1988). These ideas call us back to the body, 
back to the primordial experience of childhood, and back to the 
"skin" of a new body; these are problematics best raised by Lyotard 
(1988-1989): "Can thought go on without a body?" For thought
without a body is the prerequisite for thinking of the death of all 
bodies, and of the death o f thought that is inseparable from those 
bodies. Foucault (1986a) suggests that "it is physical pleasure 
[effects of body] that will have the last word and dismiss the prudish 
speeches [thought] with a peal of laughter" (p. 213).
One of the differences between the West and the East concerns 
the notion of "individuality"-including the notion of self. The 
construction of self, in the East, is thought as that there is lack of a 
adequate basis for individuality. One reason is that many see such a 
basis as requiring not only moral autonomy but also what Max 
Weber (1951) called a "unified personality" (p. 235). Modern 
Western tradition has constructed the self through the emphasis on 
privacy; Cartesian skepticism regarding the problem of knowledge, 
facilitating criticism of authority figures; "romantic" approaches to 
the emotions, including the profound ways in which the relations 
among emotional, sexual, moral, and religious tendencies that were 
explored by Rousseau, Dostoyevsky, and Freud; an emphasis on 
economic and political rights; and even on philosophies defining the 
individual as the ontologically formed human subject. The notion of 
self has been explicated by post-structuralism through the scrutiny 
of power/knowledge relation and sexuality, the function of desire, 
the method of autobiography, the languages games, and the 
communication and relationships to others in information society
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(Foucault, 1978, 1985, 1986a, 1989; Deleuze and Guattari, 1983b,
1987a; Derrida, 1985; Lyotard, 1985; Serres, 1982, 1983). The 
"Otherness" is recognized and is essential to understanding the self. 
Awareness of the Other and of the technologies of self-formation 
permit individuals to be affected by their own means--a certain 
number of operations—on their bodies and souls, thoughts, conducts, 
and way of being, so as to transform themselves to attain the order 
of things.
However, it is difficult to discern any trans-cultural standards by 
which they necessarily amount to the "best" or the most "authentic" 
construction of the self. An advance in intellectuality is not a 
fulfillment of the wish to know. Lyotard (1990) describes knowledge 
as "the desire of the West as a wish to know, and the wish to know as
an avoidance of responsibility, as a flirtation with the known in
which the knowing subject 'never gets his fingers burned'" (p. 99).
In addition, Chuang-tze tells us: "When knowledge went north" to
search for truth, knowledge failed (Merton, 1965, pp. 118-120). This 
understanding of reality echoes Serres' (1983) "to know is to kill" (p.
28). It is not a question o f discovering truth in the subject but of
remembering truth, recovering a truth which has been forgotten. 
Chuang-tze says: "We come nowhere being right, since we have the
answers. 'For he who knows does not speak, he who speaks does not 
know.' And 'the wise man gives instruction without the use of 
speech'" (Merton, 1965, p. 120). The subject does not forget 
her/him self, her/his nature, origin, or her/his supernatural affinity, 
but she or he forgets the rules of conduct and what she or he ought 
to have done. The use of language is necessary, yet problematical, in
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all communications. Wittgenstein (1922) once remarked: "The limits
of language. . . mean the limits of my world" (p. 34). J. Hillis Miller 
(1977) also argues that "language is not an instrument or tool in 
man's hands, a submissive means of thinking. Language rather 
thinks man and his 'world'" (p. 444). As the vocabulary of  
expression is expanded (forcibly), so is the potential repertoire of 
relationships among human communication and understanding.
Foucault explicates the identification and construction of self through 
the nexus of power and knowledge relation. Individuals are effects 
of power, the tools of power, the elements of its articulation, not its 
points of application.
Pedagogical Listening
The philosophy of listening has been suppressed by a 
dominating culture of "talking" or "speaking" in the West. The 
mechanism of "saying without listening" has been regarded as 
constituting itself a generalized form of domination and control.
Listening is not passive but active. Aoki (1989) explains "listening" 
through etymology ("Listening" in Chinese): Listening involves ears,
eyes, mind and undivided attention altogether in order "to listen."
He remarks that "listening to the foregoing carefully allows us to 
become thoughtful of how we may have become beholden to the 
metaphor of the I-eye—the I that sees" (Aoki, 1989, p. 5). We need 
to listen to the living speech of the Other. We must not merely listen 
to one's words but to o n e . After all, "what would be the value of the 
passion for knowledge if it is resulted only in a certain amount of 
knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent
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possible, in the knower's straying afield of himself?" (Foucault,
1986a, p. 8) Jo Anne Pagano (1990) insists that "to engage in 
conversation is to inflict oneself toward the Other. Conversation is 
made up of gesture and posture as well as of word" (p. 133). We 
need to listen to "voices" or the "tone" of teaching (Aoki, 1990a; van 
Manen, 1986, 1991). It is in the teaching of the teachers that 
students can acquire, assimilate, and transform a set of practices into 
a permanent principle o f action and to get prepared.
Gemma Fiumara (1990) also suggests that the strength of 
contemporary thinking lies "less in the creation of new basic concepts 
than in the new messages of past thoughts that enable us to 
rediscover and 'hear'" (p. 76). This pluralism of expressions opens 
the way to full expression of all discourses, to a free play of
discourses. The challenge to curriculum is thus to facilitate
renegotiation of the meaning systems within which "the problem" 
exists, to open the way to new solutions. We can see that Foucault's 
(1970, 1972) project functioned as one of problematizing the 
presuppositions of utopian dreams by liberating the power o f truth 
from the forms of hegemony that imprison it. As Serres (1982) 
would say: "To invent, is not to produce, it is to translate" (p. 65).
Listening, however, is not to be envisaged as yet another position so
much as a path of a coexistential nature aimed at an understanding 
of the message or theory. This understanding will extend listening to 
develop in the direction of further conjunctions and cross- 
fertilization. This understanding also opens the door to multiple 
realities.
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Eric Chappell, in his Ph.D. dissertation entitled The Azimuth of 
Language: Explorations o f the Limits o f Expression (1985), attempts 
to articulate the m eaning-of-the-whole, which he terms "calling," in 
the texts and everyday life. This approach intersects with Aoki's 
notion of pedagogical belonging and Heidegger's "dwelling." This 
calling also involves pedagogical listening which means that not only 
should we listen to the message carefully, but more importantly, we 
should listen to the unsaid or the silent—saying what it does not 
speak. The realization of the silent implies the intervention of the 
"I." To break the bonds of any "given" has tremendous implications. 
Listening to the calling is authentic and is an embodiment of the 
undifferentiated whole o f reality.
Ted Aoki (1989) pursues a bridge over the West and the East 
through phenom enological belonging and grounding (Heideggerian 
"dwelling"). He proposes an attitude of "belonging" and "dwelling" in 
curriculum and pedagogy. He reiterates Heidegger's "dwelling":
To dwell, to be set at p e a c e ,  means to remain at peace 
within the f r e e ,  the p r e s e r v e ,  the free sphere that 
safeguards each thing in its nature. Everything that 
already belongs to the gathering nature of this thing, 
appears as something that afterward read into it. . . .
To be a human being means to be on the earth as  
mortal. (Heidegger, 1971, pp. 147, 149)
The notion of "bridging" and "belonging" in Aoki represents the 
key point of his phenomenological curriculum theory. He constantly 
evokes the notion of "calling" of teachers and students in pedagogical 
situation. We as educators, he insists, should practice and be able to 
acquire a sort of pedagogical "listening," whose meaning is two-fold; 
first of all, the teacher needs to be attuned to pedagogical living with
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students that their voices can be heard. Moreover, the teacher needs 
to be so attuned to allow a listening to the voice—the "calling"—of the 
good in the lived pedagogical situation with students (Aoki, 1989,
1990b). Teachers would invite students into modes of dialogue as 
participants rather than pawns, as collaborative interlocutors instead 
of slates to be filled. A student is a teacher and vice versa. They 
speak and listen together. They are different; they are connected.
The End of The Beginning
Post-structuralism is an on-going discourse, or a "subject-in- 
process." Since curriculum scholarship is focused on knowledge 
production and self-formation within our culture, a more in-depth 
analysis of socio/historical and self-reflective discourse is needed to 
answer questions regarding the mobilization of meaning embedded 
within cultural formation, o f organizing forces of the state in assuring 
a decentered yet unified future. In other words, contemporary 
curriculum theories must be analyzed in terms of the relations 
among self, power and knowledge.
We must be willing to confront and to transgress the limits of 
our discourse, to understand the conditions of possibility for 
entrapment in historical categories in order to move beyond those 
categories. This approach opens up the question o f the relationship 
of theory to practice, a phenomenon from which a new ethics—an 
aesthetics of existence—can be advanced, one based not on the lifting 
o f censorship and prohibition but rather on a more limited ethic that 
invents new forms of life independent from reified political and 
social structures. The call for "dialogue at the margins" (Schultz,
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1990) or "local emancipation" (Daignault, 1990) is needed to examine 
how the relations of boundaries o f our discourse and our subjective 
constitution as the paradoxical social dynamism are being realized.
Dialogue between Eastern and Western philosophy is worth 
continuing. Derrida (1976) says:
We must begin wherever we are and the thought of 
the trace which cannot take the scent into account, has 
already taught us that it was impossible to justify a 
point of departure absolutely. Wherever we are: in a 
text where we already believe ourselves to be. (p.
1 6 2 )
To develop further a dialogue between Eastern and Western 
philosophy, it is evident that one has to understand first the 
languages of both traditions, and to be able to "translate" one 
language into the other. A concern with the dialogic allows us to 
move beyond the conversation itself to attend to the conditions o f its 
production. One has to "read" the philosophical problems and 
solutions presented in different traditions and be able to 
conceptualize in one's native system so as to create passages.
Perhaps one beneficial consequence would be a better understanding 
of one's own cultural position. No improvement in self- 
understanding is possible without such discovery and exploration. 
Foucault (1985) reminds us:
There are times in life when the question of knowing 
if  one can think differently than one thinks and 
perceive differently than one sees is absolutely 
necessary if  one is to go on looking and reflecting at 
all. People will say, perhaps, that these games with 
oneself would better be left backstage; or, at best, that 
they might properly form part o f those preliminary
exercises that are forgotten once they have served 
their purpose, (p. 8)
M ichel Serres (1989b) remarks:
A touch of irrationality is a saving grace for us, a 
stroke of luck which gives us some breathing space, a 
loose fit in the machine which makes us alive. Life, 
intelligence, goodness probably came out of this free 
play and this lack of restraint. Leave some ears of 
wheat in the field for the gleaners, he [the farmer] 
said. Perhaps we shall learn one day that the most 
reliable machines leave room for the unexpected, (p. 
1 1 )
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